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
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
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LIMITED WAR:
A MODEL FOR ENTRY, CONDUCT, AND
TERMINATION

by

John M. Pruitt, Jr.

December, 1984

Thesis Advisor:

R.M. Teti

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Limited War: A Model For Entry, Conduct, and Termination

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

→ This thesis presents and tests a model for Entry, Conduct, and Termination of a limited war. Employing the "Focused Comparison" methodology, an attempt is made to relate this "Limited War Model" to a pair of historical case studies. The cases analyzed in this endeavor are the Korean War spanning the years 1950 - 1953 and the Falklands War of 1982. In the former the analysis is concentrated on the decisions of the United States, while the latter deals, primarily with the deliberations of the United Kingdom. The findings of the study are encapsulated in the final chapter.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"It is not an army that we must train for war; it is a nation."

Woodrow Wilson
May 12, 1917

The use of force as an instrument of foreign policy has been the subject of debate and controversy since the dawn of recorded history. This problem, over the years, has been influenced to varying degrees by cultural, philosophical, and political considerations. Today, with the advent of nuclear weapons the appropriate employment of force has become more imperative than ever. This thesis will present a model for the measured use of armed force in a "limited war". Within this context, the Entry, Conduct and Termination phases of such a conflict are each addressed.

The study begins with a general overview of limited war, seeking both a definition for the concept, as well as an explanation for its prevalence in our world today. The model for employing this instrument is then presented and tested using the "Focused Comparison" methodology.¹ In this regard, two cases, the Korean War and the Falklands War, are examined and analyzed. This is followed by an examination of the findings of the research and its impact on the theoretical paradigm herein presented.

¹Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp.43-66.

The examination of war has long been a preoccupation of man. From the days of the "Bronze Age" to the current era of the technological battlefield man has attempted to understand the motives and/or causes of war. Pruitt and Snyder state that three motivational and perceptual concepts are most often associated with the causes of war. They are: 1) goals that can be advanced through war 2) the perception of threat, and 3) hostility toward other states.² While these generalizations are admittedly thought provoking, Pruitt and Snyder also note that they fall far shy of an ideal and integrated theory addressing the causation of war.³ In short, the psychological phenomenon underlying the recurrence of war remains little understood.⁴

Because an understanding of the specific roots of war continue to elude us we necessarily lack the appropriate mechanisms to prevent its continued occurrence. It is this situation that led Morton Halperin to deduce that we must "take seriously the problem of how war, once it erupts, can be kept limited."⁵ Hence, to begin our study, the questions that we must address are: Why and how are wars limited? And, how can we successfully function in an environment of "limited war"? It is the first of these inquiries that we will concern ourselves with in this chapter. The second will be addressed with the presentation of the Limited War Model in the chapter following.

²Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, ed., Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 15.

³Ibid, p. 31.

⁴An example of some of the other attempts at understanding the causes of war are: Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954); E. F. M. Durbin and J. Bawley, Personal Aggressiveness and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); and Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960).

⁵Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 2.

A. LIMITED WAR: OVERVIEW AND DEFINITION

The practice of limited war is as old as man himself. In fact, many would argue that wars have more often been limited than total. However, this statement only has meaning if we agree on a definition for the term limited war, for war rarely seems limited to those whose lives it touches and sometimes destroys. It is in search of this definition that we now turn.

Clausewitz, writing in the 19th century, was familiar with both "limited" and "unlimited" wars, although he never made the distinction. Yet, even he realized that war rarely took its most absolute form. Clausewitz noted that war is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."⁶ Nevertheless, it was also "an act of policy" whose "reason always lies in some political situation" and whose "occasion is always due to some political object."⁷ To Clausewitz, war, as an instrument of national policy, was inseparable from the political goal toward which it was directed. Thus, if the goal(s) toward which war is directed it can be understood and weighed, then possibly they could be categorized into limited and unlimited varieties. In this regard, the study of history sheds some light.

The Third Punic War is often cited as the classical example of an unlimited war. It is also a case where the formulation of objectives affected the type of war pursued. The goal of this conflict, for the eventual winner Rome, was the complete destruction of its rival city-state, Carthage. Even after they were victorious militarily, the Romans insisted on the eradication of all the remaining vestiges of

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.75.

⁷Ibid, pp.86-7.

being made. It is in the face of the necessity for such a decision that the model begins. The model, in its entirety, is presented in Figure 2.1

B. ENTRY

The entry aspect of the Limited War Model is its most crucial phase. It is from the conclusions reached in this period that the guidelines for both the conduct and termination of limited war are derived. It also provides a base toward which the cybernetic loops within in the model can return for processing. The Entry phase therefore provides the foundation upon which the relativity of the judgements taken toward fulfillment of national policy are compared. It is the yardstick to which decisions regarding later assessment of battlefield progress and the accomplishment of objectives must be measured.

Step 1- Clearly establish objectives: a) Political considerations-extent of interest, b) Military considerations-types of forces available.

The first step in the decision toward entry into a limited war must be the clear establishment of objectives. This is imperative at the outset, for the delineation of the purposes toward which force may be applied is essential prior to any consideration of its use. This is nothing more than an adaptation of "Management by Objectives" (MBO) to international decision-making, where the ultimate goal(s) of a manager or organization are established before action is taken.

Management by Objectives, like much administrative theory, has often been subjected to broad interpretation which, in turn, has led to abuse and misuse in actual practice. However, this concept still provides an important and

ambiguity surrounding the concept of the "national interest", it does assume that its interpretation after serious deliberation will result in a relatively clear determination of policy by those in authority. In other words, this model can not correct a deficient reading of the "national interest", but, it does provide a rational format for the decisions surrounding the employment of "limited" force in its furtherance.

While admittedly far from flawless, this effort endeavors to redress what Gregory D. Foster called "<a lack> of a unified 'philosophy of intervention' attuned not only to specific threats and circumstances, but also to the overall, perceptual dimensions of power and posture in an increasingly hostile world, in which the element of demonstrated resolve has been even more significant a deterrent than the military capability."³² It therefore, represents an effort to increase the capability of states to adequately prosecute the types of limited conflicts that history has shown are much more likely to occur and thereby to deter the same. It is felt that this attempt at the development of a coherent and structured decision-making process in the employment of the instrument of limited war will help to fill a strategic void that has heretofore been existent. If proven to be of utility, such an effort not only adds to our ability to pursue our "national interest", but, to the strength of our overall deterrent.

Our discussion will now turn to an understanding of the intrarelationships of the steps within the model itself and its interrelationship with the actual decision-making process. The model assumes a situation (Pre-War Conflict), possibly one of crisis, when a determination concerning the applicability of various national policy instruments is

³²Gregory D. Foster, "On Selective Intervention," Strategic Review, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Fall 1983), p. 48.

II. THE MODEL

A. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter our attention has been on both understanding exactly what "limited war" is and in establishing a theoretic framework upon which a model for its employment can be constructed. This has naturally necessitated a review of some of the previous thought concerning war as an instrument of national policy in the contemporary international environment. It is within this context that a model for Entry, Conduct, and Termination of Limited War will be presented.

As will be seen, this model, finds its primary application below the nuclear threshold. It recognizes that while conflict will always exist in the international arena, there are few instances when the recourse to nuclear weapons for its settlement is appropriate. However, it also acknowledges that even the use of conventional force may be, in some cases, unsuited to either the risks associated with its employment or the goals toward which it is directed. In short, this model offers a process through which decision-makers may assess the applicability of the use of military force to a specific goal and once committed, its progress toward the same.

It is the author's contention that, since the serious consideration of limited war, as a national policy instrument, began in the post-World War II era, a decision-making structure, such as is herein presented, has been lacking from the theoretical study of the self-restricted use of force in the furtherance of the "national interest". Although this study makes no attempt to reconcile the

necessity of a continuing capability to intervene below the nuclear threshold where national interests dictate.

The recent failure of the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon (composed of U.S., U.K., French, and Italian elements) stands in stark contrast to the marginally successful campaigns mentioned above. Here a mismatch of means (symbolic but toothless force deployment) and ends (the disarming of rival militias and establishment of a stable Lebanese government) led to disaster. A mistake that many would argue was also the cause for our failure in Vietnam. It is toward the avoidance of such situations that the model to be presented in the next chapter was constructed and to which it is specifically directed.

Thus, the interlocking constraints on both means and ends mitigate toward the limitation of war. This situation, which cannot be changed, calls for a coherent and rational plan for the use of the instrument of limited war. It is to the development of such a plan that we now proceed.

B. TOWARD A MODEL

We have briefly reviewed some of the early thought on "limited war" and its application to the nuclear age. We have noted that the restrictions of both military means and political ends is almost axiomatic within the current era of international relations. It then behooves us, as a nation, to become adept at the use of "limited force" as an instrument of national policy.

The model presented in the next chapter is an attempt to logically and systematically consider the decisions made before entry and during the conduct and termination of such a conflict. Because these decisions have an obvious and considerable impact on the expectations surrounding the outcome of armed intervention, the method through which they will be addressed should be considered prior to the advent of crisis situations. It is their addressal which establishes the parameters within which the success or failure of each such enterprise will be judged and hence the precedents that will be transmitted into the international environment.

The experience of the last three years have further reinforced the importance of the limited use of force in today's world. The American experience in Grenada, as well as, the Anglo-Argentinian conflict over the Falklands or Malvinas, the continued Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and the French interest in Chad have underscored the

York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1961), p.48.

restriction of the available implements of war through which political objectives may be achieved. This necessarily makes those objectives less ambitious than they might otherwise be. Thus, the main reason for the existence of contemporary limited war is the self-enforced restraint on means. Bernard Brodie put it succinctly: "<...in today's age of nuclear weapons and related sophisticated delivery systems> the restraint to keep wars limited is primarily a restraint on means, not ends."²⁹

However, there is also a pressure to keep wars limited by constraining the ends to be sought through their engagement. This is in relation to the increased need to fight for precedents in a world which can no longer afford recourse to general war. This objective, while not mandating the total defeat of the enemy, does require the perception of some type of military success.

In today's world the battle is as much for the perception of a credible ability to act as in the actual results of our actions. Each policy decision must be weighed not only for its current effect but for the precedent it may set for the future. In this psychological struggle we seek to establish positive precedents and to avoid those that are negative. Morton Halperin states: "When major powers participate in a local war it is because of the expected political effects of doing so and not because of the direct payoff from battlefield success."³⁰ Kissinger notes that the credibility of our deterrent is linked in a very real way to our reputation in the use of our military as instruments of foreign policy or in his words: "...the experience of the last use of force."³¹

²⁹Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.312.

³⁰Halperin, p.4.

³¹Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (New

statement. In fact it can be safely said that in situations short of national survival the role of nuclear weapons conforms closely to the McNamara conceptualization.

However, as has been noted, armed conflict continues as a means to achieve political ends among the actors on the international scene today. In this regard, the discovery and production of nuclear weapons is similar to the use of the longbow by the English at the Battle of Crecy in 1346. It has redefined the scope, strategy, and tactics of war but has not rid the world of its causes.

The "common currency" used to settle those disputes that arise is still power and "the basic measure of a nation's power <remains> its ability to wage war in defense of its interests".²⁶ The implication is not that all disputes should be settled through the vehicle of military power. However, the ability to employ military force is an integral part of what Klaus Knorr called the "power package".²⁷ Included in this are both military and non-military means for the accomplishment of foreign policy objectives. The employment of force is important in this context as both a complement and, in some case, a final method by which the perceived interest of a state can be either advanced or defended.

The practice of war below the "firebreak" between conventional and nuclear weapons is a fact of life within our contemporary international structure.²⁸ As exercised today by nuclear armed powers, this requires a severe

²⁶Osgood, p. 19.

²⁷Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 15.

²⁸The "firebreak" concept, analogous to the slowdown in decision-making prior to the crossing of the nuclear threshold, was first used by Alain C. Enthoven in 1963. For a model of this idea see Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 107-8.

Why has limited war become so prevalent in our world today? Two reasons stand out: 1) the emergence, proliferation, and fear of the use of nuclear weapons, and 2) the continuing inability of nation-states to settle their differences short of armed conflict. This is particularly true of the great or nuclear powers who must carefully measure their response to any and every conflict, for most experts agree that the greatest chance for nuclear conflict lies in the catalyst of miscalculation. Yarmolinsky and Foster call this the "paradox of limited response" whereby a great power must be careful "to limit its military objectives so as not to escalate to general nuclear war."²³

Both the aversion to the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of war and their inability to deter the same have been amply demonstrated since their dual use in the summer of 1945. Although hundreds of nuclear weapons have been detonated for test purposes in the intervening period there is not a single verifiable instance of their use in armed conflict since the destruction of the Japanese industrial city of Nagasaki. Admittedly, some of these nuclear tests might be classified as coercive diplomacy.²⁴ Yet overall, these weapons are perceived as held only to deter their use by other states. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: "...nuclear weapons serve no purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless--except only to deter one's opponent from using them."²⁵ The history of the nuclear age has not disproven the ex-Secretary's

²³Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster, Paradoxes of Power (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1983), p.4.

²⁴The atmospheric detonation of at least thirteen weapons by the Soviet Union over a twenty-five day period in September 1961, as a backdrop to the crisis surrounding the construction of the Berlin Wall, is a good example of this.

²⁵Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, p.79.

know it today, in perspective. That is, a conflict fought entirely under the nuclear threshold yet, one which could include the possibility of a nuclear threat. As Kahn wrote, such a war, in conjunction with the Kennedy Administration's adoption of Taylor's "flexible response", was going on in the tiny Asian country of Vietnam.

It was the American experience in Vietnam that forced a theoretical reconsideration of the use of limited force in the furtherance of the national interest. The failure to properly employ the instrument of limited war was wrongly perceived, by many, as a repudiation of the instrument itself. Yet, the emerging nuclear parity of the superpowers still propelled the United States toward the limitation of the use of force in its relations with the outside world. In short, the theoreticians were in a quandary. Few dared to advocate the course of limited war after the debacle in Vietnam.²¹

Yet, wars which were limited in scope continued to be quite numerous. In the years 1945-1969 Seymour Deitchman found forty-six instances of limited war. Furthermore, in all but three of these cases there was some form of "Third Power" involvement, though only twenty-one included the actual employment of outside military force. In the fifteen years that have transpired since Deitchman's study it can be safely asserted that the number of both incidents and related military interventions have increased rather substantially.²²

²¹For one of the more balanced views stemming from this period see: Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnams? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

²²Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 16-7, 272.

scenarios, it would only be "in comparatively rare cases where their use would be in our national interest."¹⁶ To reserve the ability to continue to function successfully in an environment where, he felt, the utility of nuclear weapons was waning, Taylor suggested the strategy of "flexible response". This would include several "quick fixes", the first and foremost of which would be "improved planning and training for limited war."¹⁷ To implement this strategy Taylor suggested the creation of a joint service staff, to be known as the Limited War Command, which could plan for the rapid movement and employment of conventional forces in contingency situations.¹⁸

Scholarly work on limited war continued through the 1960's. In 1965 Herman Kahn published his well-known work On Escalation. In this book he called a limited conflict an "agreed battle" and put forward a step-by-step progression that extended from a disagreement or cold war to a spasm or insensate war.¹⁹ This escalation ladder (44 steps in all) pictured a continuum of conflict yet, also acknowledged that there were thresholds which separated the escalation of the use of force into recognizable sections. Among these was the nuclear threshold which segregated the wholesale employment of conventional from nuclear weapons and also included "Large Scale Conventional War" as a distinct possibility.²⁰ Though Kahn's purpose was to demonstrate the logical progression of escalation, his work put limited war, as we

¹⁶Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 145-146.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 139.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 143.

¹⁹Kahn credits Max Singer with the first use of the term "agreed battle".

²⁰The entire Kahn Escalation Ladder (steps 1-44) can be found in Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965) p. 39.

principle of welding the employment of force to its political goal. Two works, authored by Henry Kissinger and Robert Endicott Osgood respectively, stand out in this era.

In his classic Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger advocated the strengthening of the connection of politics to military action. To him, a limited war was a conflict "fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be obtained."¹⁴ Osgood, whose book, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, received almost as much attention as Kissinger's delineated a similar theme. He stressed the use of "economy of force" in the implementation of national policy. Osgood described this as "no greater force...employed than is necessary to achieve the objective toward which it is directed."¹⁵

As a result of these works a tremendous amount of material was produced addressing the possibilities of limited war. Though much of it was addressed to the nuclear scenario, there were exceptions. Maxwell Taylor's An Uncertain Trumpet was one of these.

Taylor's work, while primarily intended as a refutation of the current doctrine of "massive retaliation", nevertheless, included comments on limited war. While acknowledging the need for nuclear weapons to use in cases of national survival (which he defined as an actual or incoming atomic attack on the continental United States or a major attack on Western Europe) he asserted that on conventional weapons would necessarily rest the primary dependence for countering all other "forms of military operations." Though tactical nuclear weapons might eventually be used even in these

¹⁴Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 75.

¹⁵Osgood, p. 18.

these wars was so enormous they were virtually unlimited in both means and ends. They were, in fact, total. It was only the explosion of the atomic bombs at the end the second of these conflicts that reoriented the thrust of war because it realigned the calculus of useable means and obtainable ends on the battlefield.

This change was, at first, not readily apparent. Though B. H. Liddell- Hart had warned as early as 1946 that, "<u>nlimited warfare as we have known it in the past thirty years is not compatible with the atomic age" this was not reflected in early post-war planning.¹⁰ As an example, HALFMOON, the U.S. plan for war against the Soviet Union dated July 21, 1948, called for "an air offensive against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity" and noted that the "assumption is made that authority to employ atomic weapons has been obtained."¹¹ This strategic blueprint reflected total confidence in the American nuclear monopoly, whereby the U.S. could use these weapons without fear of reprisal in kind. This situation was abruptly changed when the U.S.S.R., in 1949, joined the "nuclear club".

The explosion of the Soviet "bomb" and the experience of the Korean War, a conflict that was very much limited in both means and eventually ends,¹² generated a large outgrowth of limited war theory in the late 1950's.¹³ Most of this material stressed a return to the Clausewitzian

¹⁰B. H. Liddell-Hart, "War, Limited," Harper's, Vol. 192, No. 1150, March 1946, p.200.

¹¹"JCS 1844/3: Brief of Short Range Emergency War Plan" reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p.320.

¹²The Korean War will be analyzed in detail in Chapters 4-6.

¹³An excellent annotated bibliography of the literature pertaining to limited war in this period can be found in Halperin, pp.133-184. It includes 343 entries.

We see that war may be limited as a result of a restraint of ends or means. It would follow that it also may be limited as a result of the combination of both. But, why is limited war employed in our contemporary era? It is to the answer of this query that we now turn.

The last two hundred years have seen a growth in the totality of war. The convergence of two phenomenon help explain this trend. The mixture of technological advances in war which made the scope of destruction more widespread and concurrently less manageable, along with the advent and growth of nationalism and the raising and employment of "citizen armies" spelled a new age of unrestricted warfare. This change was foreshadowed by the Napoleonic Wars where the co-development of an efficient machinery of war and the "citizen-soldier" of France almost succeeded in dominating the European continent and ushered in a twenty-five year period of unlimited war.

Historically, one could trace this change to the declaration made in June 1789 by the National Assembly of France, which spoke for the Third Estate or "bourgeoisie", that it now represented the "national will" of the state. As a result of this statement and similar developments that followed, the pursuit of war would, ultimately, no longer be connected with the goals of individual rulers or monarchs, which were often limited, but, with the survival and will of a nation. (One might recall that this was also the case in Rome during the Punic Wars.) Thus, the wars of the French Republic and its extension, the Napoleonic Empire, with the French soldier fighting for himself and his nation through a well-oiled military machine, were unlimited in both their means employed and ends sought.

Both the world wars of this century were also caught up in this convergence. They, in a very real way, were battles for the life and death of nations. Because the stakes of

Carthage.⁸ So efficient were the Romans at this task that the term "Carthaginian Peace" is now synonymous with the pursuit of the total annihilation of the enemy. This war exhibits clearly one of the factors on which the classification of a war as limited or unlimited can be judged, the extent of the aims or goals in the conflict by the respective belligerents. Thus, the formulation of "the ends" toward which a war is directed help to distinguish its variety.

Another historical example helps to point out the other factor in the equation from which the categorization of war is derived. In this regard, the wars of the 18th century offer a good case for examination. The value of these conflicts lies in the fact that they are often mentioned as paramount examples of limited war. Robert Endicott Osgood notes that warfare in this era "was conducted so as to interfere with the lives of the civilian population--and especially the merchants--as little as possible and so as to conserve the soldiery as much as possible."⁹ In these conflicts the implements of war were actually constrained so that the level of violence was noticeably reduced. Though the extent and scope of violence is not the primary factor on which one would classify a conflict as limited or total it is, nevertheless, indicative of something that is more important, the employment of the means of war. Therefore, the wars of the 18th century were limited principally because there was a constraint on the resources devoted to their pursuit. In this circumstance, the wars were limited due to a restraint on means.

⁸Salt was actually sown on top of the ruins of the defeated city to assure it would never arise again.

⁹Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p.64.




Figure 2.1 Limited War Model.

effectual orientation toward both task accomplishment and problem solving. The key to the exercise of MBO is understand that it forms a conceptual framework through which one can view the task of management vice a systematic process for its accomplishment. The author's preference is for the definition of MBO advocated by Karl Albrecht:

"Management by Objectives is ...an observable pattern of behavior on the part of a manager, characterized by studying the anticipated future, determining what payoff conditions to bring about for that anticipated future, and guiding the efforts of the people of the organization so that they accomplish those objectives."³³

The merit of such an outlook is that it focuses the decision-maker on the "big picture" making he/she and therefore his/her state an active rather than reactive force when confronted with possible conflict. This is obviously the point from which anyone would want to approach the process of decision-making, as well as, crisis management.

A caution is also relevant here. Political authorities should avoid the "pie-in-the-sky" theory of goal construction. Objectives should be firmly grounded within the confines of the achievable. There should be a clear understanding that no panaceas exist in the realm of international relations, yet, a sharp focus on what realistically can be done begins the establishment of a structure within which decisions can be made and their results subsequently judged.

The initial consideration in this regard must always be the relationship of the impending conflict to the current and long-term political atmosphere. Included in such a deliberation are geostrategic, ideological, cultural, social and, if considered applicable, moral issues that are

³³Karl Albrecht, Successful Management By Objectives (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978) p.20.

relevant to the actual situation or the precedent that it will invariably set. It is at this point that an interpretation of the "national interest" by the decision-makers comes into play; a reading that is, without a doubt, critical to any further action. Those tasked with such a responsibility must be sensitive to both the international and domestic arena in which their actions will eventually be played out. They must safeguard both the viability of their instruments of national policy and the role or position of their state in future world affairs. This is a charge that would appear at first glance to be "eye watering" but that, in truth, is far from hopeless. A crucial point that should always be kept in mind is the Clausewitzian precept subordinating the pursuit of war or conflict to politics. While there will always be issues worth fighting for, war should never be viewed as self-fulfilling.

The other consideration taken in the establishment of objectives is an examination of the specific indigenous force structure available to employ toward their possible accomplishment on the field of combat. There is a distinct possibility that the type of action dictated by a study of a particular situation may be outside the current capabilities of the actual military units available for employment. Although such a contingency would signal a distinct inadequacy in prior force planning, it would, nevertheless, be quite pertinent to any future decision surrounding the use of force in the furtherance of national policy. This assessment, made early on, begins the matching of means and ends that becomes of primary concern in any attempt to successfully prosecute a limited war. If forces are, in fact, not available, then the use of another policy instrument or the suspension of action until they can be acquired through alliance or internal development seems prescribed.

Once both political and military considerations have been consolidated the finalization of objectives can be accomplished. This aggregation should result in the setting of goals that are both meaningful in light of the "national interest" and attainable in regard to available resources. Once this process has been completed the attention of the decision-maker can be directed to Step 2.

Step 2- Do the accomplishment of your objectives require the use of force?

This question would appear to find its roots in the Western cultural tendency to view the use of force to accomplish one's goals only as a last resort. While this would seem to skew the model toward utilization by only "Western oriented" states, such is not the case. The Leninist interpretation of Marxist doctrine, although viewing conflict as inevitable, also sees the employment of force as a final measure. Though probably less hesitant than their Western counterparts to use force (a debatable point that is beyond the scope of this study) their picture of history through the prism of dialectical materialism allows them to forgo overt military action and literally allow nature to take its course. Hence, this query is relevant, to a degree, to any state that is considering entry into a limited war.

Phrasing this step a little differently in an attempt to shed more light on its significance, we might say: If our objectives can be accomplished short of the actual use of force then that is the road we will take. However, if force is necessary to assure their realization then we are ready to proceed with our consideration regarding its possible use. In the former case, it could be that the exercise of some other policy instrument (diplomatic signalling, increased military presence, etc.) would, at least initially, be more appropriate to the situation at hand.

However, in the latter instance, either the earlier attempt to reconcile the conflict below the Armed Hostility threshold has failed/is failing, or the use of tools other than the active utilization of military forces was considered incompatible with the current circumstances. Once this judgement is made we may then either: 1) forswear the use of force by returning to the realm of Pre-War Conflict or, 2) proceed with an analysis of the level of "risk" that we are willing to bear in regard to the possibility of armed intervention.

Step 3- Consider your opponent and his current or potential allies: a) Do you have the political will (resolve) to out perform your opponent(s) in a "competition in risk-taking"? b) Do you have the military means to out perform your opponent(s) in a "competition in risk-taking"?

After completing the considerations that effect the establishment of realistic objectives and arriving at the determination that these goals may require the use of force, the decision-maker(s) must direct their efforts to a "net assessment" of their capabilities for the successful employment of force relative to that of their opponent(s). Such an examination must go beyond the scope of a mere "bean count" of men and material and first compare the "resolve" of the two or more states or coalitions that are in conflict. An analysis of the psychological factor of resolve or will is not easy to conduct of oneself, much less of one's opponent. Yet, a look at just what you and your opponent are willing to hazard to achieve the accomplishment of your respective goals is a beginning toward the accomplishment of this task. It necessarily requires not only the establishment of your own objectives (a process we have already covered) but, a perception of the goals of your opponent. Such an analysis consolidates the cultural,

historical, ideological, and political attributes of one's opposition at both the national and individual decision-maker levels.

This task has traditionally been performed by intelligence services, individual analysts working directly for the political authorities, or by the political authorities themselves. However, the final result of this assessment, regardless of the preparer, should result in a meaningful estimate of the comparative stakes between the two opposing parties in the current situation. If nothing else, the ultimate parameters within which force will continue to be employed (.i.e how far will you go?) must be established.

In the model the term "competition in risk-taking" is used to describe the gamble inherent in the escalatory process that forms an undercurrent beneath any decision to actively use armed force for the furtherance of national policy.³⁴ Herman Kahn used this concept to define the essence of "a typical escalation situation" where the comparison of resolve, "and a matching of...resources, <lead to> some form of limited conflict between two sides."³⁵ While Kahn was attempting to provide the basis for his construction of a comprehensive "escalation ladder", our interest is to a specific range of escalation, namely, the limited use of armed force below the nuclear threshold. It is an assessment of our will to out perform our opponent in this realm of the escalation continuum or the eventual decision to crossover into an unlimited or total war that is of interest in this model.

³⁴The conception of escalation as a "competition in risk-taking" was first put in print by Herman Kahn. He gives Thomas Schelling credit for the phrase. See: Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p.3.

³⁵Ibid.

To take our analysis one step further, the comparative estimate of the factor of national will must be extended beyond that of our current opponent to the actual or potential allies that it may recruit. This situation is usually very relevant to the considerations surrounding entry into a limited war, for often the actual conflict will be prosecuted against a proxy or dependent state of a larger power. It is within these circumstances that the extension of the analysis of relative resolve beyond that of one's direct military opposition must be undertaken. Such a step is dictated by prudence if nothing else, yet, its addressal can frequently provide guidance that is crucial to later policy development.

When the decision-maker(s) can assure themselves that they possess the psychological intangibles necessary to back the employment of military force for the accomplishment of national policy, an actual comparison of military potential between the two competitors can be made. It is fitting that this assessment should follow that of comparative resolve because any policy mandating the use of military force, however physically powerful, not backed by a matching political will is doomed to stillbirth. Again, this estimate of capability must include your opponent's actual or potential allies.

The heart of this analysis is a comparison of both the quantitative and qualitative factors that, when aggregated, form an appraisal of relative military capability. Although numbers become understandably more important in this area other variables such as readiness, training, and morale should be given substantial weight. Intervening factors including location of forces to the possible theatre of operations, prior force commitments, mobilization potential, and the whole myriad of logistical support questions must also be considered. Again, this analysis could be conducted

by any number of organizations or individuals. However, the final product must provide a timely and meaningful estimate of comparative military potential. Since such assessments can rarely be generated without bias during crisis situations they are best conducted on a periodic basis in the guise of peacetime contingency planning and given frequent review. If this is competently accomplished estimates can be quickly updated as circumstances warrant.

Once completed, the examination of the relative capability of a state to out perform its opponent in a "competition in risk-taking" on both the mental and physical level can be synthesized. The product of this process should give the decision-maker(s) an adequate indicator of their state's individual ability to engage in military conflict, under the current circumstances. If this analysis tilts in their favor then the active employment of military forces may begin. But, if this appraisal reveals a shortcoming in the ability to accept the risks associated with overt intervention then an attempt must be made to enhance the relative escalatory capability of the state. This can only be done, in the short-term, through the recruitment of allies.

Step 4- Recruit allies.

The engagement of allies is a sensible step that would be taken by almost any state before entering into military conflict. In fact, it is a move that might well be taken by those nations who already believe they possess the ability to out perform their potential opposition, as well as, those who do not. However, it is readily more apparent that this would be a much more important undertaking for those in the latter situation than for those in the former.

In the model, the terms ally, allies, and alliance are used with a much broader connotation than the classical meaning of these concepts. While the traditional definition

of an "alliance" would indicate the execution of formal pacts, treaties, or agreements that provide for the mutual security of the parties involved, the idea as used in our context, is considerably more open. The model's utilization of this term and its derivatives includes not only classical alliances, but also both political and military support in instances where security considerations between two states may momentarily, though not permanently, coincide. Such support may begin at the level of mere diplomatic backing and extend to full scale joint military cooperation. In this way, the perception of alliances falls in step with the employment of limited military force. That is, the signaling associated with constrained, though positive, international support is more meaningful in an environment of a war engaged in for limited ends employing limited means than in a situation of total or unrestrained conflict. Whatever the situation, any addition to one's alliance structure adds to the overall political and military potential to successfully engage in a limited war.

The search for political and military support on a worldwide scale is crucial to most decisions to enter limited wars. Few states feel that they can "go it alone" in such a situation for the costs, both real and opportunity, of this type of conflict may be exorbitant. Although allies can help to spread the expense of such an action, their recruitment is often a double-edged sword. This is especially true when their support is given contingent to a modification or further restriction of the objectives of the conflict that is more in line with their particular interests. Such trade-offs must be carefully weighed at this early stage so as to determine the utility of any expected support relative to its price. Analysis of these considerations is imperative from the outset for the successful implementation of the limited war instrument. This is true

because, while alignment represents the only significant short-term vehicle for the augmentation of one's capabilities, its unrestricted utilization may undercut the very objective toward which the use of force was initially considered.

Once the road of alliance has been considered and subsequently accepted or rejected the ultimate decision point on whether or not to enter a limited war has been reached. A comprehensive aggregation of one's psychological and material resources along with those of your allies may be stacked against those of the opposing coalition. From this analysis, an assessment concerning movement toward or away from the Armed Hostility threshold may be made. Once crossed, one's effort must necessarily be directed to the Conduct phase of limited war.

C. CONDUCT

The Conduct phase of the Limited War Model is concerned with the fruitful implementation of the decision to utilize force in the furtherance of national policy. Our interest in this area will be with the actual operationalization of the predetermined objectives of the intervention into the reality of the battlefield. A method of conducting a limited war is also included in the model. Termed "selective intervention", this technique stresses the exploitation of technological advantages and an emphasis on mobility, speed, and the use of specially trained/elite forces. We begin our discussion with the initial step after penetrating the Armed Hostility threshold, the matching of ends and means.

Step 5- Match your objectives to your available means:

- a) Give due regard to the type and setting of the war,
- b) Develop indicators signaling movement toward and ultimate accomplishment of objectives.

The mating of objectives and means is predominantly a military task. It entails the dispatch and employment of the proper force structure and the implementation or development of suitable tactics for the mission at hand. This job should be undertaken with full cognizance of any limitations or constraint that were envisioned by the political authorities when the decision was made to enter the war.

We saw in Step 3 that an assessment of comparative military capabilities was necessary before conflict entry. One would hope that such an analysis included the inputs of the military establishment before finalized. If so, this initiates the cooperation between the civilian and uniformed authorities so vital to the successful conduct of limited war. From this beginning, plans for the actual employment of force should begin.

In this regard, there must be a concerted effort to consider both the type and setting of the war and its effect on the utilization of the available force structure. If the American experience in Vietnam proved anything, it was that a barrage of men, money, and material is not the answer to every strategic problem. Specific force employment in limited war takes a mixture of a knowledge of: your enemy, his "modus operandi", and your capability to counter the same; your preferred "modus operandi", its applicability to the current conflict, and your ability to adapt it as necessary to the developing tactical and strategic situation; and finally, your ability to force your enemy to engage you in a realm where you hold a potential escalatory advantage. Of course, all this must be tempered by geographic and seasonal considerations (deserts, jungles, mountains, monsoons, snow/ice, etc.) that could effect both your own and your enemy's battlefield capabilities.

One might note that these considerations are not only applicable to limited war but, to total war as well. What

then is the difference between the waging of these two types of conflict? This query takes us back to the contemporary definition of limited war itself. That is, a war utilizing limited means and hence directed toward the achievement of only limited ends. Its answer is found in an examination of some of the actual restrictions often associated with the instrument of limited war.

These constraints may have a substantive impact on the resources available to the commander in the field for employment in actual combat or it may saddle him with "Rules of Engagement" (ROE) that severely restrict the scope or arena in which forces may be employed. However, regardless of the limits that may be placed on the utilization of military power, the field commander is still faced with the reality of death and destruction on the battlefield. He still must contend with the requirement of mission accomplishment with the resources of, what will probably be, a less than fully mobilized national warmaking potential. All of this could well be taking place in an aroused international atmosphere where the coherence of political and military alliances that are crucial to the eventual success of his state in the limited war could well be at stake. The combined mastery of the violence of the battlefield and the subtleties of international relations and image projection is the task that many a military commander has found so daunting in the current era. Yet, the reality of the needed capability to, as necessary, employ limited military force remains a unshakable characteristic of the contemporary international environment. Therefore, military commanders must be ready and able to operate coolly and decisively in a context of politically mandated restraint.

To overcome this hurdle takes the cooperation of both the civilian and military leadership. The easiest method by which the adequate matching of means and ends may be

encouraged is the development of a broad spectrum of force employment options for utilization in limited war. Such a menu would range from the use of small counterinsurgency units to the employment of air strikes, conventionally armed cruise missiles, and/or large commitments of ground forces as dictated by the tactical situation and the "interest" involved. Such a selection offers the decision-maker(s) a much needed flexibility in the conduct of limited war in both the escalation and victory denial scenarios.

Another important concern early on in the Conduct phase, is the conceptualization of indicators which will signal both movement toward and eventually the accomplishment of one's goals in limited war. The development of these signs should not be taken lightly and their adequacy and validity should be quickly established. In fact, their generation should begin as soon as the type of force structure that is to be used in the conflict has been determined and the initial direction of the conflict has been set. Although the indicator may be as simple as a military advance to a predetermined geographic line or point, or as complex as the current state of quantitative analysis will allow, it should be well understood by both the political authorities that approved the initial entry into the conflict and the military leaders whose success will be judged by its usage. A periodic reexamination of these indicator(s) and their relationship to the ultimate objectives of the intervention would seem wise, if not, mandatory.

Albert Clarkson deals peripherally with this subject in his discussion of some of the problems of measuring "real effectiveness" in strategic analysis. While he is well aware that the strategic analyst (or in our case decision-maker) must concern himself primarily with the future, the pursuit of a meaningful "post mortem" which will distinguish the "real effectiveness" of prior policy decisions from

their "estimated or apparent effectiveness" is critical to actual or continued success. This process includes hurdling numerous epistemological barriers to develop a framework for the analytical examination of actual vice perceived results. Clarkson suggests the adaptation of some current and soon to be available information technology advances to speed and enhance this task.³⁶ However, regardless of the technique employed, the assessment of indicator validity and, later on, progress toward objectives through some sort of "post mortem" analysis is indispensable to the conduct and eventual termination of a limited war.

While changes due to this "post mortem" process remain a possibility, they should never be entered into blithely. Such an alteration dictates a thorough analysis of the reasons for the inadequacy or invalidity of the former indicator, an effort that could necessitate revisiting the actual decision on intervention. Attention must also be given to cross-referencing the results of later periods to the earlier time, when different indicators were in use, for the evaluation of the trends within the conflict. In light of these issues it would seem that the simpler indicators, with clear cut ties to the ultimate goals of the intervention, the less the likelihood that it would later be discarded as invalid or unusable. This is a consideration that the developers of such indicators should be well aware of.

Step 6- Utilize "selective intervention". Stress:

a) Technological superiority; b) Speed/ mobility; c) Specially trained/elite forces, and d) Joint service operations.

³⁶Albert Clarkson, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981). See specifically Chapter 3- "Strategic Analysis Measures," pp.21-80.

that history repeats itself and that those who fail to benefit from its lessons are ultimately doomed to failure.

Dealing with history has never been easy. Almost twenty-five years ago Robert L. Heilbroner wrote:

"<The> recurring surprises and shocks of contemporary history throw a pall of chronic apprehensiveness over our times...We feel ourselves beleaguered by happenings which seem not only malign and intransigent, but unpredictable. We are at a loss to know how to anticipate the events the future may bring or how to account for those events once they have happened...At bottom our troubled state of mind reflects an inability to see the future in an historic context. If the current events strike us as all surprise and shock it is because we cannot see these events in a meaningful framework. If the future seems to us a kind of limbo, a repository of endless surprises, it is because we no longer see it as the expected culmination of the past, as the growing edge of the present. More than anything else, our disorientation before the future reveals a loss of our historic identity, an incapacity to grasp our historic situation. Unlike our forefathers who lived very much in history and for history, we ourselves appear to be adrift in an historic void."³

Some would assert that Heilbroner's statement is just as applicable today as it was when he wrote it in the early 1960's. Can we then hope to tame the animal of history and extract its lessons for future use or are we forever doomed to be confused and bewildered behind the historical power curve? It is this author's belief that history can be used as an invaluable tool in discernment of trends, and sometimes axioms, for use in the conduct and implementation of policy. However, such a utilization cannot be undertaken without some qualification and care.

That the study of history offers some interesting insights is readily apparent. Again, in the words of Shafer:

³Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future As History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 14-15.

III. METHCDOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Before we begin our testing and evaluation of the Limited War Model the methodological structure upon which our study will be built needs to be established. Since the ultimate purpose of this study is to draw "lessons from history" through the analysis of case studies, the specific technique which will be employed is that of the "Focused Comparison" developed by Alexander L. George.⁴¹ This methodology offers several advantages in such an undertaking which will be covered shortly, but, first a word about the applicability and use of historical evidence.

B. USING HISTORY

The term history, as is herein used, refers to the record or account of events and actions of the past. Although subject to bias and multiple interpretation, based on the background and/or perspective of the historiographer, the rationale for its continued study rests in its ability to add to the individual human experience. In the words of Robert Jones Shafer: "<Its study gives> the single human being an understanding that men and women many times in the history of the race have confronted similar problems."⁴² This thought mirrors the oft reiterated conventional wisdom

⁴¹Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

⁴²Robert Jones Shafer, ed., A Guide to Historical Method, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1980) p.2.

that the model is offered and it is within a similar vein
that it will soon be tested.

initial goals for which the war was fought or from the ongoing conduct of military operations.

Conflict termination can be either negotiated or dictated based on the actual or mutually perceived strategic/tactical situation. It may be stalled so as to gain a more advantageous political or military conclusion. Conversely, it can be speeded, as we have already discussed, through nuclear or conventional escalation. Such decisions are always within the purview of those who are tasked with the interpretation of the "national interest" and its relationship to the ongoing conflict. Each should be undertaken with full cognizance of its effect on both the objectives sought in the current use of the limited war instrument and the impact it will have on the use of that tool in the future.

E. SUMMATION

In this chapter a model for the employment of limited war has been presented. Its three specific phases--Entry, Conduct, and Termination--have been closely described and discussed. The model attempts to provide a coherent decision-making flow for those responsible for considerations regarding the limited use of force. In the following chapters we will test the model for its applicability and utility against the barometer of history.

The model's central theme is its demand that objectives and goals be realistically set before wholesale entry into a conflict and that they remain the guiding force in subsequent decisions relating to its conduct and termination. Without a clear reading and understanding of goals the decision-maker who would enter a limited war becomes like the blind man examining an elephant, destined to make mistakes. It is toward the avoidance of such a contingency

take.⁴⁰ In our case, war termination is dictated by the capability and will of one side to carry the conflict across the nuclear threshold. It differs from the previous situation where the nuclear monopoly was employed because, in this latter circumstance, the attacker would be still seeking to restrict the use of force to the minimum necessary for the accomplishment of objectives.

The second situation where the nuclear threshold would not be permanently crossed is when one's opponent or his allies possess nuclear weapons and neither side feels that the ongoing conflict bears the weight of "national interest" necessary to drive its conduct toward total war. In this scenario the expected value of any escalation across the nuclear threshold would be minimal and hence the reasons for the original limitation of the war itself would still be in place. Both sides would attempt to employ other instruments, both military and diplomatic to position themselves for the "best bargain available" in eventual termination. Of course, as discussed earlier, this circumstance leaves open the avenues of goal reappraisal, ally recruitment and/or conventional escalation.

Step 10- Negotiate or dictate conflict termination.

This is the final step in the Limited War Model. All the efforts expended in the earlier Entry and Conduct phases find their ultimate focus in this final effort at successful conflict resolution. Any success stemming from the limited war battlefield is meaningless until converted into a mutually accepted agreement which formalizes its results. The negotiating effort required in this regard may last as long as the war itself but, it can never be separated from the

⁴⁰Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 71-2.

the perceived disutility of these weapons as actual war-making instruments, already mentioned in the first chapter, that has resulted in the contemporary emphasis on the utilization of the limited war instrument. Hence, the one-sided use of nuclear armament, while always a possibility, will continue to be considered only as a last resort and then only in situations of extreme "national interest".

The second scenario in which a state might permanently cross the nuclear threshold would be in the circumstance of a decision to disregard the original determination to limit the scope or scale of the war and to escalate the conflict into the realm of total unrestricted war. Though such a conflict has its own range of "competition in risk-taking" accompanied by political and diplomatic signals which, in theory, would be similar to that of limited conventional war, the probable extent and scope of destruction and the past inviolability of the nuclear threshold dictate it as an entity that must be treated separately. Therefore, within the model one method of terminating a limited war is to make it a total war.

There are also two limited war termination scenarios when the nuclear threshold would not be crossed permanently or, in most instances, at all. The first of these is again the case of the one-sided monopoly of nuclear weapons. In this situation nuclear coercion could be employed to finalize or dictate conflict termination. Such an employment might only take the form of a nuclear threat or could involve the use of a "demonstration shot(s)" similar to the American destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. This usage conforms well with Thomas Schelling's conception of "compellence" as a means by which actions can be used to persuade one's opponent(s) to conform to the course of conduct that one would have them

may also provide an avenue through which a semblance of battlefield initiative might be maintained. The tactical commander must use this "break" in large-scale operations to reprovision his forces for the continuation of offensive operations should such a course be dictated by subsequent inaction in conflict termination.

Step 9- Does opponent possess nuclear weapons?

This query, which forms the basis of any escalation beyond the range of conventional weaponry stemming from a negative response to Step 7a,³⁹ marks one of the two end rungs of the Limited War Model. Its answer could well determine if the crossing of the nuclear threshold is a step toward total war or an effort to persuade one's enemy that the range of escalatory "risk" now exceeds his capability to respond in kind. The model assumes that such an inquiry would not be considered unless it was felt that the consequence inherent in the outcome, of what had initially been conceived as a limited war, dictated its necessity.

Though the nuclear threshold can theoretically be crossed at any time, its permanent breach is actually consonant with only two circumstances. The first and by far the more preferable, is when the use of nuclear weapons gives the user an unmatched escalatory advantage over the opposing forces. This is escalation in risk-taking extended to an arena where there is, in fact, no commensurate danger and implies that there may have been a hardening of the position of the nuclear armed power toward the final aims of the conflict. However, while these weapons are the ultimate trump card in such a situation, their use appeals to few decision-makers because of the precedent that it would set for the conduct of future international relations. It is

³⁹Step 7a asked the question: Is progress with conventional forces acceptable?

no prevailing reason for the war to be continued. Conversely, if the limited employment of force has failed to adequately pursue or defend the "national interest", as interpreted, then the possibility of escalation to general war may be dictated. Both of these alternatives will be addressed as we look at the Termination phase of the Limited War Model.

Step 8- Slow or terminate offensive operations.

This step is the rational follow-on to the accomplishment of previously developed goals. It alerts one's opponent that a possible end to armed hostility could be at hand. Such a slowdown should also be accompanied by the appropriate diplomatic signalling that could lead toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

A couple of cautions are also relevant in regard to this step. First, the ability to quickly resume active or offensive operations should never be compromised by moves toward a negotiated settlement. This is because the leverage created by military pressure may, during the course of arbitration, prove critical to the conclusion of a beneficial agreement. Therefore, military readiness may be kept sharp until the complete and formal conclusion of the conflict is reached.

Secondly, field commanders should always be given the leeway to ensure the safety of their units even though possibly forced to surrender the tactical initiative. Orders pertaining to troop deployments and rules of engagement during a period of truce, ceasefire, and/or negotiation must give adequate consideration to the tactical situation. Terrain considerations, logistical support, and unit emplacement should be considered in concert to maintain force morale and keep casualties low. Continued use of the techniques of "selective intervention" on a limited scale

speeding war termination should also include an examination of the signal it sends in light of the original objectives of the conflict. While a useful lever in any negotiating process this type of escalation should never be employed until it is absolutely necessary. This is only good psychology, for the anticipation of bad tasting medicine is usually much worse than its actual effect.

This ends the discussion of the Conduct phase of the Limited War Model. In our examination we have seen how the goals and restrictions agreed upon in the Entry phase can be translated into effectual combat action within the spirit of a less than total national commitment to war. It is to the methods for ending this conflict that we will now devote our efforts.

D. TERMINATION

Limited wars are inherently harder to end than general wars. Since they are rarely, if ever, waged in pursuit of an unconditional surrender of the opposing coalition that one faces, the point at which termination should be sought is much less apparent than the goal of a "Carthaginian peace" often associated with total war. In fact, in many instances limited wars, due to the very reason(s) for their pursuit, may have no clear-cut winner or loser in the purely military sense. However, because these conflicts are so intertwined with political and/or military considerations that forced their limitation, they may be terminated at points far short of those attempted in total war.

The conclusion of a limited war becomes apparent in two ways. The first, is the achievement of the objectives of the conflict as determined in the Entry phase or as subsequently modified as the intervention progresses. Without question, once these goals have been attained there remains

Another path that also requires back-tracking through the decision-making process is a search for allies after the entry into conflict. Like the redefinition of objectives, this action is usually an attempt to redress a current or anticipated strategic inequality. Great care must be taken in the recruitment of allies at this point for the cost of their entry could well be substantial. However, although subject to increased reservation and contingency sensitivity their possible entry could be the thread upon which continued prosecution of the limited war hangs.

Another alternative available to the decision-maker frustrated with the progress of a limited war is the road of escalation. This can follow either the nuclear or conventional path. Since nuclear escalation brings the belligerents very close to total war it will be discussed within the Termination phase of the model. Our attention presently will then be devoted to conventional escalation.

The consideration of conventional escalation in a situation of strategic or tactical dissatisfaction brings into question the implementation of the technique of "selective intervention" to date in the conflict. If progress is insufficient obviously its employment needs adaptation or reinvigoration. A consideration of forces available for and "risk" inherent in escalation, just as undertaken in the original Entry phase, must be addressed. This is a joint task of both the political and military leadership. As always, the ultimate objective(s) of the conflict and the total "risk" considered appropriate for their accomplishment must be of primary importance. Any inertia created by the ongoing conduct of the war itself should be disregarded. Yet, questions concerning precedent establishment, deterrent impact, and national prestige are fair game and must be weighted in accordance with the specific circumstances. Consideration of conventional escalation as a means for

This step represents what should be a continual process of self-critique and introspection regarding the progress of the intervention toward the policy goals that were set at the onset of the conflict. This analysis includes a review of not only one's own objectives but of the assumptions made about the aims of the opposing state or coalition before entry. The advances and setbacks of your own forces should also be judged at this time. Emphasis, in this analysis must be put on digesting and integrating the "lessons learned" into the conduct of the ongoing campaign and on their applicability in the future. Some of the Clarkson ideas that were introduced earlier in relation to indicator development and ongoing validity assurance are pertinent to this situation also, particularly with regard to the conduct and use of "post-mortems".

After completion of this progress assessment the decision-maker(s), as is most always the case, must make a choice. If advancement toward the preordained objectives is adequate then he/she may continue to orient the actions of his/her state within the context of conventional war. Escalation under the nuclear threshold, to speed the conflict to a quicker, yet, still successful termination, remains a distinct possibility in this situation (a subject we will address in more depth shortly). However, if progress has been insufficient then the decision-maker is faced with several divergent alternatives. It is to the discussion of these and their implications that we now turn.

The first course open to the dissatisfied practitioner of limited war is to redefine or modify the objectives of the conflict. The modification of goals in the event of unfavorable progress is usually a face saving measure to allow subsequent withdrawal from hostilities justified by the reduction of anticipated benefit of conflict continuation. Eventual termination, in such an instance, is usually accomplished through negotiation and/or military retreat.

A "joint" concept of operations should also be stressed in the conduct of limited war. This is important because the consolidation of military air, sea and ground power provides some of the most significant opportunities for implementing "selective intervention" and emphasizing speed and mobility in actual operations. It would seem that inter-service cooperation provides the best vehicle for the combination of these factors.

While inter-service rivalries will always exist, a consolidation of efforts toward national vice service accomplishment must prevail. Without a doubt, the lead in this area must be with the civilian leadership. An atmosphere of cooperation between both military and civilian authorities and within the military establishment itself must be established from the outset. Appointments of civilian officials to positions of authority in the area of national security who bring to the job few preconceptions about the relative utility of the various services is a start toward such an environment.

The implementation of the joint concept should begin with the planning phase and naturally extend through combat employment. Inter-service staff billets should be given increased attention as a almost mandatory step for any who would aspire to flag or general rank. Also budgetary and procurement decisions should provide incentives for the development of smoothly run joint operations. In this regard, rewards should accrue to those services that submit to the team concept in the form of a bigger piece of the national security pie.

Step-7 Compare the reality of the conflict to established objectives using previously developed indicators: a) Is current progress with conventional forces acceptable? b) Have original objectives been accomplished?

both infantry and mechanized units, and advances in the employment of both fixed wing and rotary aircraft in both the logistical and direct fire support missions (to name only a few). The purpose of stressing rapid maneuver is twofold. First, if utilized correctly it emphasizes those areas where a state holds an advantage in either technology or force readiness, training, or availability. Concurrently, it should direct the combat action away from arenas where the relative military capabilities of the opposition exceeds one's own. Secondly, an emphasis on these factors enhances the chance of achieving strategic or tactical surprise on the battlefield, both of which are important and coveted force multipliers. Obviously, the advantages offered by these factors can become extremely important in a limited war.

The utilization of specially trained/elite forces should also be emphasized in the conduct of a limited war. The training and use of such units should stress a professional and controlled approach to the concept of "selective intervention". Their use as the sole element of a military intervention would naturally be recommended. However, should the situation warrant, they could be employed in concert or as cadres for more traditional elements. The advantages offered by such an employment are dual. First, the use of these forces would again tend to hold down the number of friendly casualties and any losses taken would be viewed in a different light from those associated with conscripted troops. Secondly, the need for increased or wholesale mobilization to adequately implement the limited war instrument may, at least initially, be unnecessary if such forces are available. These units also provide a portion of the military flexibility required in connection with Step 5 and therefore, should be developed and, as needed, employed.

The model now takes us to the actual field of combat where policy goals must be accomplished through the successful employment of military resources. To realize this task the use of "selective intervention" is suggested. This idea, adapted with some modification from the work of Gregory Foster, stresses the "selective application of power at all times and places of one's own choosing."³⁷ Foster explains that such an overall strategy would emphasize the use, when possible, "of limited, precision strikes against valued enemy assets." These "limited-scale engagements are most likely to exploit natural... technological advantages, provided the forces employed are numerically adequate for the mission at hand."³⁸

The exploitation of technological superiority, when existent, is critical to success on the limited war battlefield. It assures that the prosecution of the war will enter a medium on the escalatory continuum that cannot be matched in the short-term by the opposition. It probably will reduce friendly casualties and battlefield collateral damage, both of which are considerations that may be of paramount interest in the ability to maintain domestic and international support for the intervention. It may also be more cost efficient for the accomplishment of certain military missions. In short, technological superiority is a means through which decisions to outperform one's opponent in a game of increasing risk can be implemented.

In addition, superiority in speed and mobility, if available, should also be utilized on the battlefield. This entails the use of modern means of strategic and tactical maneuver. Examples of this are developments in vertical and horizontal amphibious assault, enhanced vehicle agility for

³⁷Foster, p.51.

³⁸Ibid, p.52.

"<One> does not find in history that problems are identical in details, but that they are similar in their demands upon individuals and groups... This broadening experience promotes sophistication and judgement in the contemplation of public decisions, and tends both to the reduction of parochialism or insularity, and to steadiness in consideration of grand decisions by elimination of the supposition that all current problems are uniquely terrible in the history of man."⁴⁴

Yet, the examination of history alone, without a systematic orientation, is possibly headed for either biased or inappropriate conclusions. This is why the "Focused Comparison" methodological technique advanced by Alexander L. George is so important, for it combines the value of the study of history with a structure that enhances the "scientific" nature of the undertaking, thereby raising the probability of significant and enduring contributions to comprehensive theory.

The model presented in the previous chapter is a concerted attempt to distill the common experience of history into a workable structure, usable by future decision-makers. In conjunction with the "Focused Comparison" methodology this theoretical paradigm can then be tested for its validity through the lens of history via the examination of the historical case study. It is to the nuts and bolts of this operation and the actual structuring of our study that we now direct our attention.

C. THE "FOCUSED COMPARISON"

In presenting his development of the "Focused Comparison", Alexander L. George noted that it is never an easy task to learn from history. He stated that two major problems are always encountered in this regard. The first is that "people often disagree as to the correct lesson to be drawn from a particular historical experience", a fact

⁴⁴Shafer, pp.2-3.

especially true in historical situations clouded by either controversy or frustration for the international actors involved. This is an atmosphere that, almost of necessity, creates a revisionist school that either reinterprets or rewrites the historical record. Secondly, "even if people agree on the correct lessons to be drawn from a particular case, they often misapply those lessons to a new situation that differs from the past one in important respects".⁴⁵

George's answer to these problems is the examination of the "lessons of history" in a "systematic and differentiated way from a broader range of experience that deliberately draws upon a variety of historical cases. In other words, the task is to convert <these lessons> into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the phenomenon or activity in question."⁴⁶ Such a task is analogous to the maker of maple syrup who, after drawing the sap from a tree, boils it down to its sugary base creating a product which is then useful to a wide population of consumers. A similar process remains the challenge inherent in the study of history and the goal toward which the "Focused Comparison" technique is tailored.

George lays out five tasks that enhance the ability of his methodology to exploit the "lessons of history". They are as follows:

1. Specify the research problem.
2. Elucidate the elements to be examined in the study.
3. Select the appropriate cases.
4. Consider ways in which the study can best contribute to further theory development.

⁴⁵George, p.43.

⁴⁶Ibid.

5. Formulate general questions to be asked of each case so as to reduce the effect of intervening variables and further control the structure and and comparability of the cases.⁴⁷

We will now address these tasks and their fulfillment within this study.

As has already been noted, the thrust of this particular study is the examination of the phenomenon of limited war through the analysis of a theoretical model. This model therefore, in itself, forms a series of hypotheses concerning the employment of limited war as a tool of national policy. Hence, it represents both the research problem itself and, on close examination, specifies those elements that are to be the subject of particular study. With these first two tasks completed, our attention is now devoted to the selection of appropriate cases for study.

Two historical cases were selected for in-depth analysis in furtherance of this research effort. The decision to rely on only two cases is the result of a compromise between the constraints of time and research validity. The analysis of more cases would have necessitated a shallower approach to the individual historical studies proportional to the total number involved. Conversely, the examination of just a single case was considered completely inadequate for a true test of the theory presented. Therefore, the selection of a dual case study approach toward completion of the "Focused Comparison" structure was employed.

A five step criteria was used in the selection of the cases considered appropriate for special study. The employment of these criteria was considered crucial to the eventual perceived utility of the model as a basis upon which future decisions could be founded. In this way, the

⁴⁷Ibid, pp.54-57.

development of the criteria was pertinent to not only the validation of the research, but to the general perception of the framework in which the model would be considered to be operative. The resulting synthesis of these considerations produced the following criteria:

1. Successful prosecution of a limited war. That is, at least some, if not all, of the objectives of the intervention were satisfactorily completed under the constraint of "limited military means".
2. The conflict must have occurred after 1945. This post-WW II orientation contributes appreciably to the value and timeliness of the study.
3. Involvement of a nuclear power. This assures the analysis of an actor which has significantly limited the means by which it will pursue its military objectives.
4. Some use of sophisticated or "high-tech" weaponry. Provides a test of the exploitation of technological superiority for either escalatory purposes or the reduction of casualties/collateral damage.
5. Adequate documentation of the decision-making process at the unclassified level. Assures the widest dissemination of the results of this study without seriously hampering the availability the research sources.

Using this criteria the two cases selected were; 1) The Korean War 1950-1953, and 2) The Falklands War 1982. Our examination of these events will center on the decision-making processes of those states to which these conflicts represented a true "limited war", that is, a limitation of both the means and therefore the ends toward which force would be employed. As a result, in the former case (Korea) we will be concerned primarily with the United States, while in the latter (Falklands) our attention will be principally

on the United Kingdom. However, the maneuvers, motivations, and actions of other states will also be assessed as the situation warrants.

While fulfilling the needs of our study as detailed above these cases also offer some other interesting advantages. First, because they are separated chronologically by thirty years the continuing application of the model over a period of time can be tested. In this way, it can be shown useful as both a means for looking backward to examine the historical record, as well as, a tool for future use in policy development and implementation. Also, since these cases compare different sets of primary actors (although the United States and the United Kingdom are somewhat involved in each) it reduces the chance that the singular traits of a particular state could intervene and influence the results of the study. It is for the complementary effect of these reasons and those stated earlier in the original criteria that the selection of these cases is considered the most appropriate for the task at hand.

The implications of the development of the case selection criteria on the applicability of this study to the development of general theory has already been discussed. However, one other point in this area bears mention. This study is obviously conceived as an aid to the decision-making process of the national security leadership of a state in the context of a competitive international environment. It is therefore primarily concerned with an analysis of the political, geostrategic, and tactical decisions of both the civilian and military authorities tasked with responsibility in this arena. While not entirely disposing of domestic political considerations, an attempt has been made to examine the issues involved in the specific cases on a broader and more international plain. Therefore, the following analysis would tend toward an emphasis on

Allison's rational actor (Model 1) rather than his organizational or bureaucratic actor paradigms (Models 2 & 3).⁴⁸ This is only logical, for the model's workings key on assessments made in regard to the net political and military capabilities between two or more states. We therefore must focus our attention on this international "netting" process although domestic political, organizational, and bureaucratic considerations can never be entirely swept aside.

The final task remaining in the structuring of our "Focused Comparison" study is the development of a series of questions that will operationalize the variables within the Limited War Model and hence provide a vehicle for the comparison of the chosen cases. This requirement was found to be best fulfilled through the application of a series of questions to each of the three specific phases of the model itself. Presented below in a phase-by-phase format are the queries that were developed. Naturally, because the model is interrelated the questions will also show a certain inter-dependence and, in fact, we shall see that the answer to a particular inquiry might have application in more than one phase. This is an idea that will be investigated more fully as we progress, but first, the questions themselves.

The Entry Phase:

1. What were the principle considerations in the decision to employ armed intervention?
 - a) Political
 - b) Military
2. Were these considerations translated into clearly established objectives at the outset of the conflict?

⁴⁸Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)

3. Is there evidence that the actor assessed its political/military will and capability to out perform its opponent(s) in a "competition in risk taking" before entering into the conflict?
4. Were allies sought before entry? Why and at what price?

These questions stress the political and military contemplations that should, and in most cases do, precede a decision to enter into an ongoing or anticipated conflict. Since our model requires a coherent and rational assessment of such capabilities in relationship to that our opponent and its probable allies before military intervention the thrust of these inquiries is fairly straightforward. In essence we will be looking and judging the scope and depth of the considerations undertaken by the national security advisors of the states in our cases before their decision to enter into a limited war.

The Conduct Phase:

1. Were the objectives established during the entry phase translated into the political/military action necessary for the successful prosecution of the war?
2. Did one side possess technological superiority at the beginning of the conflict? If so, how did it exploit this advantage?
3. Was a form or adaptation of "selective intervention" employed on the actual battlefield? Were joint service operations utilized?
4. Were any of the original objectives changed during the course of the war? Why?
5. Were allies sought after entry into the conflict? Why and under what pretext or arrangement?

This set of inquiries seeks to expose the linkage (or lack thereof) between the original deliberations prior to

conflict entry and the actual conduct of the intervention. Given a certain set of considerations that resulted in a decision to pursue the fulfillment of policy via the battlefield our concern in this phase will be to find out if these were properly translated into guidelines or orders for the use of the tactical commanders. We we will also be interested in the role of technology as both a means of unmatched escalation (technological superiority) and a vehicle for damage and casualty reduction. The employment of the "selective intervention" concept that is closely related to the utilization of technology, as well as emphasizing the use of speed, mobility and specially trained/ "elite" forces, will also be tested. In this regard we will also examine the use of joint service operations and their application to the phenomenon of limited war. Finally, any search for additional allies after entry into the conflict will be questioned for both motivation and ultimate price. Our overall purpose is to construct a useful framework through which the implementation of the original objectives of the conflict may be viewed as they are operationalized on the field of battle.

It can be seen that questions concerning the indicators used as a measurement of the progress that is being made toward the stated objectives and their employment in this area are not addressed in this section. Admittedly, the whole process of the measurement of and progress towards objective accomplishment and decisions regarding conventional escalation are closely related and are made during the Conduct Phase of a limited war. However, since these determinations form the basis for the termination of a limited war, it was felt that their examination would be best understood if undertaken in that context.

The Termination Phase:

1. Were measures or tactical goals developed to indicate the accomplishment of objectives? What were they?
2. Was a periodic assessment made of the progress toward objectives?
3. When the initial objectives were reached was war termination sought?
4. Under what condition in relation to the original stated objectives was the conflict ended?
5. Was the employment of nuclear weapons ever considered? If so, under what circumstances?
6. How was the conflict terminated?

The consideration of the Termination phase, as was noted earlier, includes the analysis of the progress toward the objectives that were theoretically constructed initially in the Entry Phase of the model and now form the imaginary "finish line" toward which the conduct of the limited war is run. The questions reflect the continuing preponderance of these original or modified goals as a guide for the employment of the limited war instrument. Our interest in this area is also taken a step further by inquiring as to how the conflict was actually ended and if the use of nuclear weapons as either a means of coercion, escalation, or demonstration was employed as a means for terminating the conflict. Our hope is to structure the analysis of this phase so as to assess the extent of success attributable to the utilization of limited war as a policy tool and the means by which such a conflict can be ended.

The questions dealing with each phase of the model will not be repeated again in a verbatim form during an examination of the cases. Rather, for the sake of readability, the cases are each broken into three chapters corresponding to the three phases of the Limited War Model. Within each of these chapters further subtitling roughly reflects the

questions asked of the cases. In the concluding chapter the specific inquiries will again be listed and a summation of the findings developed in quest of their answers made.

This ends our investigation of the particulars of the "Focused Comparison" technique and its application to this study. As we have seen, this methodology offers a chance to view the "lessons of history" through a structured and potentially more meaningful format than available in the past. Because it has the inherent capability to distinguish between cases, but nevertheless remains grounded in the historic method, it represents a middle-ground between the historiographers and the adherents to the statistical/correlative approach. Therefore, due to its recognized ability for diagnostic potential "conclusions can be drawn...that can assist directly in the diagnosis of a fresh case, historical or contemporary."⁴⁹

D. EVIDENCE

The final subject of this chapter on methodology will be concerned with the gathering and interpretation of evidence. Since this study is based on the examination of historical cases the validity of evidence is of no small concern to its conduct. For this reason we will take a quick look at the types of evidence that will be used in this study and their relative weighting.

Naturally, where possible, primary sources will be utilized in the examination of our case studies. Since our concern is principally with government decision-making the

⁴⁹Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) p. 97. This work represents the most acclaimed of those that have to date employed the "Focused Comparison" methodology. It is, in fact, a classic due to both its scholarship and its methodological structure. This study relies on it heavily as an example of the research technique employed and as a goal toward which all scholastic study should be directed.

use of government documents pertinent to the actual process of formulating policy will be stressed. This is particularly true in the Korean War case, where in the last 8-10 years numerous records have been declassified that have direct relation to subject of our study.⁵⁰ However, because the quantity of government documentation available relating to the Falklands conflict is understandably limited due to the relatively recent conduct of that war our analysis, while not totally devoid of government sources, is nevertheless more reliant on contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts along with the numerous post-mortems that were published in scholarly journals after the war than is our examination of the Korean conflict.⁵¹

The next most important source of information is that of the personal memoirs written by those individuals who were associated with the decision-making process in both of these conflicts. Again, there is a wealth of this information in regard to the Korean War and a substantial lack of such insider accounts in the Falklands case. While almost all of the principals have published their recollections in one form or another for both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the availability of similar documentation from the Thatcher government is virtually non-existent. The only two accounts that could be considered in this regard would be a

⁵⁰The series published by the State Department and entitled Foreign Relations of the United States was released in 1976 for the Korean War years and includes many previously classified documents. It represents one of the principle sources now available for the study of the Korean conflict.

⁵¹Two British Government documents were extremely helpful in preparing the Falklands case study. They are: A Committee of Privy Counselors, The Lord Franks Chairman, Falkland Islands Review Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: HMSO, January 1983) and John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign Presented to Parliament by the Command of Her Majesty (London: HMSO, December 1982). Though these presentations offer a sanitized view of the decisions surrounding the Falklands War they are, at present, the only official sources available which address the conflict.

magazine article written by Sir Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador to the United States during the Falklands War,⁵² and the autobiography of Alexander Haig, the U.S. Secretary of State, who played an important role in attempts to mediate the crisis.⁵³ This fact further emphasizes our reliance on the contemporary journalistic accounts surrounding the Falklands War.

The final source of information used in the analysis is that of the outside biographies and accounts written on both of the cases which we will scrutinize. The responsibility for both the external and internal criticism of these sources is necessarily that of the researcher. This fact is not only true for these materials, but, for all of the sources employed in this study. Where questions are pertinent, particularly as to the authenticity or factual validity of a source, they will be raised. However, it is felt that the amount of documentation available for a thorough examination of both the selected cases will not be affected by such considerations. With these thoughts in mind we can now turn our attention to the analysis of our case studies.

⁵²Sir Nicholas Henderson, "Behavior of an Ally," Economist, November 12, 1983, pp.40-55.

⁵³Alexander Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan, 1984).

IV. THE KOREAN WAR: ENTRY

The Korean War, a conflict conducted between the years 1950-1953, will be the first case examined in relation to the, previously presented, Limited War Model. Robert Endicott Osgood, writing in 1957, called this conflict "the single most significant event in the development of American post-war strategy."⁵⁴ While its impact in the years since Osgood wrote may have seemingly diminished, the American experience in Korea will always be considered a watershed, for it marked the first large-scale use of the limited war instrument by a globally significant power in the post-World War II era. In fact, over thirty years later, Joseph Goulden would still be able to make a strong case for the importance of this war. He states:

"<This war> was...the turning point for America's post-World War II military and diplomatic strategy. Korea marked the first time the United States went to arms to halt Communist military expansion...<It> marked the start of the construction of a military juggernaut the support of which consumed half the annual federal budget, even in peacetime years, and found American men and women at posts in the farthest reaches of the world."⁵⁵

The war in Korea is also important because of the broad concern it generated on the international front. Not only was this conflict the source of much diplomatic maneuver within the newly created United Nations but, after that body called for military action under the aegis of collective security, personnel from twenty different states saw service

⁵⁴Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 163.

⁵⁵Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), p. xv.

in the subsequent intervention.⁵⁶ The Korean War was, therefore, not just a "civil war" but an event with international proportions.

For these reasons, this war provides an extremely interesting case for examination. This is specifically true in regard to our search into the validity and utility of the Limited War Model because this conflict was for all of the parties involved, with the notable exception of the Koreans themselves, a "limited war". No where was this limitation more profound or controversial than in the U.S. Therefore, the deliberations of the United States provide extremely fertile ground for our particular study. We now turn our attention to an analysis of the decisions regarding American entry, conduct, and termination of this war.

Our examination of the entry of the United States into the Korean conflict will be considered in the following chapter. Four sections will be used in organizing and structuring our analysis of this decision. The first will analyze the political and military considerations that impacted on the determination of the U.S. to enter the Korean conflict. The second will look at the establishment of objectives by the American decision-makers in the context of these considerations. The third section will deal with any relative "risk" assessment that was performed before the decision to enter the conflict and any limitations that were placed on the use of force as a result. The last topic which will be addressed in our examination of the Entry phase is the recruitment of allies by the U.S. in anticipation of actual armed hostility.

⁵⁶This number represents the 15 nations that sent military forces to Korea plus 5 which dispatched only medical units. For a list of participants with their relative contributions see: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), Appendix A, p. 457.

The implications of the resistance of aggression to the President were dual. First, forceful military invasion, was not an appropriate instrument through which contemporary states could affect changes in the international structure. Second, the risk of unchallenged aggression was ultimately the outbreak of total war, an alternative that was particularly distasteful in a world with nuclear weapons. By the time Truman's plane touched down in Washington he had decided that he was "not going to let the attack succeed."⁸⁰ It was in this frame of mind that the President boarded his limousine for the drive to Blair House and the meeting with his advisors.

Until the return of the President the crisis had been handled in Washington by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, although he was in frequent contact with the Chief Executive. In fact, before his return Truman had authorized Acheson to have the Korean situation brought before the United Nations Security Council. This was accomplished on the morning of the 25th, at which time a resolution was passed calling for "the immediate cessation of hostilities" and the return of North Korean forces "forthwith...to the thirty-eighth parallel." It further called for a report on the situation in Korea from the United Nations Commission currently in place on the peninsula and ended with a request that "all Members render every assistance in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."⁸¹ This resolution began the

⁸⁰Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 124.

⁸¹U.N. Document S/1501, included in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 155-156. The vote on this resolution was 9 in favor to 0 opposed, with one member (Yugoslavia) abstaining and another (U.S.S.R.) absent. The Soviets were protesting the failure to seat the delegation of the People's Republic of China on the Security Council. It was this fortunate circumstance that allowed the Council to take the speedy action that it did on the Korean situation.

called an emergency meeting of his advisors to be held at Blair House that evening. This gathering would include significant State and Defense Department personnel, but, was not representative of any formal policy making body such as the National Security Council. It was, in fact, an "ad hoc" gathering of the men that the President wanted as counselors and who were available for consultation in the capital.

On his return flight to Washington Truman was already considering the implications of the action in Korea. An avid student of history and the lessons it holds for the current decision-maker he would later write:

"Almost all current events in the affairs of government have their parallels and precedents in the past...Long before I ever considered going into public life I had arrived at the conclusion that no decisions affecting people should be made impulsively, but on a basis of historical background and careful consideration of the facts as they exist at the time."⁷⁸

It was the lessons of history that were very much on the Chief Executive's mind as he prepared to meet his advisors that evening. He subsequently recorded that his thoughts centered on the world's past experience with unchallenged aggression. In his words:

"In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier."⁷⁹

⁷⁸Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955), p. 121.

⁷⁹Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p. 333.

was happening in Korea seemed to be a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin. The Reds were probing for weaknesses in our armor; we had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-war."⁷⁵ Without question the consideration of checking the growth of the Eastern bloc was one of the primary considerations in the U.S. decision to enter the Korean conflict.

As mentioned earlier, precedent setting had become important in the American conceptualization of dealing with the post-war world. NSC 68 put it this way: "The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere."⁷⁶ Therefore, the U.S. could not afford to let the defense of freedom lag at any point. In short, the world was now to be viewed as a zero-sum game. In this contest a loss for the U.S. anywhere was, automatically, a victory for the Soviet Union and vice versa. Hence, when challenged, the "free world", led by the United States, must be willing to engage and setback the forces of the Soviets or their proxies in order to set precedents against expansion. Such an action would, in theory, concurrently reduce the possibility of further attack and boost the morale of those aspiring to individual freedom. It was this psychological charge that would have a substantial impact on the American decision to resist the expansion of communism into south Korea.

President Truman returned to Washington on June 25, 1950, the day after the commencement of the hostilities in Korea, from his home in Independence, Missouri.⁷⁷ He had

⁷⁵Truman, p.337.

⁷⁶FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p.240.

⁷⁷The time in Washington was a calendar day behind that in Korea. Therefore, though the attack in Korea took place on June 25th it was still the 24th in the United States.

Korean hostilities, is important for it gives an insight into the mind-set that dictated U.S. intervention in that conflict.

John Lewis Gaddis has noted that the Korean War and NSC 68 went hand-in-hand because the attack by the communists on the peninsula "appeared to validate several of <the document's> most important conclusions."⁷² The first of these was the nature of the Soviet Union and its relation to the rest of the world. On this subject NSC 68 stated:

"the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority on the rest of the world. Conflict has therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency."⁷³

Furthermore:

"any further expansion of the area under domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin could be assembled."⁷⁴

Thus the Soviet Union was viewed by the leadership of the United States as being ideologically evangelical and militantly expansionist. As a result, all further gains by communism were to be perceived as contrary to U.S. interests, ultimately approaching the point where the entire "free world" could well be in danger.

In this context the invasion of the ROK was seen as a Soviet conceived grab for what must have appeared to be an opportune spot for easy conquest. President Truman later wrote that he, early on, expressed the opinion that "what

⁷²Ibid, p.109.

⁷³FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p.237.

⁷⁴Ibid, p.237-238.

total war that OFFTACKLE prescribed. Korea was never a war for national survival or even of geostrategic value. It was, however, a battle for precedent.

Precedent had become important to the United States as the world moved toward an era when the perceptions of the balance of power became as important as the actual balance itself. This period basically began in 1949 with two astounding events---the loss of China to the communists and the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb. These happenings overlaid on a policy that, through the Truman Doctrine, was already committed to the support of "free peoples" everywhere restructured the American view of the world.

In Washington it was felt that these incidents signalled a permanent alteration in the international environment. The fall of China was significant because, as the most populous nation on the globe, it represented a potentially formidable adversary. It also marked only the latest in a growing number of states that had "fallen" to the communists since the end of the war. The reality of a Soviet atomic bomb was even more critical for it ended the American nuclear monopoly and changed the strategic framework in which the global competition of, what were now, "super-powers" could be played.

In early 1950 President Truman commissioned a study that would produce, for reference within his administration, a "single, comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and feasible responses" in light of the new strategic situation.⁷¹ The result, when completed by the "ad hoc" combination of State Department and National Security Council personnel assigned to the task, was NSC 68. This document, though still not officially approved at the outbreak of the

⁷¹John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.90.

the defense of the Far East as the assurance of the continuing availability as staging bases of both Okinawa and Japan.⁶⁹ In fact, nowhere in the document is mention even made of the defense of Korea.⁷⁰

This plan, though obviously not considering the possibility of a limited war, nevertheless points out some crucial factors operating in the conceptualization of U.S. strategy. First, the U.S., just as in the previous war, was going to employ a Europe first strategy. Second, the scope of American security commitments had out run its resources and decisions on the strategic value of certain areas were being made and included in planning. In this cost-benefit analysis world Korea was viewed as a virtual non-entity. Thus in June 1949 the U.S. withdrew its occupation forces from Korea leaving only a 500 man advisory contingent to assist what was now advertised as one of the best armies in the Far East. Unfortunately, future events were to prove this analysis severely clouded by wishful thinking.

A little over a year later when the DPRK attacked the south these strategic considerations had not been appreciably altered. Hence, the U.S. elected to respond in a "limited" fashion to this challenge vice the escalation to

⁶⁹Ibid, p.330.

⁷⁰Also of interest is OFFTACKLE's relationship to the later controversial statement made by Secretary of State Acheson concerning the American forward defense perimeter in Asia in a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. The Secretary defined the U.S. line as beginning at the Aleutians, running through Japan, then Okinawa, and terminating at the Philippines. One can note that this statement bears a remarkable resemblance to the OFFTACKLE plan. Acheson was, subsequent to the invasion of South Korea, to be criticized for encouraging a Communist attack on the ROK by leaving it out of the stated perimeter. Yet, the record shows that his statement was, in fact, policy. However, the ambiguity decreasing nature of the speech, particularly in light of later events, makes Mr. Acheson's candor, at best, ill-conceived though far from indefensible. It should also be noted that Gen. MacArthur made a similar statement to a New York Times reporter in 1949. Acheson gives a good defense of himself in Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 356-358.

"To these may be added the derivative objective of terminating the military commitment of the U.S. in Korea as soon as practicable consistent with the forging objectives."⁶⁶

NSC-8 shows that the U.S. was interested in an independent Korea but, was also anxious to dispose of the task of occupying its portion of the peninsula as soon as possible. This was because the men and material necessary for a continued occupation were, due to post-war demobilization and ballooning American security commitments, increasingly becoming in short supply.

A quick look at the war plans that were being written during this period is a good indicator as to where the military occupation of this peninsula fit in the overall strategic picture for the United States. In September 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told President Truman that "the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining its troops and bases in Korea."⁶⁷ Later, in May 1949, the strategic war plan codenamed OFFTACKLE (the first post-war plan to utilize statements of national interest prepared by the Department of State and the National Security Council in its formulation) put the previous disregard of the JCS for the Korean peninsula in perspective. OFFTACKLE's overall strategic concept called for "the destruction of the Soviet will and capacity to resist, by conducting a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive (my emphasis) in the Far East."⁶⁸ The plan subsequently defined

⁶⁶U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1948, Vol. VI (Washington: USGPO), p. 7764.

⁶⁷Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 325.

⁶⁸Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1948-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 328. Significant portions of OFFTACKLE are reprinted in their original form in this source, pp. 324-334.

that could then, in turn, form a national government.⁶⁵ Early in 1948 this Commission proceeded to Korea. Predictably, it was denied access to the area north of the 38th parallel, thus forcing it to consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly as to its future course of action. Subsequently, the Committee decided that, regardless of the Soviet position, the Commission should carry out its mandate in as much of Korea as possible. Therefore, elections were scheduled in the American zone for May 1948.

It was from this balloting that the Republic of Korea was formed in August of the same year with the well-known Korean nationalist, Syngman Rhee, selected as its first President. In September the Soviets responded to the creation of the ROK by announcing the formation of the Democratic Peoples Republic in the north. This state, considered by the international community to be little more than a Russian satellite, was headed by Kim Il-Sung.

In April 1948, just before these elections began the process of its permanent division, the U.S. position with respect to Korea was outlined in a then Top Secret document prepared by the National Security Council, NSC 8. Here the objectives of the United States regarding the future of Korea were defined as follows:

1. "To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.
2. "To ensure that the national government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.
3. "To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state.

⁶⁵It should be noted that this resolution was passed by the General Assembly without Soviet concurrence.

years. This period saw the idea of a trusteeship, leading to the eventual unification and independence of Korea, first wane and then altogether disappear.

The story of the lack of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Korea parallels that of similar experiences in other areas following World War II. While the specifics of this breakdown and the validity of each party's position is beyond the scope of this study, the effect that it had on future actions of the U.S. is not. Simply put, the United States felt that the Soviets were undercutting the agreements made between the victorious allies for the reconstruction of the post-war world.

In Korea, Soviet intransigence took the form of the stonewalling of the Joint Commission(JC) that had been set up as the vehicle through which the trusteeship and eventual independence of that country would be administered.⁶⁴ The JC quickly proved powerless for two reasons. First, the Soviets would not allow any semblance of outside influence within their zone of administration in Korea. And second, they consistently objected to the right of all political parties in Korea to have a voice in the provisional government that was to be formed during the period of the trusteeship. Later, this same issue of the right to free and unrestricted self-determination would form the stated basis for a substantial portion of the actions of the U.S. in Korea.

Thoroughly frustrated by the lack of progress, the U.S. decided to take the Korean problem to the United Nations General Assembly. There, in November 1947, a nine nation UN Temporary Commission on Korea was established to observe the election of Korean representatives to a National Assembly

⁶⁴The Joint Commission(JC) was formed as the result of an agreement reached between the U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union at a Foreign Ministers conference held in Moscow in December 1945.

two days earlier, it could be assumed that their forces were in much greater number and proximity to Korea; And finally, it was the desire of the Department of State that, for understandable political reasons, the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea to be accepted by the elements of the U.S. Army as far north as possible. Eventually, two Army colonels, Dean Rusk (destined for much greater fame) and Charles H. Bonesteel, were dispatched to an adjoining room to come up with a solution that represented a compromise between the contradictory military realities and political desires. It was from their deliberation that the division of Korea along the 38th parallel emerged.⁶¹

Although the two colonels realized that the ability of U.S. forces to reach this line before the Russians, should they disagree, was non-existent both considered the inclusion of the capital city of Seoul within the American area of responsibility crucial. When later approached, to everyone's surprise, the Soviets accepted division along the parallel without equivocation.⁶²

On September 8th Maj. Gen. J. R. Hodge, USA, a Corps Commander, landed at Inchon with a regiment of his troops. On the next day he accepted the surrender of the Government-General at Seoul. Meanwhile, the Russians had entered Korea on August 12th and by this time were already abreast the 38th parallel.⁶³ Gen. Hodge would remain as titular head of the U.S. occupation force for four more

⁶¹Interestingly enough, this partition used the same line of demarcation that had been employed in the Russo-Japanese agreement which had divided Korea into "spheres of influence" in 1896, a fact that may have prompted its selection by Rusk and Bonesteel.

⁶²Goulden, p.19.

⁶³Rees, p.10.

rights.⁵⁹ However, the subject of the post-war dispensation of Korea was first broached at the Cairo Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-Shek in December 1943. At this time it was agreed that a joint trusteeship should be set up to govern the Koreans after the war, a decision that was subsequently, though unofficially, endorsed by Stalin at both the Tehran and Yalta Conferences.⁶⁰

The ultimate goal of such a trusteeship was always perceived, at least in the U.S., as a method through which the country could be rebuilt after forty years of Japanese occupation and eventually be granted independence. But, because most of the American military leaders had considered the invasion of the Japanese homeland inevitable, they had not seriously considered the near-term possibility of implementing the Korean trusteeship arrangement through military occupation. This would be an area where the anticipated Soviet offensive in northeast Asia must, of necessity, be allowed to take its course, while the U.S. forces went about the business of conquering Japan.

It was with this background that the SWNCC convened on that fateful summer evening. In the course of their discussions several factors became readily apparent. First, the surrender of the Japanese occupation force and government in Korea had to be accepted by some Allied contingent. Second, because the U.S. had long been reconciled to the necessity of a invasion of Japan the nearest American ground troops to Korea were in Okinawa, over 600 miles distant from the peninsula; Third, since the Soviets had invaded Manchuria

⁵⁹Stephen Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses" in Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict (Seattle, WA: The University of Washington Press, 1983), p. 97.

⁶⁰For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the implications of the various Allied conferences on the post-war status of Korea see: Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 104-117.

The war in the Pacific ended much quicker than the Allies expected. Although the reasons for this are entirely dependent on which history book one reads, certainly the American destruction of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, on August 6th and 9th respectively, was one motivation for the sudden collapse of Japan. Another possibility would coincide with the Soviet's later claim that the Japanese suit for peace was the result of their entry into the Pacific war, with the invasion of Manchuria on August 8th. However, regardless of the rationale, the unexpectedly quick surrender of Japan forced the United States to promptly take action for the joint occupation of the Korean Peninsula unless it wanted the entire region to slip, by default, into Soviet hands.

The alliance of convenience which had allowed the capitalist West to join hands with the communist East lost, with the defeat of Japan, the only adhesive that had ever held it together--a common enemy. Concerns now centered on the rebuilding of the post-war world and the political/economic model that would be employed for this task. It was with this in mind that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) (created during the war to do just the job its name implied) met, in the Pentagon, on the night of August 10-11, with the issue of Korea high on its agenda.⁵⁸ As this group gathered to consider future U.S. actions regarding Korea there were several previously made policy pronouncements that guided their deliberations.

Stephen Pelz traces the beginnings of the U.S.'s post-war Korean policy to the drafting of the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941. In this document these leaders promised self-government for all peoples in those nations "forcibly deprived" of their sovereign

⁵⁸Goulden, p. 19.

In the following section we will examine the circumstances leading to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Our analysis will begin with the division of the peninsula following the end of WW II. We will then shift our attention to the perception, specifically within the U.S., of the Korean situation as only another example of the Soviet tendency toward global expansion. In this regard, Korea will be examined from both a psychologically and materially strategic perspective. We will then look at the factors that were later cited as the reason for American involvement, the resistance of aggression and the defense of collective security. Finally, we will end our analysis of pre-conflict considerations with a overview of the meeting between President Truman and his advisors at Blair House, the day after the invasion.

Chosun or Korea, as it is known today, has had the misfortune to be situated at the point of geographic convergence of "great powers". China to the west, Russia to the north, and Japan to the east have traditionally dominated this "Hermit Kingdom". At the close of World War II another "great power" found itself involved in this eternal border state, for the United States had now become one of the dominant powers in Asian politics.

In Korea, the U.S. was only assuming the position of the recently defeated Imperial Japanese Empire. In 1905, following the defeat of Czarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War the land of Chosun had fallen under the complete control of Dai Nippon. Over the next forty years the Japanese had not only exploited their Korean subjects but had attempted to extirpate their ancient culture. It was only the Allied victory in the Pacific, resulting in the dismantling of the East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, that broke the shackles binding the Koreans and offered the possibility of eventual independence.

A. PRE-ENTRY POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

The initial concern of this case study is with the decision of the United States to respond to the invasion of its client state, the Republic of Korea (ROK), by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), their cultural twin yet, ideological opposite to the north. The thrust of this assault by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) into the south commenced along four axes before dawn on June 25, 1950 (Korean time). The attack, which achieved tactical surprise, soon rolled over the gallant but, disorganized and outgunned, ROK forces and within three days had captured the traditional capital city of Seoul. This invasion not only succeeded in the rapidly occupying territory, but virtually destroyed the army of the southern republic. As evidence of this one need only note that the ROK Army, on the evening of June 28th, could account for only 22,000 of the 98,000 men it had carried on its roles three days earlier.⁵⁷ It was in this strategic situation that the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, and his advisors considered their possible military involvement on the Korean Peninsula.

The decision of the United States to intervene in the Korean conflict of 1950 can not be completely understood without an acquaintance with the historical background that led to the invasion of the south by the DPRK. Like all wars there were both short and long-term reasons for the outbreak of hostilities. There were also entirely separate motives that prompted an international response to a situation that was seemingly disproportionate to the security considerations involved.

⁵⁷T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 75.

campaign of the United States to make the conflict in Korea a test of the vitality of collective security, which, at the time was still considered an important aspect of American national defense.

Truman was well aware that the United Nations was on trial in the Korean crisis. In his memoirs he later said, "It was ...clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless the this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped."⁸² Secretary Acheson, in Congressional Hearings, later remarked:

"The attack of Korea was...a challenge to the whole system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world...If we stood <by> while Korea was swallowed up it would have meant abandoning our principles, and it would have meant defeat of the collective security system on which our own safety ultimately depended."⁸³

We thus see that considerations about the United Nations and the viability of the global collective security system, put in place as a result of the experience of two World Wars, were very much on the minds of the senior U.S. decision-makers as they considered the appropriate response to the Korean situation.

The meeting at Blair House on that Sunday evening began a week of deliberations that ended in the commitment of U.S. combat ground forces to the fighting in Korea.⁸⁴ In this

⁸²Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p.333.

⁸³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East (hereafter Hearings), 82nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 1, Pt. 4, p. 1715.

⁸⁴Those present at Blair House on June 25th were: Pres. Truman; Sec. of State Acheson; Sec. of Defense Johnson; Sec. of the Navy Matthews; Sec. of the Army Pace; Sec. of the Air Force Finletter; Under Sec. of State Webb; Asst. Sec. State (Far Eastern Affairs) Rusk; Asst. Sec. of State (United Nations Affairs) Hickerson; Ambassador-at-Large Jessup; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Bradley; Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Collins; Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Sherman; and Chief of Staff of the Air

first conference of that momentous week the participants reviewed the basic issues that we have already touched upon. That the invasion of Korea was a Soviet inspired was a fore-drawn conclusion. Earlier in the day the Office of Intelligence Research at the Department of State had released the following assessment:

"The North Korean government is completely under Kremlin control and there is no possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior instruction from Moscow. The move against South Korea must therefore be considered a Soviet move."⁸⁵

Furthermore, this intelligence estimate warned of the results of failing to successfully halt the Communist aggression on not only the Far East but, in Europe as well. The thrust of this analysis was that neutralist pressures in both Japan and occupied Germany would substantially increase if the U.S. was unable to save the ROK.⁸⁶ This was battle for precedent advocated with a vengeance, and the beginnings of a concept that would, later, be termed the "domino principle". The message of the invasion of Korea seemed obvious to the U.S. political and military leadership, world communism, directed from Moscow was aggressively on the move.

In notes taken of this Blair House discussion by Ambassador Phillip Jessup we also know that mention was made of both the consideration of resisting aggression and the implementation of collective security.⁸⁷ It was reiterated on several occasions in the meeting that any U.S. response would be made through and under the shield of the United

Force, Gen. Vandenberg. Source: FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.157.

⁸⁵FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.149.

⁸⁶Ibid, p.151, 154.

⁸⁷Jessup's "Memorandum of Conversation" of the first Blair House meeting can be found in: Ibid, p.157-161.

Nations for purposes of both precedent and support. We will examine the U.S. use of the U.N. in more depth shortly.

Finally, our analysis of pre-conflict political/military considerations can end with a look at the review given the positioning of both friendly and potential enemy armed forces at this first meeting. Acheson had opened the discussion, at the President's request, with a review of the situation in Korea including some recommendations for preliminary U.S. action. Truman then immediately turned to the uniformed military advisors (Bradley, Collins, Sherman, and Vandenberg) and had each run down the strength of American and Soviet forces in the Far East.⁸⁸ It was only after this review of the military situation and some further deliberation by both himself and his advisors that Truman issued his orders for the evening. It is to the substance of these instruction and those of the following days that we now direct ourselves as we examine the formulation of objectives.

B. ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES

As stated earlier, in the presentation of the model, the establishment of objectives that clearly relate to the political and military considerations involved in a particular situation is vital to the ultimate success of a limited war. In the proceeding section the factors that were of importance to the United States in relation to the Korean crisis of June 1950 have been considered in some detail. We will now take each of these and discuss its translation into a goal by the American authorities.

The basic objective of the U.S. decision-makers as they considered the relative weights of various actions during the initial period of the crisis was the assurance of the

⁸⁸Ibid, 158-159.

continued existence of the Republic of Korea, based on the principle of self-determination, and the return to its sovereignty of, at a minimum, the territory under its control at the commencement of hostilities. This objective fit in well with the demonstrated U.S. concern for the right of individual choice for the people of Korea and the establishment of a positive precedent against international aggression. There is little question that if the invaders had returned across the 38th parallel in the first week of the war there would have been little further action by the U.S. outside of beefing up the defenses of the South Koreans. The wording of the original U.N. resolution, passed on June 24th, calling for the "cessation of hostilities" and a withdrawal to the original border is ample evidence of this.⁸⁹ The survival of the ROK remained a goal of the U.S. throughout the conflict although, as the war continued, it was to undergo some reinterpretation.

The possibility of extending the war north of the 38th parallel, as was later done, is consistent with this objective for two reasons. First, this line represented no military reality as its selection was made, as we have seen, on a purely political basis. Hence, the defense of the ROK might well include tactical action across this imaginary line of demarcation. Secondly, the U.S. and most of the world recognized the government of the ROK, elected under the auspices of the United Nations, as the only legitimate state on the Korean Peninsula. Later, on September 9th the National Security Council would approve a report addressing the suggested "Courses of Action With Respect to Korea" (NSC 81/1) that lucidly states the U.S. position:

⁸⁹U.N. Document S/1501 included in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.155.

"The political objective of the United Nations is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949...The United States has strongly supported this political objective."⁹⁰

Since the events of June 1950 had proven that it was threatened by its "illegal" neighbor to the north, a case could be made for forcibly unifying the two Koreas. The later question of the wisdom of crossing the parallel was not so much concerned with its political defensibility, as with the possibility that it might widen the war. It is to this concern over limiting this conflict that we now turn.

Another objective of the U.S. in dealing with this conflict was to limit the war to the Korean Peninsula. We have already noted that, from a military standpoint, the consensus of the American military establishment was that the possession of Korea held little strategic value in the event of an all out war with the Soviet Union. However, because of the need to, not only deny a victory to aggression but, also check an attempt at Russian/Communist expansion, it was felt that a successful defense of the ROK, if possible, below the threshold of total war was in the best interests of the United States.

Both Truman and Acheson recognized this unique constraint early in the decision-making process. For example, Truman later wrote: "Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world."⁹¹ Acheson, meanwhile, was concerned with preventing a spread of the war to China by involving either the Nationalist government on Formosa or its Communist counterpart on the mainland. It

⁹⁰FRUS 1950, Vol.VII, p.713.

⁹¹Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p.345.

was he who recommended that the Navy's Seventh Fleet be moved north from the Phillipines "to prevent any attack from China on Formosa or vice versa."⁹² This recommendation was subsequently approved and translated into action.

Thus the course toward a limited war was set from the very beginning in the American approach toward the Korean situation. Again NSC 81/1 gives an insight into the U.S. position:

"If ...present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish <the> political objective without substantially increasing the risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, ...to take action in Korea that would involve a substantial risk of general war."⁹³

A final objective of the U.S. was to limit the expansion of the Soviet Union and thereby its communist ideology. We have seen that this was not only a concern in Korea but, globally. In fact, much of the discussion in the early stages of the Korean conflict centered on whether or not the Communist push in that area was not a precursor to activity elsewhere. Chiefly mentioned in such a scenario were Iran and Yugoslavia. The U.S. was also now formally committed to the defense of Western Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty. The questions in the minds of the U.S. authorities were: Would the Soviet Union use the Korean crisis as a diversion for a push elsewhere? And, if so, when and where would the new challenge arrive?

President Truman was again well aware of this possibility. At Blair House on the evening of the 25th he instructed the State and Defense Departments to make a "

⁹²Acheson, p.406.

⁹³FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.713.

Soviet action might take place."⁹⁴ We have already noted that at this time he also called for an analysis of Soviet military strength in the Far East. Thus, Truman was preparing himself to meet the Russian global challenge, so forcefully defined in NSC-68 which we examined earlier. Korea would be a point where the U.S. would meet the thrust of communism. To paraphrase the opinion of Gen. Omar Bradley, we had to draw the line somewhere and Korea offered as good an occasion as any.⁹⁵

In summation, we have noted three primary objectives of the U.S. in the Korean conflict. They are:

1. To assure the survival of the Republic of Korea, based on the principle of self-determination, and the return to its sovereignty of, at a minimum, the territories it held prior to the initiation of hostilities.
2. To limit the war to the Korean Peninsula thereby avoiding recourse to total or general war.
3. To check the expansion of the Soviet Union and world communism in Korea.

We have related these objectives to their origination in the historical background and international context in which the Korean crisis arose. Now, with the knowledge of the direction of U.S. policy in hand, we can analyze the "risk" assessment taken by its decision-makers before conflict entry.

C. PRE-CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT

The process of risk assessment for the United States decision-makers began with the first meeting at Blair House and was to continue throughout the duration of the war. In

⁹⁴Ibid, p.160.

⁹⁵Ibid, p.158.

this section, we will consider the analysis of risk that was associated with the determination by the American leadership to commit troops to combat in the air, sea, and ultimately on the ground in Korea. Later in our study of the conduct of the war we will consider U.S. post-entry escalatory actions in the pursuit of victory on the peninsula.

The assessment of risk in situations of possible armed conflict logically begins with an inquiry into the applicability of the use of force to the specific circumstances. If this question is answered affirmatively, decisions can then be made regarding the types, quantity, and tactical employment of particular military elements. Also of importance at this stage is a general feeling for the limit of both your own and your opponent(s) will to enter into, what has been termed, a "competition in risk-taking". Once these issues have been resolved, one may proceed toward armed hostility.

In examining the American approach toward the Korean conflict we will look at these considerations in their logical order, beginning with the decision to employ U.S. forces in Korea. We will then review some discussion within the American leadership in the early weeks of the war that dealt with a relative risk assessment of the perceived international actors involved.

As the first week of the Korean crisis wore on it became apparent that the ROK forces would be unable to hold on without outside help. This put the onus on the U.S. decision-makers and, in particular, President Truman to determine if Korea would be left to its own fate or if the U.S. would intervene. We have already seen in our earlier analysis that, due to the nature of the attack and the attacker, the survival of the south Korean republic was a major concern of the U.S. Therefore, armed intervention

short of total war, if necessary, was almost a foredrawn conclusion.⁹⁶

With the ROK in headlong retreat U.S. involvement was quick. Dean Acheson stated the U.S. position forthrightly:

"To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore, we could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the very guns of our defense perimeter with no more than words and gestures in the Security Council. It looked to us as though we must steel ourselves for the use of force."⁹⁷

Thus the question, for the U.S. soon became not whether to use force but, what type and where.

In what was later to become a standard formula for the measured use of military power, air and naval elements were used prior to ground forces in Korea. At the initial Blair House meeting the President had authorized that American air power cover the evacuation of U.S. civilians from the Seoul area. At the same time he ordered Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE) and currently heading the Allied occupation force in Japan, to send a team to survey the situation in Korea.⁹⁸ The findings of this on hand observation, accomplished by a member of MacArthur's Tokyo staff, Maj. Gen. John Church, edged the U.S. closer to all-out intervention for it paved the way for a similar inspection by CINCFE himself before the week was out.

⁹⁶Almost certainly the Eastern bloc did not share this analysis, for it is doubtful that the attack would have taken place if the quick intervention of the United States and the United Nations had been predicted. For an interesting view of this problem from the Communist side see: Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 367-370.

⁹⁷Acheson, 405.

⁹⁸FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 160.

When the President met with his advisors again at Blair House on the evening of the 26th the situation in Korea was reported through both political and military channels as rapidly deteriorating.⁹⁹ The composition of the group at the second Blair House meeting was almost identical to the first according to a memorandum of its proceedings prepared, again, by Ambassador Jessup.¹⁰⁰ After hearing that American aircraft had already engaged and shot down a North Korean plane while covering the withdrawal of American citizens and dependents from Seoul, the President again let Secretary Acheson begin the discussion. Acheson suggested that in light of the worsening situation for the ROK (Seoul was already being evacuated) "that an all-out order be issued to the Navy and Air Force to waive all restrictions on the operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible support to the Korean forces." On inquiry from Army Secretary Pace, it was agreed the the mission of these elements would be, for the moment, restricted to areas south of the 38th parallel.¹⁰¹

It is significant that air and naval power should be used first in this situation. The merits of their employment in Korea at this juncture were several. First, they represented areas where neither the DPRK or their theoretical allies, the PRC or the USSR, could match the U.S. in escalatory capability from a purely qualitative respect. Second, they were forces that would not be nearly as visible or as potentially costly in friendly casualties on the battlefield as ground forces. And finally, they were also

⁹⁹For example see: "Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to Secretary of State" June 26, 1950. Ibid, p.176.

¹⁰⁰Jessup notes that Sec. of the Navy Matthews arrived just after the meeting was adjourned and that Deputy Under-Sec. H. Freeman Matthews had replaced Under Secretary Webb in the State contingent. Ibid, p.178.

¹⁰¹"Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)" Ibid, p.179.

more easily controlled from the standpoint of limiting hostilities to certain areas while still sending an unmistakable signal to the Communists about U.S. intentions. Thus we see that the U.S. was slowly "upping the ante" in Korea. Paramount in these initial force commitments are the objectives of assuring the continued survival of the Korean republic while still limiting the war to the area south of the 38th parallel.

On June 28th the National Security Council held its weekly meeting at the White House. Naturally, the situation in Korea was discussed. The specific problem addressed at this gathering was that of successfully opposing the invasion of the ROK without embroiling the U.S. in a general war with the Soviet Union. Secretary Acheson presented a draft of a policy paper on this subject at this time. Because it represents a significant example of "risk assessment" it is reproduced here in full:

"The decision now made to commit United States air and naval forces to provide cover and support for the South Korean troops does not in itself constitute a decision to engage in a major war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken with the full realization of a risk of war with the Soviet Union. If substantial Soviet forces actively oppose our present operations in Korea, United States forces should defend themselves, should take no action on the spot to aggravate the situation, and should report the situation to Washington.¹⁰²

This specific document, though never accepted as a singular statement of U.S. policy, subsequently found its way into NSC 81/1 signed by the President on September 11, 1950 which prescribed the action(s) to be taken by American forces should the Soviets enter the war in Korea.¹⁰³ The crucial point it demonstrates for our study is that the U.S.

¹⁰²Ibid, p.217.

¹⁰³Ibid, p.717.

decision-makers were well aware that their moves in Korea constituted a significant increase of the risk of war with the Soviet Union and that this knowledge was incorporated in their future plans and analysis.

By the end of the week the situation had become critical for the ROK. On June 29th MacArthur decided to get a first-hand view of the of the circumstance on the peninsula for himself. After arriving at Suwon airfield about 25 miles south of Seoul he made his way to the Han River which provided a natural geographic barrier south of the capital city. What he witnessed was a scene of utter chaos and confusion. It was at this time that he decided to recommend the commitment of U.S. ground forces to the battle in Korea. MacArthur's message to Washington communicating this suggestion read in part:

"It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the over-running of all Korea. The South Korean Army is incapable of counteraction and there is grave danger of further breakthrough....The only assurance for holding the present line and the ability to regain the lost ground is through the introduction of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area."¹⁰⁴

In Washington action was also being taken. As MacArthur travelled back to Tokyo from his battlefield tour, determined to recommend the introduction of American ground forces to the combat in Korea, the National Security Council, at the behest of Secretary of Defense Johnson, held its second meeting in as many days. Unfortunately, the Council did not have MacArthur's personal assessment, for he, inexplicably, was to wait more than sixteen hours before sending it to his superiors. Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Johnson, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs, had

¹⁰⁴Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p.334.

determined that the currently approved measures for the employment of U.S. forces in Korea would probably prove ineffectual. This was due to both the limitation of their action to areas south of the 38th parallel and the inability of American aircraft to operate from bases in Korea. He asked that the President authorize an extension of U.S. naval and air activity north of the parallel "and to commit a limited number of combat infantryman to protect a port-airfield beachhead in the southeastern coastal city of Pusan."¹⁰⁵ This recommendation was approved, but not without some consternation. Although the commitment of U.S. ground forces was, at this time, purely for defensive purposes the decision would have been much easier had the Far Eastern Commander's report been available to the President and his advisors.

At this meeting Acheson also reported on an earlier request (June 27th) made of the Soviet Union to use its influence with the DPRK to end the hostilities in Korea. While the reply from the Soviet spokesman in Moscow, Andrei Gromyko, was expectedly negative, the wording of the statement caused optimism among the analysts at State for it indicated that the Soviets, at least for the moment, would not intervene in Korea. The key to the analysis rested in the following phrase, "the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea."¹⁰⁶ Thus the U.S. decision-makers left the meeting feeling that the chance of war with the Soviets over Korea was somewhat lessened.

Early on Friday morning (June 30th) MacArthur's recommendations began arriving in Washington. The first official to act in light of this new information was Army Chief

¹⁰⁵Paige, p. 245.

¹⁰⁶FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 229.

Collins who passed the specifics on to Secretary Pace. MacArthur wanted to commit one regimental combat team (RCT) to the battle in Korea and to build up two of his occupation divisions for subsequent use on the peninsula. Pace telephoned the President (at approximately 5:00 AM Washington time) to report on the Korean situation and to ask for permission to commit one U.S. RCT as the lead element in an eventual deployment of two complete divisions to Korea. The President immediately approved the commitment of the RCT and told the Secretary that a decision on the two divisions would be made after a meeting of his advisory group later that morning.¹⁰⁷ Thus, it was the MacArthur assessment that led to the commitment of U.S. ground forces to combat in Korea. However, there is an interesting sidelight to this action that demonstrates the connection between risk assessment and political objectives. This is the offer by Chaing Kai-Shek of Chinese Nationalist troops for use in Korea made during the first week of the crisis.

The offer of 33,000 troops, by Chaing, for commitment to the Korean Peninsula was brought by Secretary Acheson to the White House on Thursday June 29th. The idea at first appealed to the President for it had a couple of advantages. First, it would be a much needed augmentation to the thinly stretched American forces and second, it would broaden the base of support for the Korean intervention in the international community. But, Acheson argued against accepting the offer. He noted that it was inconsistent to use the naval forces of the United States, now positioning themselves between the Nationalist held island and the mainland, to preclude the spread of the Korean conflict to Formosa while accepting the movement of its natural defenders to Korea, where their presence could well provoke the intervention of

¹⁰⁷Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 342-344.

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
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
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the Communists anyway. Furthermore, the transport of the Chinese Nationalists would have to be accomplished by U.S. elements that could well be used to greater advantage elsewhere. When the subject was put before the advisory group meeting of Friday morning the quality of the Chinese troops from a material and equipment standpoint was also questioned by the Joint Chiefs. Therefore, it was decided that the offer would be politely declined.¹⁰⁸ This outcome points out the overriding concern that was placed on the limitation of the Korean conflict, for the U.S. was willing to reject the offer of what amounted to the two divisions that it would initially commit to the peninsula.

At the same meeting that produced the final decision on the rejection of the Chinese Nationalist forces the President and his advisors also considered the MacArthur request for the commitment of two divisions to the battle on the peninsula. Based on the State assessment that Soviet intervention was unlikely and Communist Chinese involvement was, though of higher probability, far from imminent, the group eventually granted the Far East Commander the leeway to utilize his entire occupation force in Japan as necessary to stop the enemy advance in Korea.¹⁰⁹ The only stipulation put on the commitment of U.S. forces by the decision-makers in Washington was that their use was subject to continued assurance of the safety of Japan, a matter whose judgement was left solely to MacArthur.¹¹⁰ Shortly after receiving these instructions Gen. MacArthur ordered the 24th Infantry Division under the command of Maj. Gen. William Dean to the

¹⁰⁸This account is a synthesis of two sources: Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, pp.342-343 and Acheson, pp.412-413.

¹⁰⁹MacArthur had four infantry divisions under his command: 7th, 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry (an infantry unit despite its name).

¹¹⁰An actual transcript of the orders sent to MacArthur can be found in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.263.

peninsula. Within a week elements of Dean's command were engaged in wholesale combat in Korea.

The following day the Far East commander was authorized to utilize the naval units under his command to "blockade...the entire Korean coast." These orders specifically stated that "<C>are should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR."¹¹¹ Again the objective of limiting the conflict seems paramount. Yet, it still did not stop the U.S. decision-makers from employing force on the peninsula. Instead, it forced these men to tailor their military response to the joint goal of outperforming their opponents in the realm of tactical escalation while avoiding recourse to general war. Thus began the American commitment to hostilities in Korea, a decision, as we have seen, that was based on a knowledge of the political and military context, an establishment of objectives, and a candid assessment of the risks involved not only in entering the war but, in the specific tactical employment of forces. We will now address the final step in the entry process, the recruitment of allies.

D. RECRUITING ALLIES

When viewed with historical perspective the recruitment of allies by the United States for the intervention in Korea seems insignificant. In truth, the material contributions of the international contingent that fought beside the U.S. and Korean forces seems minimal. However, while President Truman and his advisors realized that they could probably handle the situation in Korea without outside support, the addition of allies would add tremendously to their ability to successfully prosecute the war.

¹¹¹Ibid, p.271.

There are several reasons for this. First, one of the objectives of the U.S. decision-makers was the resistance of aggression. This, in a very real way, was the purpose of the United Nations. Truman was determined that this organization would not suffer the same impotency that had shackled its predecessor, the League of Nations. The legacy of Munich, considered indicative of the dangers of appeasement, was a vital issue to the Americans, and their decision to take the Korean matter immediately to the U.N. shows this concern.¹¹²

The second reason for lining up allies was the perception that the Communist thrust into Korea was only a precursor of Soviet moves elsewhere. As we have seen this was certainly a concern of the U.S. decision-makers. Therefore, not only was a diplomatic offensive launched within the U.N. but the embassies around the world were kept well informed of the government position and actions in Korea.¹¹³

State also set up a briefing for Latin American and European nations concerning Korea on Tuesday, June 27th. These states were tied to the U.S. through the Rio and North Atlantic Treaties respectively, and it was obviously considered important to keep them informed of military commitments that could ultimately impact on their own security.¹¹⁴ This action also was intended to build international support for the stand that the U.S. was taking in the United Nations and

¹¹²President Truman later sent a letter to Secretary Acheson commending his "initiative in immediately calling the Security Council". He continued, "<h>ad you not acted promptly...we would have had to go into Korea alone." The letter is reprinted in full in: Acheson, p.415.

¹¹³The record of the first week of the deliberations on Korea in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII is literally filled with dozens of communications between the State Department and its various representatives overseas regarding the Korean situation.

¹¹⁴Paige, pp.191-193.

send a clear signal to the Soviets that the Western bloc stood ready to confront any challenge.

A final reason for recruiting allies in response to the Korean crisis was the the desire to positively display the action of the United States to both the international and domestic audience. It was important for the U.S. decision-makers to portray themselves as the "good guys" in their actions regarding the invasion of Korea. This initially was much more important on the international front than at home, for the crisis condition could be counted on to sidetrack, at least momentarily, any domestic dissent. Hence, if what appeared to be a tough military intervention could be "sold" to the international community it would make its later defense at home somewhat easier.

Glenn Paige, in his analysis of the Korean situation and its handling by the American decision-makers, noted that in crisis situations there is a greater tendency to initially solicit international than domestic support. This is because "the absence of regularized patterns of authority in international politics" necessitates the need for persuasion which is usually "promptly undertaken."¹¹⁵ This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated in the Korean crisis, where international support received the lion's share of attention in the early going.

With these rationales in mind we can now turn to an analysis of the search for allies in the Entry phase of the Korean War. Our examination will be principally concerned with the utilization of the United Nations as both a forum for international discussion surrounding the Korean conflict and a vehicle through which an alliance to oppose the Communist invasion of the south could be formed. We earlier covered the initial resolution of the Security Council

¹¹⁵Paige, p. 313.

regarding the hostilities in Korea on June 25th, our analysis will now pick-up with the later developments leading toward the creation of a United Nations Command on the peninsula.

The U.N. Security Council convened again on Tuesday, June 27th, to consider the developing situation in Korea and judge the adherence to its earlier resolution. The President of the Security Council also had in hand the reports from the U.N. Commission stationed in Korea. These forthrightly placed the blame for the invasion on the North Korean forces, a piece of evidence that was to be crucial in building and maintaining international support.¹¹⁶ The United States representative, Warren R. Austin, then submitted a resolution to the Council that was designed to solidify international support behind the ROK while concurrently providing legitimation for the use of outside force to save the same. The pertinent parts of this document are reproduced below:

"Having noted...that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security; ...

"Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."¹¹⁷

This resolution was adopted by the Council late on the evening of the 27th and it was under its authority that later U.S. military action was taken.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶The text of one of these communications, U.N. Document S/1507, can be found in FRUS 1950 Vol. VII, p.207.

¹¹⁷U.N Document S/1501 FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.211.

¹¹⁸The vote on the resolution in the Security Council was 7 in favor, 1 opposed (Yugoslavia), two abstaining (Egypt and India), and 1 absent (U.S.S.R.).

The adoption of this resolution was to have far reaching affects, for it not only opened the door to U.N. military action in Korea but, on the U.S. domestic front, gave the President a rationale for committing the United States to a long-term military action on the peninsula. This course was now legitimized without receiving a formal "declaration of war" from Congress. In fact, a Congressional authorizing resolution was considered by Truman but rejected, principally on the advice of Dean Acheson, because of the impact it might have on the actions of future Chief Executives.¹¹⁹ We thus see, in operation, the import of the generation of international support to later rationalization of the conflict on the domestic front.

With the U.N. now committed to militarily supporting the ROK, U.S. decision-makers were confronted with the problem of constructing a proper structure through which this international assistance could be funneled. This matter took on more urgency as international offers of assistance poured in. By June 29th, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands had already stated their intention to help the South Korean republic. Also, mentioned earlier, was the offer of Nationalist Chinese forces for combat on the peninsula. Yet, because many of these states had vital political and commercial interests in the Far East, particularly with Communist China, a suitable organization for the employment of military power in Korea had to be established.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹For Acheson's recollection on this matter see Present at the Creation, pp.414-415. The official State memorandum supporting the President's action, prepared on July 3, 1950, can be found in Hearings, Appendix O, pp.3198-3204.

¹²⁰Two cases demonstrating this point were the Dutch who had recognized the PRC and, while anxious to show the vitality of "collective security", wanted to avoid any chance of hostilities with the Chinese and the British who were understandably concerned about the security of their colony in Hong Kong.

To satisfy these concerns the U.S. proceeded to enter into a series of negotiations regarding the set-up of a U.N. Command. Since a large majority of the men and material that would be committed to the defense of Korea would come from the U.S. it was soon accepted that an American would be named as the unified commander. The thrust of the arbitration centered on assuring the Security Council that the military action would be restricted to the Korean Peninsula (i.e., not overflowing into Manchuria or Formosa) and on the use of the United Nations flag by the U.N. Command. The resolution, as adopted, solved the first matter by using wording similar to that which had been employed on the June 27th, calling for the member states to "assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus restore international peace and security in the area" (my emphasis). The second issue was solved by authorizing "the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations... concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating." But, these were only minor issues, for the central theme of the Council's resolution was the appointment of the U.S. as its agent for the implementation of the U.N. intervention. To quote the document:

"<The Security Council> recommends that all Members providing military forces and assistance... make such... available to a unified commander under the United States; requests that the United States designate the commander of such forces <and that> the United States... provide... the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command."¹²¹

¹²¹The full text of the July 7th resolution, U.N. Document S/1588 is reproduced in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.329. This resolution was introduced by the representatives of France and the U.K. and was adopted by a vote of 7 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia) and 1 absent (U.S.S.R.).

The next day President Truman appointed Gen. Douglas MacArthur as the United Nations Commander in Korea.¹²² Thus the U.S. gained allies for its involvement in Korea without, seemingly, altering substantially its own objectives in the conflict. Although, the later crossing of the 38th parallel was to strain the U.N. commitment, the formation of this alliance was, in the long-run, to prove most beneficial for all of the parties involved. If for no other reason it was crucial as a precedent for actively pursuing the goal of "collective security".

E. SUMMATION

This ends our analysis of the entry of the United States into the Korean War. The treatment of this phase has, of necessity, been detailed because the decisions made in this early period impact on the Conduct and Termination phases to be discussed later. In our examination we have painted the political/military background in which this conflict arose and the translation of these considerations into goals by the U.S. decision-makers. We have also looked at the assessment of "risk" undertaken by these men in their determination to engage in armed hostilities in Korea. And finally we have seen the U.S. recruit international support of both a material and political nature for an intervention in Korea without altering its own objectives. Now our attention will be focused on the translation of the decisions made in the Entry phase into action in the conduct and termination of the war.

¹²²Ibid, p.333 (fn 1).

V. THE KOREAN WAR: CONDUCT

Our attention is now turned to the actual pursuit of the political and military goals, developed in the Entry phase, on the battlefield. The specific conduct of this war, which lasted over three years, would be impossible to cover in the short treatment which will be accorded it in this study. However, to examine its relationship to the Limited War Model, certain examples of the attempted operationalization of the objectives of the intervention will be noted.

The strategic and tactical operations of this conflict have been well documented in the thirty-odd years since its end.¹²³ In the following chapter some the particulars of certain plans and operations will be dissected for their illustrative value. A quick overview of its structure follows.

¹²³The three best "unofficial" treatments of the war, authored by David Rees, T. R. Fehrenbach, and Joseph C. Goulden respectively, have been previously cited. Two personal memoirs also deal specifically with Korea: Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1967) and J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969). Furthermore, all of the U.S. armed service branches have published official and/or quasi-official histories of their operations in the Korean War. An extensive, though not necessarily exhaustive, list follows: ARMY: Orlando Ward, Korea: 1950 (Washington: USGPO, 1952); John Miller, Jr., Maj. Owen L. Carroll, USA, and Margaret E. Tackley, Korea: 1951-1953 (Washington: USGPO, 1956); Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington: USGPO, 1961); Walter J. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington: USGPO, 1966); James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: USGPO, 1972); NAVY: Cdr. Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr. Frank A. Manson, USN, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1957); James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington: USGPO, 1966); MARINES: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 (hereafter Marine Operations): Volume I- Lynn Montross and Cpt. Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC The Pusan Perimeter (Washington: USGPO, 1954); Volume II- Idem, The Inchon-Seoul Operation (Washington: USGPO, 1955); Volume III- Idem, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign Based on the research of K. Jack Bauer (Washington: USGPO, 1957); Volume IV- Lynn Montross, Maj. Norman Hicks, USMC and Maj. Hubard D. Kuokka, USMC, The East-Central Front (Washington: USGPO,

In analyzing the conduct of the Korean War, in an attempt to glean its lessons for the use of the instrument of limited war, four different aspects of the conflict will be examined. In the first we will look at the attempt to operationalize the political and military goals, as predetermined in the Entry phase, on the field of combat. In this regard, a review of the U.S. mobilization effort, whose purpose was to provide the men and material necessary for the successfully prosecute the intervention, will be undertaken. Following this, in the second section, will be an examination of the use of "selective intervention" in the Korean conflict. The example selected for our study in this area is the amphibious landing of U.N. forces behind enemy lines at Inchon. Its analysis will include a look at the exploitation of technological superiority by U.S. forces in Korea. The third section will consider the translation of objectives or goals in an unbiased and effective manner to the battlefield. Korea provides an almost classic case of this phenomenon in the MacArthur recall and 38th parallel situations. Finally, we will end our look at the Conduct phase of this war with a review of the effect that the actual fighting of this war had on both those allies taken into the conflict and on further recruitment after the initiation of hostilities.

1962; Volume V- Lt.Col. Pat Meid, USMCR and Maj. James M. Yingling, USMC, Operations in West Korea (Washington: USGPO, 1972); Air Force: Col. James T. Stewart, USAF, ed., Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea (New York: D. Von Norstad, 1957); Robert Frank Futrell, Brig.Gen. Lawson S. Moseley, USAF, and Albert F. Simpson, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Druill, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961)

A. SHAPING MILITARY ACTION

The war in Korea was primarily a conventional ground action. The invaders, from the beginning dictated this type of conflict through the use of organized infantry and armor divisions in their push into the south. Although, there was a significant amount of guerrilla and insurgency activity associated with the actions of both sides, the truly decisive combat was between the regular ground forces of each coalition. Hence, the successful prosecution of the intervention by the U.N. forces depended on mustering the men and material necessary to first halt the Communist invasion and then to push it back. It was this task which confronted the peacetime mobilization structure of the West and, in particular, the United States during the early months of the conflict in Korea.

At the beginning of the Korean War the U.S. Army consisted of 10 divisions, the European Constabulary (equivalent to a full division), and 9 separate regimental combat teams.¹²⁴ Four of these divisions--the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry--were in the Far East. All of the units, with the exception of one regiment in the 25th Division, were manned and equipped at only two-thirds strength.¹²⁵ However, understrength or not, these units would obviously be the first that would have to be committed to the action in Korea.

In fact, there was a feeling within the American camp that the DPRK offensive would be halted after only a symbolic deployment of U.S. forces. The argument supporting this was that the Army of the Democratic People's

¹²⁴Memo from the Troop Control Branch, Department of the Army, May 1951. Cited in Appleman, p.49.

¹²⁵The 24th Regiment carried the normal complement of three battalions and its support artillery, the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, contained the traditional complement of three batteries. Ibid.

Republic, the In Min Gun, would be coerced to a standstill by the presence of its famed American counterpart. The proponents of this school were to be shortly disabused of this notion. MacArthur himself hoped that through an "arrogant display of strength <he> could fool the enemy into a belief that <there were> greater resources at" his disposal than he actually had.¹²⁶ It was with this in mind that he began the piecemeal commitment of the 24th Division to the peninsula after receiving approval for the use of U.S. forces in combat from Washington.

The initial engagement between American and North Korean forces occurred on July 5th, about three miles north of the small village of Osan, along the road that connected Seoul with the city of Taejon in west central Korea. Recounted in the U.S. war histories as the mission of "Task Force Smith" (after Lt. Col. Charles Bradford "Brad" Smith who commanded the U.S. forces engaged) this experience was to provide several data points for American planners. The first was that the North Korean forces were not in awe of American troops for they chopped right through Smith's infantry contingent and supporting artillery without being seriously delayed. The second was that U.S. forces were unprepared materially to stop the In Min Gun advance. The light infantry elements found in most of the U.S. units did not have the anti-tank capability to seriously challenge the armored spearhead of the Communist advance.¹²⁷ Third, and most important, the American soldier was not psychologically ready to fight in Korea. This is a theme to which T. R. Fehrenbach returns repeatedly in his account of the early failure of the U.S. forces to halt the In Min Gun.¹²⁸

¹²⁶MacArthur, p.336.

¹²⁷A good account of the battle fought by Smith and his men can be found in Goulden, pp.116-123.

¹²⁸The complete title of Fehrenbach's book, This Kind of

MacArthur's biographer, William Manchester, states the case for the Marines' performance at Inchon clearly:

"In the history of arms certain crack troops stand apart, elite units which demonstrated gallantry in the face of overwhelming odds. There were the Greeks and Spartans at Thermopylae, Xenophon's Ten Thousand, the Bowmen of Agincourt, the Spanish 'Tercios', the French Foreign Legion at Camerone, the Old Contemptibles of 1914, the Brigade of the Guards at Dunkirk. And there was also the 1st Marine Division at Inchon. Veterans of Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, Pelelieu, and Okinawa, the leathernecks were the cutting edge of the force which...MacArthur put ashore behind enemy lines on September 15th."¹⁵⁵

We can excuse some of the enthusiasm of Manchester, himself an ex-Marine who had served in the Pacific during WW II. Yet, the basic thrust of his statement is correct. The Marines who stormed ashore at Inchon on that fall morning were the best that the U.S. had to offer in the way of specially trained/"elite" forces and their employment in a task which was their forte represents the best use of these types of units in war, whether limited or total.

MacArthur, in convincing the higher authorities in Washington of the potential of the Inchon landing, remarked that the amphibious landing "is the most powerful tool we have."¹⁵⁶ The results of this operation proved him correct. On September 28th, less than two weeks after the assault at Inchon, the politically important capital city of Seoul had been recaptured by forces of the X Corps. This joint-service campaign, which featured contributions from every branch, stands as the foremost example of "selective intervention" by U.S./U.N. coalition in the Korean intervention.

¹⁵⁵William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 577.

¹⁵⁶Ibid, 575.

transport ships essential to the landing. This fact would also preclude the traditional retirement of the amphibious force at night in accordance with established naval doctrine.¹⁵³

Terrain was another drawback to the selection of Inchon. A landing there would not be against the gently sloping and wide beaches of the Pacific were the amphibious skill of the Navy and Marine Corps had been honed. Instead, this assault would be against a fully built up industrial port complex complete with sea walls that were, in some places, at least ten feet tall. Furthermore, because the island of Wolmi Do dominated the harbor and contained significant fortifications it would have to be taken before the actual capture of the city could commence. Hence, the initial period of favorable tides had to be devoted to landings on this crucial piece of real estate which would then be followed, after an almost twelve hour lag, by the attack against Inchon itself. In other words, the positive effect of local surprise would be lost long before the actual assault began on the actual city.

Lcdr. Arlie G. Capps, a gunnery officer on the amphibious planning staff, later remarked: "We drew up a list of every conceivable and natural handicap and Inchon had 'em all."¹⁵⁴ It is therefore a credit to the skill and professionalism of the specially trained amphibious forces that this pivotal landing was successful. Not only was the planning and execution by the naval elements superb but, the actual assault by the 1st Marine Division was almost of textbook fashion.

¹⁵³Field, p. 177.

¹⁵⁴Cagle and Manson, p. 81.

advantage accruing to the U.N. forces in the form of superior mobility was crucial to their success at Inchon.

The use of specially trained and "elite" forces was also very much in evidence in the Inchon landing. The amphibious planning staff that pieced together the operation following MacArthur's conceptualization is one example of using a distinctly experienced group to press home a known advantage in material capability. Also, the troops which made the initial assault at Inchon, the Marines, were a preeminently seasoned force which could very well be described as "elite".

It is well known that the selection of Inchon as the target for an amphibious assault was not a popular one among the Navy and Marine Corps planners who were tasked with its tactical implementation. Their objections were many. First, the target area had the second highest tidal range in the world, averaging well over 25 feet.¹⁵¹ Because of this, the invasion could only take place on a limited number of days, when the tide would exceed the draft of the largest landing craft, approximately 29 feet. Thus the actual date of the assault was restricted to three days--September 15th, 27th, or October 11th--when the high tide would give the U.N. forces dual three hour periods of unrestricted beach operations between sunrise and sunset.¹⁵² Of course, if this same information was understood by the enemy the results could be disastrous.

The Navy was also concerned about the sea approach to the beachhead itself. Long and tortuous, the two channels which led from the Yellow Sea to the harbor at Inchon were easily susceptible to mining and, due to their narrowness, virtually necessitated a daylight approach for the bulky

¹⁵¹The Bay of Fundy between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, with a range exceeding 40 feet, is the first.

¹⁵²Langley, p.46.

assigned to cover the operation. The work of these elements proved very beneficial, for though they were heavily opposed by shore batteries on their initial sortie, the bombardment in conjunction with multiple air strikes silenced the enemy resistance. This allowed the landing on Wolmi Do, at dawn on September 15th, to be made without opposition from coastal artillery.¹⁴⁸

OPERATION CHROMITE also exhibited the advantage inherent in the use of speed and mobility on the battlefield. The Marine history of the landing estimates that, on the day of the invasion, there were only about 2200 defenders in the city of Inchon.¹⁴⁹ This force was obviously insufficient to hold the port against the combined Marine and Army force of X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, USA, numbering close to 70,000 and slated to conduct the assault.¹⁵⁰

Certainly, if this operation was anything, it was a surprise to the Communists. The reasons for this are varied. One is the hydrographic difficulties that Inchon presented as a target, a matter we will discuss in more depth shortly. However, the ability of the U.S. to move large amounts of men and material across the oceans and ultimately to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault against hostile territory, far away from friendly lines, was not fully appreciated by the North Koreans. Perhaps the lack of acquaintance inside the Communist camp with amphibious operations is partially responsible for this. Yet, there can be little doubt that the exploitation of the

¹⁴⁸Field, pp.191-197.

¹⁴⁹For a complete rundown of the North Korean strength see: Montross and Canzona, Marine Operations Vol. II, The Inchon-Seoul Campaign Appendix B, pp.325-328.

¹⁵⁰X Corps consisted of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division along with supporting air, artillery, staff and administrative elements.

The superiority of the naval forces of the U.N. in comparison to those of the Communist forces has already been discussed. However, nowhere was this more prevalent than in the power projection mission. While the DPRK and its allies, the USSR and the PRC, might possess a minimal "sea denial" capability they had no ability to use the oceans as platforms from which the battle on the land could be affected. Furthermore, they lacked the capability to deny this arena to the U.N. forces.

The advantage in this area, for the West, was complete. It began with several elements of technological superiority. First, the U.S. and its allies were equipped with sea based tactical air that could both ensure the protection of the fleet while concurrently holding hostile naval forces at significant risk. Many of these assets could also be used in close air support for ground forces operating on the peninsula. This latter capability would be especially cogent to the amphibious landing at Inchon where carrier based air would provide an unmatched boost to the invading forces.¹⁴⁷ Second, the utilization of cruisers and destroyers by the invading force at Inchon in the reduction of the coastal defenses on the island of Wolmi Do, dominating the approach to the harbor, and to cover and support the initial landing was another example of using weapons systems that the enemy did not have and could not counter. On the two days prior to the actual landing Inchon was treated to a pounding by the nine ship Gunfire Support Group

¹⁴⁷The close air support for the Inchon landing was provided by F-4U Corsairs flown by both Navy and Marine pilots. Although the proficiency of these pilots and their aircraft was a very real advantage, the use of some "new" weapons would also have a positive effect on the operation. Of particular interest in this regard was the initial use of napalm for defoliation purposes along the Inchon beachfront before the landing of the Marines. This was a tactically sound employment of a weapon that had first been introduced in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. See: Michael Langley, Inchon Landing (New York: Times Books, 1979), p.62.

The General would later recall that the idea first occurred to him on his inspection of the battlefield on June 29, 1950:¹⁴⁴

"I watched for an hour the pitiful evidence of the disaster that I had inherited. In that brief interval...I formulated my plans....I would throw my occupation soldiers into this breach. Completely outnumbered, I would rely upon strategic maneuver to overcome the great odds against me....<I>n these reflections the genesis of the Inchon operation began to take shape--a counter-stroke that could in itself wrest victory from defeat."¹⁴⁵

The General's plan was relatively simple, it was its execution that would be the challenge. In a cable to Washington in the July it was described in this way:

"Operation planned mid-September is amphibious landing of a two division corps in the rear of enemy lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from the south by the Eighth Army. I am firmly convinced that early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main line of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow."¹⁴⁶

What this communication does not say is that: 1) the amphibious landing would take place almost 150 miles behind enemy lines, and 2) that the forces needed for its execution were not then available in the Far East. But, despite its drawbacks, the Inchon idea was a sound one, for it pitted the forces of the U.N., principally those of the United States, against those of North Korea in an area where their relative capabilities were far out of balance--the projection of military power from the sea.

¹⁴⁴One will recall that it was also from this experience that MacArthur recommended the commitment of U.S. ground force to combat in Korea.

¹⁴⁵MacArthur, pp.333-334.

¹⁴⁶Ibid, p.346.

objectives was, as possible, provided. Our attention must now be directed to the use of this potential on the battlefield.

B. USING SELECTIVE INTERVENTION

We will now look at the use of "selective intervention" in the Korean conflict. Our primary concern in this context will be with the exploitation of technological superiority, speed/mobility, specially trained forces, and joint service operations in the successful prosecution of a limited war. The example chosen for diagnosis in this regard is the amphibious invasion of the Korean port city of Inchon by U.N. forces on September 15, 1950.

Historian David Rees called Inchon "a modern Cannae, ever to be studied."¹⁴² Certainly, all who examine this action have dubbed it a strategic masterpiece. Due to its success, U.N. forces, under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, were able, almost overnight, to transition from the defensive to the offensive on the peninsula. Though the study of this action, planned and executed as OPERATION CHROMITE, is extremely interesting, space does not permit a full recount of its conduct here.¹⁴³ Rather, our concern is with its implementation as an example of a very successful use of specific force elements in a limited war. It is in this vein that we will proceed.

The conception of the Inchon landing was that of MacArthur himself. He was looking for a method through which the pressure could be simultaneously taken off the Pusan Perimeter and a death blow dealt to the In Min Gun.

¹⁴²Rees, p.96.

¹⁴³Several books have been written about the Inchon landing. The most oft quoted and probably the most readable is, Col. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., USMC(Ret.), Victory at High Tide (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968).

the movement of naval forces and embarked troops by the use of mine warfare (most notably at Wonsan in November 1950) it remained very much on the defensive in the naval arena throughout the war. Naval superiority was exploited on many occasions by the U.N. forces, Inchon being the foremost example. Also, the day-to-day support of the land war was assisted by naval forces through both coastal bombardment and air strike. The latter mission augmented greatly Air Force efforts to maintain air superiority over the peninsula. In many cases, the ability of the carriers and their indigenous air wing to close on and hit targets that were out of the range of ground based air, on short notice, proved invaluable to the U.N. war effort.

Thus we see that the goals that had been established in the Entry phase of the conflict were translated into an effective vehicle for action on the field. The buildup of the U.S. conventional ground, air, and naval forces in Korea was a recognition that the battle there would be one of classical military attrition, at least until the "Western" forces were strong enough to assume the offensive. The immediate advantages of the superiority of American air and naval units were also quickly brought into play. In short, the U.S. was assuring a check to aggression and the survival of at least a portion of the ROK until the balance of forces on the peninsula could be tilted through the influx of men from either domestic mobilization or its allies in the United Nations.

Later, in December after the entry of the forces of Communist China into the Korean conflict President Truman would continue this commitment by declaring a National Emergency. This action was designed to ready the country both materially and psychologically for the prospect of a long and gruelling yet, still limited war. Hence, the means for effective military action in the spirit of established

secure and guard airfields and port facilities around Pusan. Yet, as the war continued, FEAR was able to consolidate its capability to strike Korea and was to play a major role in the fighting, specifically in carrying the war to the north.

As its official historiographer, James A. Fields, puts it, the naval war in "Korea had its strange and unpredictable characteristics. One of these was the fact that, so far as the control of the seas was concerned, the war started with the exploitation phase."¹³⁹ This was because the immediate adversary, North Korea, had little or no naval capability outside of a small coastal patrol force used for both defense and insurgency purposes. Thus, the Navy was able, when ordered, to impose a blockade on the coast of Korea with basically the units on hand in the Far East, although the transfer of an additional Carrier Task Group to provide air cover for the blockading force was requested.¹⁴⁰

The Navy also had another advantage over the other services. This was the early augmentation of its forces by those of the U.N. members who had opted to help in the intervention. Chief among these was the contribution of the British, whose attack carrier HMS Triumph and accompanying escorts provided a needed boost after their arrival on June 30th.¹⁴¹ Other nations contributing naval forces in the first few weeks of the war were Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. All U.N. Naval Forces eventually came under the operational command of Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander of Naval Forces Far East (CINCNaveFE).

As a result of these factors the U.N. Naval Forces quickly captured and maintained the control of the sea around Korea. Although the DPRK was able to stall some of

¹³⁹Field, p. 74.

¹⁴⁰FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 281.

¹⁴¹Field, p. 56.

Inchon and would remain in combat in Korea for the duration of the hostilities.

Although the deployment of ground forces was the most crucial factor in the early stages of the Korean War, the build-up of the Navy and Air Force for use in the intervention had to be accomplished also. As already mentioned, these forces were the first to be utilized by the U.S. on and around the peninsula. Their ability to provide an almost unchallengeable sanctuary for the employment of American military power was to prove extremely beneficial on more than one occasion in the war. However, unlike the Army, their mobilization could not be accomplished by a mere influx of men, for they needed the weapons systems in which their personnel, once trained, could perform their missions. Hence, these services went to war with what they had and with little hope of short-term augmentation.

The Air Force, which because of the significant role that airpower had played in the conduct of the second World War, had not suffered nearly the cuts that demobilization had forced on the other branches and was in good shape when hostilities broke out in Korea. No where was this more true than in the Far East, where there was stationed the "largest aggregation of USAF air strength outside the continental United States."¹³⁸ However, the 350 combat aircraft that were assigned to Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commander of the Far East Air Force (FEAF), were spread throughout the Pacific. Furthermore, those stationed in Japan, although able to reach Korea, were, due to fuel considerations, limited in the amount of time they could spend over the battlefield. As we saw earlier, this was one of the considerations in the initial deployment of American troops to Korea on June 29th, when the mission of these forces was to

¹³⁸Appleman, p.50.

Pusan, the last remaining foothold for the U.N. forces on the peninsula. The defense of Pusan was entrusted to Gen. Walton H. Walker, commander of the Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK), a man that many have written never shared the full confidence of his immediate superior, MacArthur. This fact was to impact on the performance of Walker's forces throughout his tenure in the war.¹³⁵

The final element of the ground forces committed in the early months of the Korean War were those of the Marine Corps. Priding themselves on their slogan "First to Fight" they were obviously anxious to get into action as soon as possible. Gen. Clifton B. Cates, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, volunteered its services on June 28th for duty in Korea.¹³⁶ When it became apparent that the Army would be unable to mobilize quickly and that the fortunes of the U.N. force in Korea depended on a rapid build-up of men and material around Pusan, the offer of the Corps was accepted.¹³⁷ The deployment of the Marines, in comparison to that of the Army Reserve and National Guard, to the Far East is remarkable. The Marine Reserve was recalled to active duty on July 19th. By August 2nd a Provisional Marine Brigade, including a BCT and attached indigenous air support, had arrived at Pusan. On September 15th the 1st Marine Division would spearhead the assault of the beach at

¹³⁵Walker was killed in an jeep accident while still in command of the Eighth Army in December. For an example of the perception of distrust between MacArthur and Walker see: Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983) pp. 543-544.

¹³⁶Montross and Canzona, Marine Operations Vol. I, p. 48.

¹³⁷It is fairly well known that the Marines were out of favor bureaucratically in Washington during this period. Their forte, amphibious assault, had been relegated to the status of the horse cavalry in the minds of most of the top national security officials. Also, President Truman had a strong personal distaste for the Corps which he would later describe as a naval police force with "a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." See: "Truman Letter to Rep. MacDonough," New York Times, September 6, 1950, p. 13.

The only place where the Army could find relatively complete and ready units to fill the ranks of its swollen authorized manning was in the National Guard of the United States. Gen. Collins, Army Chief of Staff, and the other members of the JCS opposed the nationalization of the National Guard until it became an absolute necessity. This was principally due to the highly charged political nature of selecting the individual units to be recalled and the economic dislocation that it would cause. However, in late July the Chiefs finally recommended that the President authorize the recall of certain Guard units to active duty. Therefore, on September 1st, four divisions and two RCT's were called to active duty, to be brought to full wartime strength through conscription and ready for operational employment by April 1951.¹³³

Thus, the Army began to build toward the ability to cover the global security commitments of the United States. Yet, as we have seen, the tactical situation in Korea demanded more than just a long-term plan for mobilization. Forces to bolster the defense of Pusan and ultimately to go on the offensive versus the In Min Gun had to be found. They were to come from three sources, the occupation force in Japan, the General Reserve in the continental U.S., and the United States Marine Corps.

By the end of July MacArthur had committed three of the four divisions of his Japanese occupation force to the Korean Peninsula.¹³⁴ The 2nd Infantry Division had also been dispatched from the General Reserve to Far East. These units, augmented by the ROK Army would eventually form the defense perimeter around the crucial beachhead surrounding

¹³³A good discussion of the mobilization of the Army for the Korean War is found in Schnabel, pp.117-125. It is from this source that the majority of the facts presented in the previous discussion were taken.

¹³⁴The 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry.

By July 19th the authorized strength of the Army had been increased on three separate occasions and now totaled 834,000.¹³⁰ But, as James Schnabel was to later write, "a paper army wins no battles and deters no aggressor."¹³¹ Therefore, the manpower to fill the ranks had to be acquired. This was done in two ways, through conscription and the recall of reserves to active duty.

In July the Army called for 50,000 draftees to be inducted into the service in September.¹³² Of course, it was recognized that these men were far from helping the immediate situation in Korea. However, it was hoped that they would fill the positions of the rapidly depleted General Reserve held as a contingency force within the continental United States.

On June 30th Congress authorized the President to order units of the Reserves and the National Guard into active federal service. The rapid mobilization of the Army Reserve in the face of the crisis in Korea was, at best, a bad joke. Out of well over 600,000 men on the ledgers of both the inactive and active reserve there was little information available through which to intelligently select those best suited for regular service. Because periodic medical examinations had been discontinued in February 1947, the process of locating those still physically fit for duty was slow and arduous. On July 22nd, 1,063 Army Medical Service officers were recalled to help with the task of sorting the situation out. Nevertheless, the effect of the recall of the Army Reserve was long in being felt on the fighting front.

¹³⁰Schnabel, pp. 119-120.

¹³¹Ibid, p. 120.

¹³²Ibid.

The soft life of occupation duty in Japan where, due to the constraint of space, there was little opportunity for training caught up to the American GI with a vengeance in the first days of the Korean War.

The failure of "Task Force Smith" was shortly followed by the defeat of the entire 24th Division at the Kum River on the 16th of July and the loss of Taejon four days later. With MacArthur's "arrogant display of strength" now a shambles the ROK and American forces began their retreat to the Pusan beachhead. It would be within the confines of this "Pusan Perimeter" that the strength of the newly formed U.N. Command would grow and eventually turn the tide of battle. This was accomplished through the mobilization of men and material and the exploitation of certain advantages available to the "Western" coalition. It is to an analysis of this mobilization that we now turn.

President Truman addressed the question of the possibility of partial mobilization early in discussions with his advisors on the Korean crisis. At the second Blair House meeting, held on June 26th, Truman asked Gen. Bradley if it might not be necessary to callup the National Guard were the U.S. to become involved on the ground in Korea.¹²⁹ In July, with the commitment of American forces now a fact and their performance on the field less than satisfactory, this concern now required action. The problem was not that the authorized strength of the U.S. Army, 630,000 on the eve of the Korean War, was insufficient to meet the challenge of the DPRK. It was that it could not simultaneously fight in Korea and fulfill its commitments elsewhere. It was this situation that the President and his advisors set about to rectify in the early days of the intervention.

War: A Study in Unpreparedness, gives some indication of the angle he pursues in his history of the war.

¹²⁹FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 183.

It provides a classic case of the use of combined arms and a goal toward which the employment of force in limited wars should strive.

C. IMPLEMENTING OBJECTIVES

In this section we will deal with the actual quest for the fulfillment of the objectives established in the Entry phase on the battlefield. Two questions will be addressed in this context: Were the original goals of the war clearly understood by the battlefield commander(s) as evidenced by their pursuit through military action? And, were any of the objectives changed after the beginning of the conflict? The Korean War offers a timeless example for the study of both these inquiries.

The conflict in Korea will always, from the American perspective, be considered controversial because of the disagreement that it fostered between President Truman and his commander in the Far East, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In the end the friction between the two resulted in the latter's relief from command, touching off a furor that has lived on through the vehicle of history even today.

The point with which we will be concerned is whether or not the Far East Commander understood the objectives of the United States in deciding to employ force in Korea. Such a determination is not as easy as it might sound for there is ample evidence that the members of the administration were not in total agreement as to how to implement, through the use of armed force, the pursuit of their goals in the Korean War. This controversy centered around the decision to allow the U.N. ground forces to cross the 38th parallel.

As was mentioned in our addressal of the initial establishment of objectives before conflict entry, the goals of defending the ROK and establishing a setback to Soviet

expansion were not out of harmony with the crossing of the 38th parallel. However, the objective that proved, in the end, to be out of line with the expansion of the war to the north was the limitation of the conflict. It was also on this issue that MacArthur's troubles with his superiors in Washington stemmed.

Early in the intervention the confusion surrounding this issue was already evident. On July 13th CBS Radio reported that Korean President Rhee had issued a statement "to the effect that the action of the North Korean forces had obliterated the 38th parallel and that no peace and order could be maintained in Korea as long as the division of the 38th parallel remained." The report further asserted that "an American Army spokesman had publically stated that American troops were only fighting to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel and would stop there and use force if necessary to prevent South Korean troops from advancing beyond."¹⁵⁷ The Department of State hastened to prevent the occurrence of what it considered premature statements by both Korean and American officials until a specific policy had been determined.

In fact, the administration had always been ambiguous about the possibility of crossing the 38th parallel. At his weekly press conference of the same day the President was asked if he intended to carry the conflict north of the parallel. Truman's remarks were later paraphrased as follows:

"...<I will> make that decision when <I come> to it....This country has never recognized that line as one separating sovereignties of a divided Korea but merely as a geographic convenience for the original occupation tasks of the American and Russian troops."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.373.

¹⁵⁸Anthony Leverio, "President Sees U.S. Holding in Korea for Counter- Attack", New York Times, July 14, 1950,

Truman's hesitance can be understood if one realizes that there was a spirited debate going on among his advisors as to the wisdom of crossing the parallel. Furthermore, the issue did not appear nearly as pressing in July as it would after the landing at Inchon, in September, opened the door for a quick move by the U.N. ground forces to the north.

The battlelines in Washington over the parallel issue formed within the Department of State with the Policy Planning Staff, headed by Paul Nitze and strongly influenced by George Kennan, arguing for the restriction of military action south of the geographic line. Meanwhile, the officials manning the Asia desk, primarily John Allison and Dean Rusk, urged that no political constraints be placed on the employment of military power in Korea. The argument of the former group was that the crossing of the parallel seriously increased the danger of conflict with both the Soviets and the Chinese.¹⁵⁹ However, the latter felt that the increased risk of a widened war was more than outweighed by the need to repel aggression, specifically that which was believed to be Soviet inspired. Hence, it advocated the pursuit of the war north of the parallel until the North Korean Army could be destroyed and Korea could be unified.¹⁶⁰ The convergence of their views can be found in NSC 81/1, dated September 9, 1950, which stated that:

"Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists...and <the> appraisal of the risk of general war....It would be expected that the U.N. Commander would receive authorization to conduct military

pp. 1,6. The rules of the Presidential press conference under Truman prohibited his being quoted directly hence, his remarks were reported in paraphrase form.

¹⁵⁹FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.453.

¹⁶⁰Ibid, p.461.

operations north of the 38th parallel, for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea."¹⁶¹

Thus the recommendation was that the U.S. pursue the unification of Korea but, only if this could be accomplished short of a widened war.

When the total success of the Inchon landing opened the door for the extension of the ground war to the north the President approved the employment of U.S. forces across the parallel. In late September, the message sent from the JCS informing MacArthur of this decision was explicit about the basis upon which this "escalation" was approved. In words that were taken almost verbatim from NSC 81/1 they said:

Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations...north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances...will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.¹⁶²

On October 9th, when evidence of a possible intervention of the Chinese Communists mounted after the U.N. forces had crossed the 38th parallel the JCS revised their earlier instructions:

"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgement, action by forces

¹⁶¹Ibid, pp.715-716.

¹⁶²JCS 92801 to CINCFE, September 27, 1950. Cited in Goulden, p.237.

now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."¹⁶³

In these communications we can see that the Far East Commander should have been well acquainted with the political considerations that were preeminent in the minds of the U.S. decision-makers. The stated "tactical" objective was now the destruction of the In Min Gun and the Chinese Army could be engaged, if necessary, on Korean soil in achieving this end. When MacArthur, on October 17th, formulated a plan that would send "non-Korean" forces to within 45 miles of the Chinese frontier he was already stretching an order. But, a week later, when he issued a directive that, in effect, made the Yalu River, separating Manchuria from Korea, the geographic goal of all of the forces under his command he was directly challenging established policy.¹⁶⁴

Some would later argue that the original decision to carry the war into the north had signalled a quantum change in U.S. policy and therefore, MacArthur's actions were only representative of this transition. Yet, such was not the case. The extension of the war into the north and the quest for the annihilation of the In Min Gun flowed from the earlier decisions to punish aggression and assure the survival of the ROK. Besides, MacArthur had long sought the destruction of the Communist forces from the north. His Inchon operation had been specifically designed to hammer the North Koreans between the anvil of the X Corps and the hammer of the Eighth Army in an attempt to shatter its will and capability to offer further resistance. What had changed was something more subtle but, ultimately just as disturbing to the pursuit of a limited war, the criteria for

¹⁶³FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.915.

¹⁶⁴Ibid, p.256.

measuring the accomplishment of objectives. However, whatever confusion may have surrounded this aspect of the war one goal of the conflict remained undisturbed, the pledge to limit the military action to the Korean Peninsula. It was this constraint, in concert with MacArthur's failure to grasp its implications, that would get the U.N. Commander into trouble.

Two distinct features appear to underpin the the failure of MacArthur to fully grasp the political desires of his superiors in the use of force in Korea. The first is the image of infallibility that surrounded the General due to both his vast experience and the recent astounding success of the Inchon landing. The second was the tendency of the authorities in Washington to assume that MacArthur understood the realities of the changed world in which the United States operated after the close of World War II, specifically after the Soviets joined the nuclear club.

MacArthur, by far the most senior officer still on active duty in the U.S. armed forces, was far removed from the Joints Chiefs who were tasked with passing the orders of the President on to him. None had ever served with or under the General and most, including the President himself, had never spent a great deal of time with the him. This led to judgements by both on the basis of second impressions and perceptions. In such a context, the landing at Inchon and its result were extremely significant. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as U.N. Commander, has grasped well the implications of the Inchon success on the image of the General:

"A...subtle result of the Inchon triumph was the development of an almost superstitious regard for General MacArthur's infallibility. Even his superiors, it seemed, began to doubt if they should question any of MacArthur's decisions and as a result he was deprived of the advantage of forthright and informed criticism, such

as any commander should have..."¹⁶⁵

No one can say what the effect of outside advice would have been on MacArthur. Yet, many of the authorities in Washington would later claim that as the U.N. forces continued their drive toward the Yalu the signs of an impending disaster were growing. Unfortunately, none spoke up until it was too late.¹⁶⁶ There is little doubt that MacArthur was out of touch with the political mood in Washington. When the Korean War broke out it had been fifteen years since he had been in the continental United States. During this absence the thinking concerning the employment of power and the grand strategy of the U.S. had undergone a substantial transition. The Far East Commander had access to all of the pertinent documents on the evolution of strategic thought and he was frequently visited by Defense and State officials but, one has to wonder if he really understood the new role of the U.S. D. Clayton James points out that "unlike some of the top commanders of the wartime European Theater who had been in on the evolution of the containment policy since 1945, MacArthur...was not acquainted with the twists and turns of Pentagon thinking nor with the officials who had been developing the Cold War strategy."¹⁶⁷ This was to make the General's strategic thinking out of step with that of the contemporary political and military leadership.

¹⁶⁵Ridgway, p.42.

¹⁶⁶Acheson gives a good account of his feelings during this period and offers no excuses. See: Present at the Creation, p.466-468.

¹⁶⁷D. Clayton James, Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War, The Harmon lectures in Military History, No. 24 (Colorado Springs, CO: The United States Air Force Academy, 1982), pp.6-7.

Such a background was certainly assumed by Secretary of Defense George Marshall when he had sent CINCPAC a "for your eyes only" message on September 29, 1950.¹⁶⁸ This communication, encouraging the General to "feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of <the> 38th parallel", was later used by MacArthur as justification for his ordering non-Korean forces all the way to the Yalu.¹⁶⁹ Goulden states correctly that this message was intended to induce the General "to cross the 38th parallel with as little fanfare as possible."¹⁷⁰ The message was also never intended to authorize the U.N. Commander to use his forces in a way which might precipitate a wider war.

When evidence of Chinese intervention surfaced in late October MacArthur and his intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, were hesitant to admit the broadened scope of the war. After all, CINCPAC had assured President Truman at their face-to-face meeting on Wake Island two weeks earlier that if the Chinese did enter "there would be the greatest slaughter" because they had no air force and their combination with Russian air "just wouldn't work".¹⁷¹ Also, the U.N. forces under his command were on the verge of a great victory, having crossed the 38th parallel on October 1st and captured the northern capital of Pyongyang on October 19th. The war in Korea, in MacArthur's mind, was all but over.

By November 1st the evidence of the massive entry of Chinese forces became overwhelming. The next day Peking Radio formally announced that a "Volunteer Corps for the

¹⁶⁸Gen. Marshall had replaced Louis Johnson at the Pentagon in mid-September.

¹⁶⁹For the text of the Marshall message see: FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.826.

¹⁷⁰Goulden, p. 258.

¹⁷¹Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p.366.

protection of the Hydroelectric Zone...had entered Korea expressly to protect the dams and power complexes along the Yalu."¹⁷² On November 4th, in response to an inquiry from the JCS as to the extent of Chinese military forces in Korea, MacArthur remained calm. He stated that it was too early to judge the scope of the Chinese commitment to Korea warning that "a final appraisal should await a more complete accumulation of military facts."¹⁷³ Over the next week his assessment of the Korean situation would waver between the prediction of disaster and that of reassurance, a situation that, needless to say, was confusing to the decision-makers in Washington.

MacArthur wanted to bomb the Yalu bridges which connected Manchuria with the northern provinces of Korea. In this way he hoped to stem the flood of Chinese men and material that was surging to the south toward the U.N. forces. When the scope of these operations threatened to inadvertently carry the war into Manchuria he was ordered to postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of the border. In a message dispatched to Washington on November 6th, protesting this restriction, MacArthur stated that "...large force<s> are pouring across all bridges of the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command."¹⁷⁴ It would seem that it was time to reconsider the offensive in North Korea and consolidate the U.N. contingent in a strong defensive position, for the chance of continued successful operations was fast waning. After all, MacArthur's most recent directive had ordered him to "continue...action <only> as long as in your judgement

¹⁷²Goulden, p.297.

¹⁷³Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p.373.

¹⁷⁴Ibid, p.375.

<such> action offers a reasonable chance for success." Instead, by the end of the month MacArthur's command was on the offensive again.

Just as uncertainty still surrounds the decision of the Communist camp to initiate the Korean War so does it also cloud the understanding of the PRC's military entry into Korea.¹⁷⁵ However, one thing is certain, the drive of the Chinese into the northern provinces of Korea in late October and early November 1950 should have been a significant indicator of the possibility of a widened war to the American political and military analysts. Unfortunately for the U.S. decision-makers in both Washington and the Far East, by the middle of November the Chinese had broken contact all along the front. It was in this situation that MacArthur misjudged Chinese intentions and launched his ill-fated offensive to end the war. That such an error could be made now seems close to unbelievable. In interpreting the Communist perspective Whiting notes that the three week lull that followed "was designed to maintain freedom of action while observing the U.S. response to Chinese intervention."¹⁷⁶ When the response was a continued drive toward the Yalu coupled with a promise that "If successful, this <offensive will> end the war" the breadth of maneuver left to the Chinese was significantly narrowed.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the U.S. was destined to clash with the armies of Communist China for well over two more years.

The actual outcome of the November offensive was a disaster for the widely dispersed U.N. troops. The Eighth Army, operating in western Korea was forced south of Seoul

¹⁷⁵The classic work on this subject is still considered to be Michael Whiting's China Crosses the Yalu (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960).

¹⁷⁶Ibid, p.vii.

¹⁷⁷Goulden, p.325.

before it could recapture the offensive. Meanwhile, X Corps staging from the Wonsan/Hungnam beachhead was forced to conduct a retreat to the south, by sea, for many of its units. The blame for the results of this situation can not be laid solely at the doorstep of the MacArthur house. Although, it stems from a true misperception of the extent to which the U.S. was prepared to take the war in Korea by the Far East commander, officials in Washington must also shoulder a portion of the blame for not correcting the mistakes of their field commander and for underestimating the commitment of the Chinese Communists.

This debacle was the beginning of the end for the General. He had always been outspoken and had, on more than one occasion, misstated or seemingly publicly disagreed with government policy. Yet, in the bleak days before the strategic reversal at Inchon MacArthur was needed as a distinguished commander and respected tactician around which the "Western" coalition could rally. After its overwhelming success he was perceived as an "American Caesar"; a description which William Manchester so deftly coined. It was only after his repeated disagreements with the Truman Administration over the conduct of the Korean War that he was relieved of his duties.¹⁷⁸ This controversy remains important, even today, for it underlines the importance of a full understanding of the political nature of limited war, especially in an era when recourse to general war is close to unthinkable.

¹⁷⁸The immediate cause of MacArthur's removal was the reading of a letter he had written to Minority Leader Martin(R) on the floor of the House that was strongly critical of administration policy. It was this correspondence that contained the well-known phrase: "There is no substitute for victory." For the views of the two principals on this final collision see: Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, pp.445-450 and MacArthur, pp.385-396.

In summary, the objectives of the U.S. in Korea were not fully understood by the Far East Commander. Principally this failure resulted from his inability to comprehend the reasons for limiting the war. The fact that the criteria used for the measurement of the other goals of punishing aggression and assuring the survival of the ROK did not help matters for the General. (This situation will be discussed in more detail in the section on Termination.) Therefore, the U.S. effort in Korea that had begun so well was headed for a long and bleak period.

D. ALLIES: RECRUITMENT AND RELATIONS AFTER ENTRY

The final section of our analysis of the Conduct phase of this war will center on the relations between the United States and its allies in the United Nations following their entry into hostilities in Korea. The "allied" material contribution to the effort in Korea was, as mentioned earlier, expected to be minimal. However, as the justification for military action was found in the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, continued support within this international body was considered crucial to the continued successful prosecution of the war. It is an examination of this situation which we will undertake.

The members of the U.N., who had supported the decision to militarily defend the ROK, were less enthusiastic about the extension of the war north of the 38th parallel. Their concern, much like that of the U.S., was centered on the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention should these states feel threatened by such an escalation. The United Kingdom was the natural leader of this group, for it was the foremost contributor, other than the U.S., to the U.N. effort. In fact, the U.K.'s leadership, in gaining international support for the continuation of the war into northern

Korea, would be essential in the U.N. Therefore, it was the British who were the prime movers in the formulation of an eight nation group for the drafting of a resolution to put before the U.N. General Assembly which would tacitly support the pursuit of the ground war north of the parallel.¹⁷⁹

As finally adopted on October 6, 1950 this "Eight Power" resolution stated the U.N. position as follows:

"Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950...that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

"Recalling that the essential objective of the ~~<previous>~~ resolutions of the General Assembly...~~<was>~~ the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Government of Korea;...

"Recommends that ...all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."¹⁸⁰

When first submitted, in late September, the "Eight Power" resolution was, as every other aspect of the war, seriously colored by the Inchon success. The North Korean armed forces were in headlong retreat throughout the entire peninsula and, though uncertainty still shrouded the possibility of intervention by the Chinese or the Russians, victory in Korea appeared to be at hand. However, the eventual unification of Korea was still considered a political vice military problem. The wording used in the General Assembly Resolution had been, "all appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure stability throughout Korea." As far as the parties in the United Nations were concerned this

¹⁷⁹This resolution was submitted by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Phillipines, and the U.K. on September 29, 1950. FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp.826-828.

¹⁸⁰General Assembly of the United Nations Resolution 376(V), Ibid, pp.904-906. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions.

included and, in fact, mandated the use of negotiation as well as military force in pursuit of this goal.

On October 3rd, as the General Assembly was debating the Eight Power resolution, an event occurred which caused a great deal of consternation among the U.N. allies and caused them to seek a clarification of the U.S. position. This was the meeting, in Peking between Chou En-lai and the Indian Ambassador, K. M. Pannikar. It was at this time that Chou threatened the intervention of Chinese Communist Forces should U.N. troops cross the 38th parallel. Naturally, this raised the blood pressure at capitals around the world which had committed forces to the intervention in Korea.

Again, it was the British who took the lead for the U.N. allies. Since the General Assembly resolution had not yet passed they wanted a forthright statement of U.S. intentions before U.N. forces plunged across the parallel. On October 6th Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador to the United States, met with Dean Rusk and Phillip Jessup of State to get a clarification on American policy. Two important questions were put to the U.S. officials at this meeting: 1) Was the American policy "still to localize the Korean fighting"? 2) Did General MacArthur have "clear instructions not to attack targets in Manchuria and Siberia...without full consultation"? When assured that the answer to both the these inquiries was yes the British seemed satisfied but still insisted on attempting to reassure the Chinese of U.N. intentions through Indian channels. Since the U.S. had no objections to these attempts the British were encouraged to continue in this vein.¹⁸¹ Hence, the British were convinced to continue their support for the crossing of the parallel.

¹⁸¹ FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 893-897.

It is obvious that Truman's regard for the "right" of each prisoner to decide his own fate, specifically if he felt his life in jeopardy should he return, was a principle on which he would not retreat. This was intimately connected with the U.S. ideological stand for the right of self-determination for the citizens of the ROK for, in the President's mind, if one was worth fighting over then the other was also.

Another explanation for the U.S.'s intransigence on this point is its connection with the pursuit of the Korean War as a campaign against the expansion of Communism under the direction of the Soviet Union. In a February 1952 memorandum to the President urging the acceptance of "voluntary repatriation" as an immutable position of the United States Dean Acheson demonstrated that he was well aware of this issue. Acheson noted that any agreement in Korea which forced the return of prisoners against their will "would seriously jeopardize the psychological position of the United States in its opposition to Communist tyranny."²⁰³ Acheson's support on the repatriation issue was significant because when the position had originally been conceived he had doubted its legality. Nevertheless, once won over, the Secretary proved a powerful advocate on the correctness of the policy. Hence, it was with the justification of these two objectives that the truce talks, now being held at Panmunjom, stalled on the POW issue for over a year.

C. TERMINATION AND MILITARY PRESSURE

The frequent stalemates at the Korean truce talks provided ample opportunity for the use of military pressure to quicken their pace or force concessions. We have already noted that an attempt along these lines in the summer of

²⁰³FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. XV, Pt. 1, p.44.

return to their homeland would represent an enormous propaganda coup for the West and set a dangerous precedent for the future. On May 7th the negotiating parties announced their stalemate on the POW issue to the world.²⁰⁰

The issue of "voluntary repatriation" marked an interesting point for deadlock in the negotiations. It had first surfaced as a tentative position for the U.N. negotiators when the truce talks started in the summer of 1951, had undergone some challenge within both the Departments of State and Defense, and had ultimately been accepted as a firm policy by both Truman and Acheson in February 1952.²⁰¹ Our study requires that we ask how this position related to the actual objectives of the intervention for the United States. One answer lies in the American commitment to self-determination in Korea.

Truman explained his support of "voluntary repatriation" as entirely a stand on a moral issue. In early May the President issued a statement which expressed his position clearly:

"...there shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war--as the Communists have insisted. To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our action in Korea. To return these prisoners of war in our hands would result in misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United States and the U.N.

"We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery."²⁰²

²⁰⁰Allan E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institute Press, 1978), p.403-406.

²⁰¹Bernstein, p.274.

²⁰²Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p.461.

During this period the FEAF kept unrelenting pressure on the Communists from the air. On July 13th, just after the negotiations had started, Ridgway had told the U.N. air units that "during this period...<he desired> to exploit <the> full capabilities of airpower to reap maximum benefit of our ability to punish the enemy wherever he may be in Korea."¹⁹⁷ This included massive raids against the northern capital of Pyongyang itself in late July and early August after overcoming the objections of Washington.¹⁹⁸ Unfortunately, this had little or no immediate effect on the Communist bargaining position. In fact, they walked out of the talks on August 22nd and did not return until October 24th.¹⁹⁹ Why the Communists did return is unclear. The excuse used was the transfer of the talks from Kaesong to Panmunjom six miles away. However, they came back with a significant concession. They would now accept the current battleline vice the 38th parallel as the armistice line. This progress and the effort expended to accomplish it were indicative of the pace of the negotiations.

After seven more months of tedious progress the end of the conflict appeared in sight. By May of 1952 the belligerents had narrowed the final settlement of the armistice to a single issue, the exchange of prisoners. The U.N. position in this area came to be known as "voluntary repatriation". This term simply indicated that no prisoner would be forced, against his will, to leave South Korea and return to either the PRC or the DPRK. The Communists violently opposed this policy for understandable reasons. The failure of a significant portion of their POW's to voluntarily

¹⁹⁷Putrell, Moseley, and Simpson, p.400.

¹⁹⁸Barton J. Bernstein, "The Struggle Over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?", in Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict (Seattle, WA: The University of Washington Press, 1983), p.269.

¹⁹⁹Ibid, p.270.

invitation of the United Nations Commander, now Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, to negotiate the first meeting was held at the town of Kaesong on July 10, 1951. This initial session pointed to the long road that would be ahead for the U.N. negotiators. To start things off, the U.N. rejected the Communist proposal for an immediate ceasefire and mutual withdrawal to separate sides of the 38th parallel. In this regard, it was felt that only continued military pressure would force the Communists to negotiate faithfully. Also, experience had shown that the parallel was far from defensible and since the U.N. forces were establishing themselves along the "Kansas-Wyoming" line the belief was that his hard-won territory should not be so easily returned to the enemy. There was also some holdover of the feeling that a loss of territory for the Communists, which agreement along the current battleline would mandate, was necessary to discourage any future attempts at armed aggression. For the moment, the U.N. delegation insisted that the first matter for the conference should be the establishment of an agenda from which the talks could then be structured. This proposal was subsequently accepted by the Communists and over two weeks were spent on its formulation.

On July 26th an agenda was agreed to by the respective parties. In brief it called for: 1) the adoption of the agenda, 2) fixing a military demarcation line, 3) arrangements for a ceasefire and armistice, 4) arrangements relating to prisoners of war, and 5) recommendations to the countries concerned on both sides.¹⁹⁶ Since the agreement fulfilled the first item on the agenda the parties next devoted themselves to the second. It was to take almost three months before an understanding could be reached on an armistice line.

¹⁹⁶Ibid, pp. 735-737.

"Kansas-Wyoming" line was reached all that remained was the conclusion of an armistice. Unhappily, this was to take a long time.

B. INITIATING TERMINATION

With the American decision-makers now agreed that it was time to end the military hostilities in Korea we will now devote our attention to the beginnings of the actual process of termination. Action in this area was slow for, as much as they wished to breakoff the conflict, the U.S. seemed unable to do so. This situation was in a large part due to the lack of diplomatic contact between the United States and its two primary adversaries, the PRC and the DPRK. All feelers for the beginning of negotiations therefore, had to be passed through third parties or unofficial channels. In June a contact that had been made confidentially between George Kennan, currently out of government service, and Yakov Malik, the Soviet representative to the U.N. Security Council, bore fruit.¹⁹⁴ Though not responding to the Kennan initiative directly, Malik, in a radio address sponsored by the United Nations, declared that "the most acute problem of the present day--the problem of the armed conflict in Korea--could be settled." The first step to such a settlement would be the beginning of "discussions...between the belligerents for a ceasefire and an armistice."¹⁹⁵ It was through this opening that the Kcrean Armistice talks started.

However, the commencement of these talks proved to be only a small hurdle in the road to conflict termination. After the Chinese and Korean Communists accepted the

¹⁹⁴For the record of Kennan's use in this regard see: Ibid, pp.460-462, 483-486, and 507-511.

¹⁹⁵Ibid, p.547.

The U.N. Commander responded that his current directives were "adequate to cover" the protection of his forces and that he objected to any further limitations being placed on his freedom of action.¹⁹¹ By early April the General informed the Joint Chiefs that the limit of his offensive progress would be along a line that provided a good defensive position for his forces.¹⁹² This band of ground ran across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula and, with the exception of the portion bordering the Imjin River, was on the northern side of the 38th parallel. Known as the "Kansas-Wyoming" line it was to provide the tactical objective, with some slight modification, for the U.N. forces until the war in Korea ended over two years later.

On May 17, 1951 NSC 48/5 was approved which set forth the current policy of the United States with respect to Korea. While still avowing that the "ultimate objective" of the U.S. was to "provide for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea" the document asserted that this was made "without commitment to unify <that country> by force." A termination of hostilities in Korea would now be sought that in part, contained "appropriate armistice arrangements" and assured for the ROK, "to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense" below a border that was in no case to be south of the 38th parallel. Meanwhile, until such a settlement could be reached, the U.S. should..."inflict maximum losses on the enemy <and> prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression."¹⁹³ Thus, the policy of the U.S. and the indicator of its accomplishment had now come together. When the

¹⁹¹The full text of the MacArthur response can be found in Ibid, pp.255-256.

¹⁹²Collins, p.268.

¹⁹³The portions of NSC 48/5 dealing with the Korea problem can be found in FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, pp.439-442.

This change appeared and, in fact, was logical until it threatened to have an impact on another political objective of the conflict, the assurance of its limitation to the Korean peninsula. When the initial entry of Chinese Communist forces in October 1950 indicated that the destruction of the armed forces of the DPRK could not be accomplished short of dropping or altering this objective another rethinking of indicators seemed mandated. When this was not done, the U.N. Commander put his own interpretation on both the resolutions of the international body whose forces he commanded and the directives that he received from its appointed agent, the United States. The final result of this freeplay by MacArthur was an stinging setback for the U.N. forces and eventually his removal from command. Meanwhile his troops were pushed south of the 38th parallel and thus could not even meet the standards of the original termination criteria.

When U.N. forces were once again able to reverse the strategic trend in Korea and approach the 38th parallel a new indicator signalling the beginning of attempts to terminate the war was forthcoming. Determined not to make the same mistake twice, the JCS sent the following message to MacArthur on March 20, 1951:

"State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of the bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea.... Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for the next few weeks to provide for the security of UN forces and maintain contact with the enemy."¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, p.251.

been utilized as an occasion for ending the war.¹⁸⁸ In fact, there were several plans put forward they could be construed as potential indicators of objective accomplishment by the political authorities in Washington. The problem with each was that it was impossible to cross-reference the progress made under one to that achieved under an earlier set of criteria. Therefore, because each appeared so distinct they were looked on as not a redefinition of an indicator but, as an entirely new political objective.

The first of these indicators coincided with the commitment of the United States to the survival of the ROK within, at a minimum, its pre-war boundaries. This necessarily made the reaching of the 38th parallel a signal of the accomplishment of objectives. However, this definition did not last long. Because two of the foremost objectives of the conflict called for the setting of a precedent against overt aggression and Soviet expansion it was decided that the infliction of a punishment in the form of a loss of territory for the Communist held sector of Korea was important. Furthermore, it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that the assurance of "stability" throughout Korea, called for in the June 27th resolution of the Security Council, necessitated the destruction of the North Korean Army. This task was originally believed to entail only "mopping up" operations in the north. For this reason it also appealed to the political authorities because it would advance the cause of a unified and independent Korea without unwarranted risk.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, MacArthur, in September 1950 was ordered to destroy the In Min Gun.

¹⁸⁸MacArthur, p.359.

¹⁸⁹Collins, pp.145-146.

A. MEASURING OBJECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT

One of the problems which our analysis of the Conduct phase pointed out was that there was confusion concerning the difference between the objectives of the war and the indicators signalling the accomplishment of those objectives which were often framed as tactical or battlefield goals. This bewilderment was to have a profound impact on the historical interpretation of the war, particularly by those who were involved the decisions surrounding this conflict. A good example of this is a statement by Adm. C. Turner Joy, the first Chief Negotiator for the United Nations at the Korean truce talks. In his words "the political objectives of the United States in Korea weather-vaned with the winds of combat, accommodating themselves to current military events rather than constituting the goal to be reached through military operations."¹⁸⁷

Perhaps capabilities did affect intentions for the United States in Korea to some extent. However, the real debate was not so much what the U.S. wanted to accomplish, in a strategic sense, by engaging in a war on the peninsula as how these goals would be evidenced on the battlefield. Since Korea was the United States' first real exposure to limited war the development of such indicators posed a real problem. One that, unfortunately, was very late in being solved.

The debate within the Department of State over the wisdom of crossing the 38th parallel, discussed earlier, was indicative of the quandary that U.S. decision-makers found themselves in relation to the appropriate time to begin attempting to terminate hostilities. MacArthur was later to bemoan the fact that his smashing triumph at Inchon had not

¹⁸⁷C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate, (New York: MacMillan, 1955), pp. 173-174.

VI. THE KOREAN WAR: TERMINATION

The Termination phase of the Korean conflict was, from a chronological standpoint, the longest of the war. Most historians date its beginning no later than June 1951, when a Soviet overture started the belligerents in Korea down the road to peace. However, one could contend that its start can be found in the peace feelers put out in December 1950 by the United Nations with the half-hearted endorsement of the United States. Yet, regardless of its inception, the eventual settlement that led to a cessation of hostilities in Korea was to be a long time in coming.

In this chapter we will examine some of the important issues and aspects of the termination of this war. In the first section we will deal with the types of indicators that were being employed by the American decision-makers in keying them to the achievement of objectives which would then naturally lead to the initiation of steps toward terminating the war. The second topic of this chapter will be with the starting of and the early maneuvering surrounding the process of actually ending hostilities. It will be followed by an analysis of the role that the use of military pressure played in eventually arriving at a formal armistice. Of particular concern in this area will be the threatened use of nuclear weapons in attempts to end hostilities. And finally, we will address the actual signing of that armistice and the relationship of its terms to the objectives established in the Entry phase. It is to these tasks that we now turn.

Communist expansion. And finally, relations with the allies recruited prior to entry were emphasized in order to keep them in coalition with the U.S. However, this was not done at the expense of compromising the original objectives although, as we shall see in the Termination phase, the indicators associated with objective accomplishment were to undergo another change. It is to ending of this conflict that we now turn.

opinion the U.S. needed a watchdog and the British, still looking for a global role, were only too happy to fill that capacity.

The U.N. "alliance" was to undergo some other tough times before their intervention was officially ended in July 1953. However, the biggest crises were now behind them. Although the continued support of this organization was important to the United States the Americans determined that if the Chinese entry should force the dissolution of the U.N. Command they would continue in Korea alone.¹⁸⁶ With this determination made the U.S. was not forced to make concessions through the reorientation of its original objectives to either keep or to recruit allies. In fact, the addition of new allies was not avidly sought by the U.S. after the Entry phase of the war.

E. SUMMATION

It is extremely hard to grasp to conduct of the Korean War in the short space that has been afforded it here. However, there are some items worthy of note for the purposes of our study. First, there was an honest attempt by the United States to translate the objectives of the war into meaningful military action consonant with the perception of the type and scope of the conflict. The mobilization effort is adequate evidence of this. Second, "selective intervention" was also employed, the Inchon landing standing as the foremost example of this. Third, the original objectives of the war, principally the commitment to its limitation, were not clearly understood by the commander in the field. This situation was exacerbated by changes in the indicators associated with the accomplishment of the dual goals of resisting aggression and checking

¹⁸⁶Acheson, p.484.

other issues faced by their two nations. However, it was obvious that the Korean conflict was the dominate topic of the conference. The communique issued at the close of this meeting is indicative of common resolve that the U.S. and U.K. still shared in their search for an acceptable solution to the Korean problem. Pertinent portions of this document are reproduced below:

"The situation in Korea is one of the utmost gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them....A free and unified Korea--the objective which the United Nations has long sought--was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese communist forces entered Korea....

"The United Nations forces were sent to Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of <that body>. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

"We are in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East <or elsewhere>....

"For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation....Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution to the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea."¹⁸⁴

Thus, the British Prime Minister and the American President stated their joint policy on Korea. Though behind the scenes agreement was never total, the ability of the U.S. to keep the British actively involved on the peninsula assured the continuation of the United Nations Command. For their part, the British stayed because they wanted to see the United Nations work and, in Rees words, "believed that the Americans had been behaving irresponsibly."¹⁸⁵ In their

¹⁸⁴FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, 1476-1477.

¹⁸⁵Rees, p.230.

However, from this exchange one can detect that London was far more interested in negotiation, in the days before Chinese intervention, than Washington.

We might also assert that the British were more concerned about the possibility of the possibility of a widened war than the U.S. Yet, as we have seen, the American concerns in this area were very real also. In actuality the British position on this issue, which was very representative of the overall U.N. feeling, only reinforced a predetermined U.S. objective in the conflict.

Subsequent to the massive intervention of the Chinese Communists in late November there was again great consternation among the allies. Many privately accused the U.S. of leading them down the path to a wider war. In early December Clement Atlee, British Prime Minister, felt the situation serious enough to request a summit meeting with the President.¹⁸² The Truman-Atlee Summit, like other meetings of this type, produced no dramatic change in ongoing policy. Its primary purpose was to reassure the Prime Minister of the purpose and limits of the respective American political and military aims in Korea.¹⁸³ The two leaders also took the opportunity to examine some of the

¹⁸²The actual catalyst of the summit request had been some ill advised remarks concerning the use of atomic weapons in Korea by President Truman at his press conference of November 30th. The President had said, in effect, that the use of the atomic bomb had always been considered in relation to the Korean conflict. Although the connotation intended by the Chief Executive had been that the use of "the bomb", as another weapon in the U.S. arsenal, had naturally been thought about and rejected, such was not the impression rendered through the press. This kind of loose talk scared the British, touched off a two day foreign policy debate in the House of Commons, and eventually sent Atlee scurrying across the Atlantic. For Truman's account of this episode see: Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, pp.395-396.

¹⁸³The summit was conducted over five days. Of the six meetings held, the first and last two concerned the Korean situation. The U.S. minutes of these conferences can be found in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 1361-1374, 1392-1408, 1449-1461, 1468-1475.

1951 was not particularly successful. However, a good case can be made for the positive effect that military pressure had on negotiations in the late stages. Of specific note in this area was the use of an "air pressure" strategy by the FEAF and later, the thinly veiled threat of the use of atomic weapons by the United States against its adversaries were the talks not soon to produce results.

In April 1952 an exhaustive study was completed which examined the most efficient contribution that the Air Force could make to the war during the prolonged period of negotiations. This analysis concluded that, while the maintenance of air superiority over Korea would remain the number one priority of FEAF, the remainder of its effort should be devoted to "the selective destruction of items of value to the Communists nations fighting in Korea."²⁰⁴ When the conclusions of this report were approved in principle it was left to the Air Force to find the appropriate tactical objective for its new "air pressure" strategy within the confines of the remaining target suite in North Korea.

This proved to be a task that was not as easily accomplished as it might sound. Almost two years of rail interdiction had reduced that system in Korea to the point where further massive air attack against it would be a waste of assets. Air Force planners admitted that, outside of the hydroelectric system, there were few "gold" targets left in the north. Unfortunately, it was the policy of the U.N. Command that the power producing dams in the north would not be attacked. This was based on two rationales. First, several of the hydroelectric facilities, specifically the huge complex at Suiho, were situated near the Manchurian border and their attack might well violate Chinese air space. Second, it was feared that the adverse global

²⁰⁴Futrell, Moseley, and Simpson, p.444.

publicity that would surround an attack against a target with marginal military value would negate, through the disaffection of allies, any tactical advantage gained through their destruction. Thus FEAF seemed left with a plan that defied implementation.

However, when the truce talks bogged down over the POW issue the attitude of the U.S. toward attack on the North Korean hydroelectric complex changed. The arrival of Gen. Mark Clark, replacing Gen. Ridgway as U.N. and Far East Commander in May 1952,²⁰⁵ also could have contributed to this change. Clark insisted that "only through forceful action could the Communists be made to agree to an armistice that the United States considered honorable."²⁰⁶ Therefore, on his recommendation the President authorized an attack on all of the hydroelectric plants and related transmission grid in North Korea. This was accomplished in joint Air Force and Naval Air strikes in the last week of June 1952. However, as predicted the attacks caused such an international uproar that they were discontinued, though not before causing a severe blackout in most of Communist held Korea and parts of Manchuria. These results demonstrated that an "air pressure" strategy employed against well selected targets could be somewhat effective. But, more than just the threat of conventional air attack would be needed to break the deadlock at Panmunjom.

The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States in November 1952 signalled a shift in the policy surrounding the limitation of force in Korea. Eisenhower, probably the most experienced military commander in the West, realized that the situation in Korea could not be continued forever. The month after his election he made

²⁰⁵Ridgway was transferred to the command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

²⁰⁶Ibid, p.448.

a secret trip to the battlefield on the peninsula to personally assess the situation there. "Ike" spent several days talking with American, U.N., and ROK military leaders in Korea. By the time he left, Eisenhower had decided roughly the tact he would take once he had assumed office. In his words:

"My conclusion as I left Korea was that we could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without visible results. Small attacks on small hills would not end this war."²⁰⁷

Eventually this perception would lead Eisenhower to consider the use of atomic weapons to end this elongated war.

The use of "the bomb" in relation to the war in Korea did not begin with Eisenhower. We saw earlier that President Truman, at his press conference on November 30, 1950, admitted that their use had been considered. The uproar that followed his statement was indicative of the trepidation with which the use of these weapons was now considered. This was particularly true in a world where the Soviet Union possessed the atomic bomb and was known to be on the way to the development of a thermonuclear device.

However, when Truman stated that he had considered the use of atomic bombs in Korea he was not being misleading. In fact, the first discussion of the use of "the bomb" in this regard can be found in the initial Blair House meeting of June 26, 1950. At this conference the President had asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Vandenberg, if his service possessed the ability to destroy the Soviet air bases in the Far East should the conflict in Korea escalate to a general war. When Vandenberg responded that it was possible "if we use A-Bombs" the President ordered that the

²⁰⁷Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), p.95.

"Air Force...prepare plans to wipe out all Soviet air bases in <that area>." ²⁰⁸ This potential use of the atomic bomb was indicative of Truman's concept of its role in the Korean conflict--a weapon that would be used only if the war there escalated to a direct confrontation of the "superpowers".

In the late summer of 1951, as the war developed into a tactical stalemate, Truman's view of the use of "the bomb" altered slightly. This was due to the advice of the Joint Chiefs who were worried that a sudden change in Communist strategy could spell disaster for the U.N. forces. In such a scenario it was feared that a breakoff of the truce talks followed by an enormous attack, augmented by reserves drawn from Manchuria, would sweep the less easily reinforced U.N. Command off the Korean Peninsula. To prepare for this contingency the JCS suggested that the Air Force practice the use of atomic bombs "in support of engaged land forces." These flights commenced in September and were designed to provide the American decision-makers with a valid option should they be faced with a military disaster in Korea. ²⁰⁹

The ascension of Eisenhower to the Presidency in January 1953 signalled a more fundamental change in the American view of the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea. In NSC 147, a Top Secret study dated April 2, 1953 and titled "Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea", the new administration's changed attitude toward the possible use of nuclear weapons is set forth clearly. While concluding that "the use or non-use of such weapons is left open for future determination", the document addressed the use of atomic bombs in several different circumstances. It also detailed the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the employment of these weapons from both a political and military

²⁰⁸FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 159-160.

²⁰⁹"Memo JCS to Lovett (SECDEF)", August 14, 1951, cited in Bradley and Blair, pp. 649-650.

standpoint. In all, it was the most sophisticated treatment of this subject since the U.S. had become involved militarily on the Korean Peninsula.²¹⁰

With NSC 147, Eisenhower made an intellectual leap that Truman had considered dangerous, that atomic weapons could be employed in a "limited war". This study was to form an important building block for the "New Look" policy of his administration, later embodied in NSC 162. The reason for this was simple. To paraphrase John Lewis Gaddis: It became an article of faith that the threat of the use of these weapons was decisive in bringing about the July 1953 armistice.²¹¹ We now turn to the substance of this claim.

In recalling his thoughts about ending the Korean War Eisenhower later wrote that one of the possibilities that he considered was to "let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in the use of our weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula."²¹² Although such a step would cause great concern among America's allies, it had surprising support in an American domestic context where the prolonged hostilities in Korea had become increasingly unpopular. In a Gallup Poll taken in late 1951, 51% of those asked had responded that they felt the atomic bomb should be used in Korea.²¹³ Though no direct threat of the use of atomic bomb was made, Eisenhower recalls that "we

²¹⁰The entire text of NSC 147 can be found in FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. XV, Pt. 1, pp.838-857. The section dealing with the use of the atomic weapons is in pp.845-846.

²¹¹Gaddis, p.169.

²¹²Eisenhower, p.181.

²¹³The question, asked on November 10-11, 1951, was: Do you think the United Nations should use the atomic bomb on enemy military targets in Korea? Answers: 41% Should, 10% Qualified Should, and 37% Should Not. Dr. George H. Gallup, ed., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, Vol. 2, (New York: Random House, 1972), pp.1027-1028.

dropped the word, discreetly, of our intention. We felt quite certain that it would reach Soviet and Chinese Communist ears."²¹⁴ It would appear that this subtle coercion worked for in the spring of 1953 there was again progress on the negotiating front.

When the talks began again at Panmunjom in April the Communists revealed that they still were not prepared to sign an armistice. While the threat of escalation in the war had brought them back to the table it had not as yet forced the termination of hostilities. Though both sides made small concessions, the Communist's, as yet, would not accept the policy of "voluntary repatriation" of prisoners.

Fehrenbach points out that the pressure on the psychological front became intense during these last months of the Korean War. The U.S. shipped the 280mm "atomic cannon" to the Far East during this time and, though its nuclear shells were not stored with it in Korea, they were kept within range of easy shipment. Meanwhile a rumor wafted about that "the U.S. would not accept a stalemate through the end of the summer."²¹⁵

The Air Force also put increased pressure on the Communists. In April and May it pounded the North Korean irrigation dam system. The success of these attacks which, due to the resultant flooding, seriously affected the planting of rice in the north and temporarily denied some crucial transportation links to the Communists between Manchuria and the front battlelines, has been pointed out by some as key to the final signing of an agreement.²¹⁶ Finally, in July the Communists initialed the Korean Armistice agreement.

²¹⁴Eisenhower, p.181.

²¹⁵Fehrenbach, pp.685-686.

²¹⁶Futrell, Moseley, and Simpson, pp.623-629.

D. FINALIZING AND JUDGING TERMINATION

Shortly before ten o'clock in the morning on July 27, 1953 Lt. Gen. William Harrison, USA, representing the United Nations, and Nam Il, representing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, met in the truce tent at Panmunjom for the formal conclusion of the Korean Armistice. After each had signed nine copies of the document the truce was official though it did not actually go into effect until ten that evening. In this final paper the Communists agreed to "voluntary repatriation" which was to be supervised by a neutral nation, India. Thus ended the hostilities of the Korean War, a conflict which cost 142,091 American casualties--33,629 killed, 103,284 wounded, and 5,178 captured or missing.²¹⁷

Did the United States accomplish its objectives in the Korean War? The answer to this question must be a qualified yes. Certainly, the ROK's survival was assured. The people of that nation also retained the right of self-determination, although it would, in the future, be occasionally usurped by their own leaders. This can in some way be traced to the existence of a "national emergency" in the south since the conflict ended, for though the United Nations had ceased its hostilities with the north the competition between the two Koreas was not to end. However, the ROK regained most of the territory lost at the beginning of the conflict and, in fact, had a net gain of square mileage and a far more defensible border. therefore, from a pure security standpoint, the south was in better shape.

The U.S. was also successful in checking the expansion of communism through the vehicle of overt aggression into the southern republic. This was important as both a precedent and in the psychological battle perceived as ongoing

²¹⁷Goulden, p.646.

between East and West. Though in the future some would point to this war as the precursor of the American debacle in Vietnam, the U.S. military action in Korea, while not overwhelming, must nonetheless be considered a success.

The final objective of limiting the war to the Korean Peninsula was also successful. However, the score in this area was far from satisfying. Though able to geographically contain the conflict the miscalculation that resulted in the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war brought the American effort on the peninsula close to disaster. Furthermore, the hostilities in Korea were, in the end, restricted primarily by the limitation of U.S. power. Although Chinese entry added more than two years to the intervention, when compared to the possibilities inherent in escalation to total war the effort in this area was not wholly negative.

The Korean War, while far from a perfect example of the use of the limited war instrument, still holds lessons for the contemporary decision-maker. We have tried to focus on these in our analysis. The conflict appears to conform to the structure of the Limited War Model. In the concluding chapter of this study this will be examined in more detail.

VII. THE FALKLANDS WAR: ENTRY

Our second case study involves an examination of the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the possession of the Falkland Islands in the spring of 1982. This conflict provides an interesting focus for study, specifically in regard to the validity of the Limited War Model, because it was from its inception, a war pursued for limited ends with limited means. Our analysis of the Falklands (or Malvinas as the Argentines would call it) War will tend to concentrate on the British perspective. This allows us to examine the decisions of the actor which most severely restricted itself from the standpoint of military means throughout the Entry, Conduct, and Termination phases of the conflict and also the one which is most clearly documented.

This war may, with the perspective of history, be looked on as just as much of a watershed for the United Kingdom as the Korean conflict was for the United States. Certainly Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the British leader during the crisis, thought so. In a speech given shortly after the end of the hostilities in the South Atlantic she said:

"When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts. The people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself.

"The people who thought we could no longer do the great things which we once did. Those that believed that our decline was irreversible--that we could never be what we once were....

"Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through history."²¹⁸

²¹⁸The Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P. (Barnett, Finchley), "Speech Before the Conservative

To Thatcher and to much of the British citizenry the Falklands was not only a vindication of all of the good things about Britain but, also the beginning of a return to greatness for their country. This feeling, dubbed by the Prime Minister herself as the "Falklands Factor", may eventually be looked at as of more importance than the actual war itself.²¹⁹

The effect of this war outside of the United Kingdom could also become of lasting import. Jeffrey Record noted that the war "possessed a peculiar appeal to both the public and the professional defense community" because it "was short, simple, and 'clean'" and not "adulterated by ideological struggle."²²⁰ In fact, this interest produced a large literature that analyzed the events surrounding the Falklands from almost every conceivable political and military angle. This characteristic also benefits our purpose. Because this conflict was so straight forward and absent of major superpower clash, it forms a convenient counter-weight to our earlier analysis of the Korean War which exhibited both of those qualities.

Our analysis of the decision of the United Kingdom to attempt to regain the Falkland Islands by force will be addressed in this chapter. Four sections will consider the specific aspects of this problem. In the first the political and military considerations that form the background of the Falklands conflict will be reviewed. The second section will analyze the formation of the objectives or goals of the war prior to actual intervention. The third topic to be examined will be the process of "risk assessment" in the

Rally at Cheltenham Race Course, July 3, 1982". Reprinted in full in: Anthony Barnett, Ircn Britannia (London: Allison & Busby, 1982), pp. 149-153.

²¹⁹Ibid, p. 150.

²²⁰Jeffrey Record, "The Falklands War," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1982), p. 43.

deliberations of British decision-makers during this phase. The final subject of this chapter will be the recruitment of allies before the actual commencement of hostilities.

A. PRE-ENTRY POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

Our first concern in this study is with the decision of the United Kingdom to respond to the seizure of the Falkland Islands, their territorial possession in the South Atlantic, by the forces of Argentina on April 2, 1982. In their analysis of this conflict Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins note that it has been the misfortune of these barren and wind-swept isles to have "always been wanted more than they were loved."²²¹ In brief, this clash, within the ostensible boundaries of the "Western" bloc, is not explained by either its strategic value or any traditional affinity for the archipelago as much as by the motive of national pride amplified by miscalculation.

The sovereignty of these islands has been surrounded by controversy for well over 200 years. First landed upon by the English explorer Sir John Strong in 1690 they were named after the First Sea Lord of Admiralty, Lord Falkland. However, the islands were not settled until a French expedition landed on the easternmost of the two large islands, known simply as East Falkland, in 1764. This expedition was shortly followed by an English settlement on West Falkland in 1765. In fact, both of these early colonization efforts were technically illegal for in 1713 Spanish control of its traditional colonial areas in the New World, which included the Falklands, had been confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht. When Spain became aware of these settlements within its recognized sphere of influence, the Falklands "stumbled on

²²¹Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983), p.1.

to the stage of world politics."²²² The result was the first Falkland's crisis.

The French, who were allied to Spain, sold their colony and left peacefully but, the English departed only after a year of fairly intense negotiations. Therefore, open hostilities, in this instance, were avoided. Later, in 1790 Spanish sovereignty was once again confirmed by the the Nootka Sound Convention in which the British renounced any colonial ambitions in South America. The islands were then occupied as a Spanish colony for the next 20 years. In 1820 the newly independent forerunner of modern day Argentina, the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, announced its claim to the islands as an extension of Spanish sovereignty.

The Argentines, in fact, did administer the colonies from 1823 until 1833, when this arrangement was abruptly terminated by an American naval expedition led by Captain Silas Duncan. The cause of this action appears to have been the confiscation of an American sealing vessel and its catch by the Argentine Governor, Louis Vernet. In the resulting confrontation, the Americans not only recovered their stolen property but, spiked the Argentine guns and sacked the capital city of Puerto Soledad before declaring the islands free of all government and sailing away. When the British became aware of this power vacuum they reoccupied the Falklands forcing the lone Argentine frigate guarding the archipelago to depart in deference to superior force, though only after strong protest. It is this armed seizure that forms the basis of the Argentine argument for the return of these islands today.

With the exception of the two months in 1982, when Argentina occupied the Falklands, these islands since 1833 have been under continuous British administration. This is

²²²Ibid, p.3.

not to say that the Argentines have not periodically advanced their claims to the archipelago. A good example of this can be found in the negotiations at the Inter-American Conference 1947 when Buenos Aires aired its claim to sovereignty over the "Malvinas".²²³ Thus, the controversy over who rightly owns the Falklands has been an ever present, if not often publicized, issue for many years.

The current period of tension over the Falklands can be traced to the mid-1960's when the Argentines took their grievance to the United Nations "Committee of 24", tasked with overseeing the independence of colonial countries and peoples. As a result of this action Resolution 2065 was passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1965. It called for negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom without delay with a view toward finding a peaceful solution to the problem.²²⁴ In response to this and several other events Britain, though still maintaining that their occupation of the islands was entirely legal, began discussions with Buenos Aires about the future of the Falklands. These talks were to drag on, with little result, until the early months of 1982.

British claims to sovereignty by now rested on three pillars. The first stemmed from its early settlement of the islands in 1765. However, this claim had obvious weaknesses because of the questionable legality of the original colonization and is known to have been a source of concern within Britain's own Foreign Office. The second edifice on which the British case was built was the doctrine of prescription.

²²³U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, Vol. VIII, (Washington: USGPO), p.75. This conference resulted in the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Treaty.

²²⁴A Committee of Privy Counsellors, The Lord Franks, Chairman, Falkland Islands Review (hereafter The Franks Report) Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: HMSO, January 1983), p.4.

One could broadly define this as an assertion that continuous possession of territory over a period of time eventually constitutes the right of ownership. Such a claim is naturally reinforced if it is never challenged.

Unfortunately, we have seen that this was not exactly the situation with the Falklands. The final argument was rightly stated by Hastings and Jenkins as the strongest. This is the right of self-determination, a concept "enshrined in the United Nations charter" and underlying several decades of decolonization. The fact is that the indigenous population of the islands are of British stock and passionately want to remain within the United Kingdom. It is this desire that dominated and, in the end, negated any attempts to find a negotiated settlement to the Falklands problem.²²⁵

The islanders or "Kelpers", as they are called, have always enjoyed an extremely effective lobbying organization within the British Parliament. More than one minister from the Foreign Office has suffered a mauling for even hinting that the Falklands might be "sold out". The most recent example of this was the treatment accorded Nicholas Ridley, a Minister of State who had been assigned the task of the Falkland negotiations after the ascension of the Thatcher Government in May 1979. Ridley, after appointment, made a trip to the islands to get the views of the "Kelpers" in person, particularly to the possibility of a leaseback arrangement similar to that which covered Hong Kong. Upon his return he reported to a House of Commons already aware, through sources on the islands themselves, of what was construed as a government attempt to relinquish sovereignty of the Falklands. The scene that followed, in which Ridley was repeatedly attacked by MPs from both parties, is said to have left the minister so shaken that he departed the

²²⁵Hastings and Jenkins, pp.6-7.

successful mission.²⁴⁷ It was fast becoming apparent that the U.K. and Argentina were headed for a clash over their dual claim to sovereignty of the islands.

On March 24th the British Defence Attache in Buenos Aires warned that, in his opinion, any attempt to remove the Argentines from South Georgia by force would result in a military confrontation.²⁴⁸ Further evidence was provided in support of this analysis when one week later the Naval Attache reported that five Argentine warships, including a submarine, had been dispatched to that island and that another four warships had departed from Puerto Belgrano for an unknown destination. Also, on the same day, the Defence Operations Executive (DOE), which acts on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff for the central direction of military operations, noted not only the increased Argentine naval presence around South Georgia but, the existence of an Argentine task force comprised of its lone aircraft carrier, four destroyers, and an amphibious landing ship on exercises 800-900 miles north of the Falklands.²⁴⁹ In short, it was now obvious that the Argentines were raising the stakes in the South Atlantic and, due to their closer geographical proximity to the area, had created a temporary capacity for escalation dominance.

The British, finally realizing that the situation was approaching a crisis point, began to make moves on March 29th. The first was the dispatch of a nuclear powered submarine to the South Atlantic along with the naval auxiliary RFA Fort Austin. Interestingly enough, the departure of the former was kept a secret so as not to push the Argentines into a position where they felt their interest

²⁴⁷The Franks Report, p.51.

²⁴⁸Ibid, p.55.

²⁴⁹Ibid, p.64.

Georgia, a part of the Falklands Dependency though 800 miles to the east of the main archipelago, on March 20, 1982 of a cadre of Argentine workers to dismantle the old whaling station near Stromness Bay. The disagreement that resulted from their appearance was not that their presence was entirely unexpected. In fact, an Argentine scrap metal merchant, Constantine Davidoff, had secured the rights to the remains the the old whaling station in 1979. However, when the Argentines refused to check in with the British base at Grytviken to obtain clearance to land on the island and subsequently raised the flag of Argentina over their encampment the makings of an international incident were evident.²⁴⁶

When the Argentines refused to leave or to normalize their presence, London exercised the only real option it had available on short-term notice in the South Atlantic by dispatching the HMS Endurance with a contingent of Royal Marines to South Georgia. This platoon sized group was instructed to position themselves so as to be able to remove the Argentines by force should such a move become necessary. This action seemed momentarily to have succeeded in defusing the crisis, for on March 22nd the Argentine naval vessel which had carried the workers to South Georgia sortied from the island with what appeared, at first, to be all of the Argentine landing party. Unfortunately, further investigation revealed that a number of its group had been left behind. Furthermore, the British later monitored a message from naval headquarters in Buencs Aires to the departing vessel, the Bahia Buen Suceso, congratulating it on a

²⁴⁶There are some indications that this event was orchestrated by the Argentines. Most of this speculation centers around the actions of the chief of the Argentine Navy, Admiral Jorge Anaya, who was also a member of the three-man military Junta. See: "Falkland Islands: The Origins of a War," Economist, June 19, 1982, p.43 and Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, (Fall 1982), p.199.

negotiations were still ongoing, the British may have misjudged the intentions of the Argentine Junta.²⁴⁴ Certainly, this fits in well with the conclusions of the 1981 intelligence assessment, an analysis that, eventually, was to be proven overly optimistic.

Peter J. Beck, in a now forgotten but, extremely foresighted article, noted in February 1982 that the Falklands remained "a source of potential confrontation" for the British in Latin America.²⁴⁵ While this fact was accepted in London, there was a belated realization of the extent to which the circumstances had slowly pushed both the United Kingdom and Argentina toward a hostile encounter in the South Atlantic. This misguided preconception not only impacted on the accuracy of British intelligence estimates leading up to the seizure of the Falklands but, also affected the rational assessment of risk that London felt it was taking. The result was that Britain's efforts to deter the Argentines from aggressive military action failed and were only to catch with the situation after the occupation of the islands.

Often crisis situations result from a catalytic event and such was the case with the Falklands affair. The incident which triggered the escalation toward open hostilities in the South Atlantic was the arrival on the island of South

²⁴⁴Hopple, p.348. It is worthy to note that Hopple's analysis disregards one significant fact. This was that, though the talks held in New York appeared to go well, there were ominous stirrings in Buenos Aires immediately after their conclusion. In fact, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued an unilateral communique on the day following the end of the meetings in New York which, while acknowledging the advances made at the current talks, stated that should future progress prove unsatisfactory Argentina reserved the right to "terminate <the> mechanism and to choose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests." Cited in The Franks Report, p.41.

²⁴⁵Peter J. Beck, "Cooperative Confrontation in the Falklands Islands Dispute: The Anglo-Argentine Search for a Way Forward, 1968-1981," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February 1982), p.56.

resolve to use force, if needed, to defend the islands will be studied.

We have already established that no one really expected a large-scale military confrontation over these islands. The British intelligence community had long maintained that the chances of such a move by Argentina were small. Since 1965 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had periodically assessed the Argentine threat to the Falklands.²⁴² The latest comprehensive assessment available to the British decision-makers prior to the advent of the 1982 Falkland crisis was completed in July of 1981. According to The Franks Report this document had conformed to the traditional analysis that Argentina "would turn to forcible action only as a last resort." Much more likely was the possibility of economic and diplomatic moves designed to pressure the British into reaching an agreement in regard to the islands that was favorable to Buenos Aires. However, the assessment warned that should Argentina come to the conclusion that the transfer of the islands could not be achieved peacefully then there was a distinct chance that "military action against British shipping or a full-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands could not be discounted."²⁴³

The last round of talks by the U.K. and Argentina, prior to the seizure of the islands, were held in New York on February 26, 1982. They ended with a communique which referred to a "positive and cordial atmosphere" and seemed to augur well for some future movement toward a settlement on the diplomatic front. Hopple states that, because

²⁴²The Joint Intelligence Committee is normally chaired by a Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It includes members from all of the intelligence agencies, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Treasury. For a further description of the functions and responsibilities of this group see: The Franks Report, pp.94-95.

²⁴³Ibid, pp.26-27.

had rapped the table they were sitting around and reminded Haig that this was the same table that Chamberlain had conferred at during the Sudetenland crisis. In the Secretary's words she then begged him to "not urge Britain to reward aggression, to give something to Argentina that it could not attain by peaceful means...."²⁴¹ Ultimately, this was to be a most persuasive argument. Yet, in our current context it exhibits the emphasis that the British placed on the international responsibility it felt to not succumb to aggression.

This ends our examination of the formulation of objectives by the British decision-makers in their deliberations prior to the commencement of hostilities in the South Atlantic. To reiterate, the goals of Britain were dual. The first was the return of the Falklands to British administration while the second was the establishment of additional precedent against the use of aggression as an accepted action in the contemporary era. Having established the development of goals we now turn to the assessment of risk by the British in their planning for the possibility of entry into a limited war.

C. PRE-CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT

This section will look at the analysis of risk undertaken by the leadership of the United Kingdom before their commitment to employ armed force in an attempt to regain the Falkland Islands. In this regard, we will examine the Falklands situation in the period leading up to the commencement of hostilities in the spring of 1982. As this is done, the actions taken by the Thatcher Government to first, avoid a confrontation, and later to exhibit their

²⁴¹Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 272.

Argentine Junta with its well-known record on human rights. In short, Silkin challenged the government to rectify the the situation in the Falklands or resign.²³⁹ Clearly the Labour Party, anxious to squeeze the maximum amount of political capital possible from the advantageous circumstances, had thrown down the gauntlet. It was left to Thatcher and her cabinet to either pick it up and fight or beat a hasty strategic retreat out of office. It is not surprising that they chose the former course.

The objective of defeating the use of armed aggression was also a goal that was widely advertised by Britain during the Falkland crisis. It was ultimately this issue which enabled the U.K. to construct an extensive international front against Argentina. In her Cheltenham speech following the war Thatcher would be able to say:

"This nation had the resolution to do what it knew had to be done--to do what it knew was right.

"We fought to show that aggression does not pay and that the robber cannot be allowed to get away with his swag."²⁴⁰

The aversion to unchallenged aggression comes from what might be the most oft used historical analogy in crisis management in the contemporary era, the case of Chamberlain and Munich in 1938. We know that its "lesson" influenced the deliberations of Margaret Thatcher regarding the Falklands situation. Alexander Haig, the American Secretary of State, who, after the sailing of the British Fleet, undertook a mission of shuttle diplomacy to avert the outbreak of actual hostilities, recalls well Mrs. Thatcher's grasp of the Munich parallel. At his initial meeting with the Prime Minister at No. 10 Downing Street she

²³⁹Ibid, p.44.

²⁴⁰Ibid, p.149.

The case for national honor was succinctly stated by Edward du Cann, a noted Conservative MP. He also addressed the Commons on April 3rd and said:

"In the United Kingdom, we must accept reality. For all our alliances and for all the social politeness which the diplomats so often mistake for trust, in the end in life it is self-reliance and only self-reliance that counts....We have one duty only, which we owe ourselves--the duty to rescue our people and uphold our rights. Let that be the unanimous and clear resolve of the House this day....We have nothing to lose now except our honor."²³⁸

In du Cann's mind the issue was well-defined. The return of the Falklands was nothing less than a test of Britain's own sense of "self-reliance" which in his view was the bottom line of international reality. While he may have overstated the case in relation to the majority of Parliament, the thrust of his argument was widely accepted. The honor of the United Kingdom and hence, some argued, its position in world affairs, were challenged by the Argentine occupation of the Falklands by force. Only a return to the previous situation of British administration over the archipelago could heal this wound.

A final look at the events of the 3rd of April in the House of Commons helps to highlight the domestic context with which Prime Minister Thatcher was left to maneuver. The speech of John Silkin, Labour's shadow spokesman for Defence, offers the best insight into this situation. Beginning his speech by proclaiming that Labour's Michael Foot was now "the leader of the nation", Silkin went on to note that the Conservative Government was "on trial today" and added "the sooner you get out the better." Declaring his solidarity with the people of the Falklands, Silkin could only wonder what their fate might now be in the hands of the

²³⁸Barnett, p.35.

Three motivations can be seen behind this objective. Two, the concern surrounding the right of self-determination for the islanders and the national honor of Britain have already been mentioned. However, to further reinforce their importance we will trace them to the Commons debate on the 3rd. The remaining reason for the pursuit of this goal was of a domestic political nature, although it is somewhat connected with the latter of the other two factors. Put simply, the Thatcher Government would not survive the loss of confidence inherent in the failure to return the Falklands to the "status quo" of April 1st. Consequently, if the islands were not retaken, the Conservative Government in Britain was almost certain to fall. This was a development that had little appeal to Mrs. Thatcher or several of her allies within the Atlantic Alliance, most notably the United States.

The right of self-determination was to become the international rallying cry of the United Kingdom in much of its public justification for the pursuit of the return of the Falklands via armed force and also for garnering support within the international community. Again, in the Commons on April 3rd, the Prime Minister most lucidly stated her position:

"The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the U.K. are an island race. Their way of life is British, their allegiance is to the Crown. The people are few in number but have the right to live in peace, and to determine their own allegiance.

"It is the wish of the British people and the duty of the government to do everything we can to preserve that right. That will be our hope and our endeavor and I believe the resolve of the people themselves."²³⁷

²³⁷Ibid.

avored in such circumstances was again to be that of limited war.

B. ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES

Perhaps part of the success of the British in this war stems from the establishment and maintenance of a set of objectives that were from the beginning clear and unequivocal. Two goals stand out as being conceived early on and later translated into successful action. They are: 1) the return of the Falkland Islands to British administration, and 2) the creation of additional precedent against the use of aggression. We have already noted some of the roots of these objectives earlier. They will now be examined in more depth.

The goal of assuring the return of the Falklands to British administration was the predominant concern of the Thatcher Government from the time that the islands were first seized by Argentina. In the debate before the House of Commons on April 3rd,²³⁵ the day following the invasion, the Prime Minister made this very clear:

"The Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment."²³⁶

²³⁵It is interesting to note that this special session of the House of Commons was convened on a Saturday morning. The last time the Commons had met on a Saturday was during the 1956 Suez Crisis. The irony of this coincidence was not lost on its membership.

²³⁶The Times Parliamentary Staff, "Our Objective is to Free the Islanders, Says Thatcher", The Sunday Times, April 4, 1982, p.2.

nation or deserve to do so."²³³ This concern was fully demonstrated in the debate held in the House of Commons the day after the Argentine seizure of the islands. Michael Foot, leader of the Labour opposition, stated the matter forthrightly:

Even though the...people who live in the Falklands are uppermost in our minds...there is a longer term interest to ensure that foul and brutal aggression does not succeed in the world. If it does, there will be a danger not only to the people of the Falklands, but to people all over this dangerous planet."²³⁴

This ends our review of the background issues that impacted on the initiation of the Falklands War. We have looked briefly at the historical context in which this confrontation arose and some factors which speeded the advance of the parties involved toward armed hostilities. From the Argentine standpoint the conflict formed the head of almost 150 years of frustration exacerbated by some developments on both the domestic and international fronts. In Britain the issue was one of relatively steadfast support for the self-determination of the "Kelpers" magnified by a vocal Parliamentary lobby. However, the economics of defending the strategically insignificant islands and the political message of a seeming withdrawal were problems that were given too little consideration. The British also felt that certain standards of international conduct were important enough to fight for. Hence, much like the Korean War the intervention in the Falklands would be justified and, to some extent, fought as a precedent against a mode of international behavior that was not only considered anathema to democracy but, dangerous in today's world. The instrument

²³³Anthony Lejeune, "Colonel Blimp's Day," National Review, July 23, 1982, p.898.

²³⁴Barnett, p.32.

were specifically excluded from the provisions of this law a similar attempt to bar the "Kelpers" from it failed.

But, if economy was forcing the British to retreat from empire it was more than counterbalanced by the desire to retain a global role. The British in many ways still fancied themselves as a world power. Many would argue that they maintained an independent nuclear deterrent, by trading off much needed conventional military forces, just to retain a claim to this role. This left the British in somewhat of a predicament, for a global power could not be seen backing away from what some would say was an insignificant South American dictatorship. Sir James Cable puts Britain's awkward position into perspective. Noting that the U.K. is a medium strength power, he states:

"Some <such powers> aspire to greater influence and status than the statistics of their military and economic strength would altogether justify. Their standing in the world depends as much on their reputation as it does on their measurable assets. They cannot afford humiliation, least of all at the hands of another country in that debatable middle ground between the superpowers and the minor nations."²³²

A final factor in the ultimate decision of the United Kingdom to resort to the use of military force to retake the Falklands was a belief that the contemporary international structure could no longer afford the existence of unchallenged aggression. Anthony Lejeune, though conveniently forgetting that the "Kelpers" were not actually "citizens", captured the British feeling on this subject well: "The point is simply that no nation which allows its flag to be hauled down and its citizens captured--however far off the flag, however few the citizens--will long survive as a

²³²Sir James Cable, "The Falklands Conflict," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 108, No. 9 (September 1982), p.72.

area, the Antarctic survey ship HMS Endurance, would eventually be withdrawn.²³⁰ There can be little doubt that these actions, though based on needs to economize rather than changes in British policy, were misread by the Argentines.

The British were also faced with a military establishment that was becoming increasingly single task oriented. All of the services now saw their central mission as being in direct support of NATO. The Navy was particularly affected by this strategic conception. By the early 1980's it had become a force which was equipped principally for one task, anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. It is well known that had the Argentines waited another eighteen months to seize the Falklands the Royal Navy would have faced a much harder logistical task than it, in reality, confronted. By this time the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible would have been scraped and sold to Australia respectively.²³¹ Even with these assets, the conventional power projection force available to the British was minimal. It was the ability to adapt commercial platforms to military uses that, as we will later see, was the key to success for Britain.

The vote within the House of Commons on the British Nationality Act in 1981 did little to belay the growing ambitions of the Argentines. This law, intended to stem any flow of refugees from Hong Kong in anticipation of that colony's reversion to China in the 1990's, excluded from citizenship any person who did not have at least one United Kingdom-born grandparent. Though residents of Gibraltar

²³⁰Ibid, pp. 76-77.

²³¹Gerald W. Hoppie, "Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War," World Politics, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 (April 1984), p. 351-352.

southernmost tip of the South American continent. When in 1977 a International Court of Arbitration awarded the territory in question to Chile, a ruling later confirmed by a Papal mediator, the Argentines were bound to focus more attention on their claim to the Malvinas.²²⁸

A final factor that was to prove crucial to later Argentine actions was their country's reproachment with the United States after the Reagan Administration took office in 1981. The "Franks Committee" states: "It seems likely that the Argentine Government came to believe that the United States Government was sympathetic to their claim to the Falkland Islands and, while not supporting forcible action in furtherance of it, would not actively oppose it."²²⁹ Thus, the convergence of the creation of a military Junta and the failure of Argentina in the Beagle Channel arbitration along with a resurgence of interest in the country by the United States, directed and then boosted the efforts of this Latin nation toward repossession of the Malvinas. This is a goal which ultimately it would achieve, though for only a short time.

While the Argentines seemed to be showing increased interest in the Falklands the British concern in the area, if one can judge intentions from actions (an interesting proposition), was lessening. The naval presence of the British had steadily declined in the South Atlantic. In 1967 the decision had been made to terminate the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic and in 1974 the Simonstown agreements which allowed the British to forward base their fleet out of South Africa had been ended. The 1981 Defence Review had put a further nail in the South Atlantic coffin by announcing that the only remaining naval vessel in the

²²⁸Ibid.

²²⁹Ibid.

"chamber pale and trembling."²²⁶ This demonstrates well the fact that the islanders had a virtual veto on any government plan which would compromise on the sovereignty issue and thereby avoid a confrontation with Argentina.

The "Franks Committee", tasked with reviewing the discharge of the responsibilities of the Government with regard to the Falklands in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion in April 1982, provides in its report a good summary of the developments which affected both the British and Argentine attitudes as events moved toward overt military confrontation in the South Atlantic. In actuality, their respective positions formed the two halves of what eventually became an uncontrollable critical mass exploding into a war that each neither expected or truly wanted. Miscalculation and misunderstanding in both countries made the diffusion or avoidance of this situation increasingly unlikely.

The Franks Report notes three factors worthy of mention from the Argentine perspective. The first is the rise of the military Junta which overthrew the government of Isabella Peron in 1976. This placed Argentine decision-making in the hands of a small clique of military officers who would be much more likely to use force to advance their perception of the national interest of Argentina. The resulting arrangement also gave an increased voice to the Navy, known to be the most hawkish of the services on the Falklands issue.²²⁷

Secondly, most contemporary Argentine efforts at overt territorial aggrandizement had routinely been directed toward its neighbor Chile. This was particularly in regard to their longtime dispute over the Beagle Channel near the

²²⁶Ibid, p.40. The full text of Ridley's report to the Commons can be found in the The Franks Report, pp.101-105.

²²⁷The Franks Report, p.75.

merited preemptive action. This tendency toward emphasizing the provocation inherent in the overt dispatch of naval forces continued to dominate British deliberations throughout the week prior to the invasion of the Falklands. In the current situation, it was felt that the risk of publicizing the departure of naval forces outweighed their potential as a deterrent factor.

The next day this mindset was still predominant. John Nott, the Defence Minister, noted at a meeting of the DOE that not only would a naval surface force seem provocative but, it would require the accompaniment of a carrier to provide air support.²⁵⁰ At this point, London did not want to make the effort required to dispatch such a large force. Instead, it was decided to send another nuclear submarine covertly to the South Atlantic and hope for the best.

Though the political leadership might be hesitant about committing naval forces, such concerns were not shared by Fleet Command at Northwood. Led by First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, and Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Sir John Fieldhouse, the Royal Navy began to make contingency plans for deployment to the South Atlantic well before their civilian superiors. It was decided early on that any task force sent south would have to be large and "balanced", that is, possessing all the capabilities necessary for the conduct of comprehensive naval warfare. Fieldhouse, who on March 29th was observing Exercise Spring Training off Gibraltar with the First Flotilla, decided to take action immediately. He summoned Rear Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward to his cabin aboard the Glamorgan early on the morning of the 30th and put him on alert to be prepared to move to the South Atlantic.²⁵¹ In fact, contingency planning by the

²⁵⁰Ibid.

²⁵¹Hastings and Jenkins, pp.62-63.

Royal Navy continued at such a pace as to enable Leach to inform the Prime Minister on the evening of the 31st that the fleet would be able to sail by the weekend if necessary. However, it was recognized by all the decision-makers by this time that, if an Argentine invasion was imminent, there was no possibility for any British military action in the South Atlantic to stop it.²⁵²

By April 1st a review of Argentine military dispositions indicated that they could launch a successful invasion of the Falkland Islands as early as the next day. That evening it was decided to put troops on alert for deployment to the South Atlantic.²⁵³ On April 2nd the worst fears in Britain were confirmed when Argentina staged a successful amphibious landing near Port Stanley and after a brief firefight forced the small Marine garrison there to surrender. In response, London determined that a task force, comprising most of the conventional strength of the Royal Navy, should sail for the contested area as soon as possible. Though the political battle to deter the Argentines from invading the Falkland Islands had been lost Thatcher was determined that the military battle to retake them would be won and she was willing to wager the bulk of the Royal Navy to assure that this was accomplished.

Unfortunately, neither the Prime Minister nor her military advisors realized, at the time, the full extent of the risk to which the Royal Navy was being subjected. This fact would only become clear long after the dispatch of the task force. However, there is no reason to believe that this would have changed the minds of the British decision-makers although, it might have lessened the shock stemming from the losses later sustained.

²⁵²Ibid, p.66.

²⁵³The Franks Report, p.71.

The possibility of confronting not only Argentina but, its allies also had to be considered. The British leadership realized that Argentina had few friends on which it could depend to provide assistance in a military confrontation in the South Atlantic. Three possibilities existed from which the Argentines could draw support. The first of these was through the Rio Treaty, a Western Hemispheric collective security pact. Yet, this agreement had always been focused on the challenge of international Communism to Latin America and its real teeth rested in the commitment of the United States to militarily assist its "new world" neighbors. Obviously, the Falklands situation did not conform to the expected uses of this treaty hence, Britain could be relatively certain that the U.S. would not side against it.²⁵⁴

The second was the United Nations. In this arena there was an outside chance that the Argentines would be able to mobilize the Third World into some mild condemnation of British actions in the General Assembly. But, the possibility of invoking the collective security provisions of the UN Charter were considered non-existent since the South Americans had been the first to revert to force. Furthermore, any speedy action by the UN Security Council was precluded by the existence of the British veto.

The final source to which Argentina could turn for aid would be to the Eastern Bloc. While the chance of this always existed, the British were willing to take the risk of pushing the Argentines toward the East realizing that,

²⁵⁴For a good overview of the application of the Rio Treaty and its related organization the Organization of American States (OAS) to the Falklands crisis see: Gordon Connell-Smith, "The OAS and the Falklands Conflict," The World Today, September 1982, pp.340-347.

should such a shift threaten their chances for success, they could expect increased assistance from their own allies in the West.

The British thus decided to edge the conflict surrounding the Falklands toward a large-scale naval confrontation. It was felt by almost all concerned in London that the famed Royal Navy would make short work of their Argentine counterpart, should such a course become necessary. This assessment made the dispatch of the fleet seem, initially, to be an attempt to coerce the Argentines into abandoning their "ill-gotten gains". Its long transit time to the south (it would be over three weeks before it was on station) was beneficial in this light, because it gave time for diplomacy, backed by shown resolve, to end the crisis.²⁵⁵

Due to excellent and timely prior planning, the British naval task force departed Plymouth on April 5-6 to a rendezvous with Woodward's First Flotilla before proceeding south to the Falklands. The conflict was now rapidly moving toward the Conduct phase. However, before we embark on an examination of that aspect of the war let us first look at Britain's search for international support before its military effort to retake the Falklands began.

D. RECRUITING ALLIES

The search for "allies", in support of its quest to assure the return of the Falkland Islands, was important to the United Kingdom for three reasons. First, the U.K. sought to isolate Argentina from its economic partners in the West, particularly those who provided it with arms.

²⁵⁵Hastings and Jenkins give a fairly sophisticated treatment of the developments of British military policy during this period of transition from entry to actual prosecution of the war. See: Chapter 7, "Ascension to South Georgia", pp. 114-134.

Second, it was hoped that international pressure might force Argentina to abandon its gains on the Falklands before Britain would be compelled to use force in their recapture. And finally, Britain realized that, while the actual involvement of forces from other nations would be ill-advised, it might at some point need material and technical aid from abroad to prevail.

Several forums were open to the United Kingdom through which international support could be garnered. They were the three "alliances" of which Britain was a member: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the European Economic Community (EEC) or "Common Market". All of these organizations were utilized to build an international coalition that would support British actions to regain possession of the Falklands. We will now examine the pre-entry moves made in each of these in turn.

Though the NATO commitment restricted the actual involvement in reciprocal defense to "the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer"²⁵⁶ the British were able to appeal to their allies in this pact for they knew that it formed the cornerstone of each member state's national security. While not expecting or desiring any help in the actual campaign to recapture the Falklands, Britain did need the tacit acquiescence of their Atlantic Alliance partners to move the major portion of their fleet to the south. This is because the dispatch of the Royal Navy, which was slated to provide two-thirds of NATO's defense in the eastern Atlantic in the event of a contingency, left a yawning gap in alliance defenses. Thus, when the U.K.'s NATO partners quietly assumed an increased naval presence in the Atlantic and North Sea and excused the Royal Navy from its duties

²⁵⁶Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

there, they were allowing Britain to devote its full attention to the Falklands War.²⁵⁷

Britain was also able to mobilize support for its cause in the EEC. The European community, subjected twice in this century to invasion, was sensitive to the risks of unchallenged aggression. It was on this note that Britain was able to secure the imposition of economic sanctions against Argentina. This was important because many of the Western European states had strong commercial ties with Buenos Aires that including not only trade in consumer goods but, defense related equipment and weapon systems.²⁵⁸

When President Mitterand of France, which had substantial defense related connections with Argentina, forthrightly condemned the "Argentine aggression" soon after the seizure of the disputed islands, Britain was almost assured that the EEC would give it the backing it desired.²⁵⁹

Economic sanctions by the EEC against Argentina were, in fact, requested by the United Kingdom on April 6th and on the 14th it was decided that they would be imposed and in effect for thirty days.²⁶⁰ This effectively cut the Argentines off from most of their sources of military supply and further alienated them in the Western world.

It should be noted that sanctions hurt many of Britain's economic partners.²⁶¹ However, their imposition resulted from a careful cost-benefit analysis on the Continent. From

²⁵⁷Bradley Grahm, "British Fleet's Move Thins NATO Defense," Washington Post, May 7, 1982, p.25.

²⁵⁸For an insight into who the principle Argentine weapons suppliers were and what they provided see: "Who Armed Argentina," The Sunday Times, May 9, 1982, p.18.

²⁵⁹"The Best of Two Difficult Choices," The Sunday Times, April 4, 1982, p.16.

²⁶⁰M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, "Sanctions: The Falklands Episode," The World Today, April 1983, p.150.

²⁶¹For example see: "Penalizing Argentina Will Hurt Germany," Business Week, April 26, 1982, pp.33-34.

a long-range perspective, Western Europe needed a cooperative and economically integrated United Kingdom much more than it did a South American trading partner. Furthermore, the method by which Argentina had "acquired" the Falklands was historically and ideologically distasteful to members of the "Community". Thus, sanctions, though never intended as an indication of support for British sovereignty over the disputed islands, were a logical and predictable response by the Europeans regardless of the short-term economic problems they might create.

The last arena in which Britain sought international support was within the context of the United Nations. The maneuvering in this diplomatic forum was interesting, for both the British and the Argentines sought to condemn the actions of the other in the court of global public opinion. The Security Council met on April 3rd to consider its stand on the Argentine occupation of the Falklands.²⁶² The mishandling of the debate that followed by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, sent from Buenos Aires to begin the building of a favorable consensus, provides a model of how not to seek international support. After expressing the frustration of his country, which he noted had negotiated for the transfer of the islands for fifteen years, the Argentine Minister contended that the "requirement found in the United Nations Charter to settle disputes peacefully <did> not apply to quarrels that arose before its adoption in 1945." This prompted Sir Anthony Parsons, the British representative to the Council to remark that if this

²⁶²The makeup of the Security Council for this debate was as follows: Permanent Members- France, People's Republic of China, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States. Rotating Members- Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, and Zaire who was serving as President.

were true "the world would be an infinitely more dangerous and inflammable place than it already is."²⁶³

By the end of the debate it was obvious that the Council overwhelmingly agreed with Sir Anthony. The passage of UN Resolution 502 which called for the "immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)" and an "immediate cessation of hostilities" is ample evidence of this.²⁶⁴ Its adoption can also be interpreted as an unqualified success for the British because it meant that the UN probably would not interfere in its attempt to retake the islands and that the international feeling against the use of armed aggression was still strong. In addition, the lack of a Soviet veto indicated that they would, for the present, not become directly involved in the crisis and thus, the Argentines would be almost completely isolated on the international front.

Britain's diplomatic victories in all three of these "alliance" forums was, without question, encouraging to the decision-makers in London. They had been able to show substantial progress toward each of the objectives originally envisioned as underlying the recruitment of international support. The British had secured the cutoff of economic and military aid from the West to Argentina and also had assured that international support would swing its way. Though the credit for this success goes as much to Argentina's choice to be the first to employ armed force and their poor feel for the use of the United Nations, one can

²⁶³Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.N. Bids Argentina Withdraw Forces," New York Times, April 4, 1982, pp.1,15.

²⁶⁴The vote on the resolution was 10 in favor, 1 opposed (Panama), and four abstentions (PRC, Poland, Soviet Union, and Spain). For a complete text of the resolution see: New York Times April 4, 1982, p.15.

say that Britain took full advantage of the Argentine mistakes and translated them into a loose but, politically meaningful coalition against Buenos Aires.

E. SUMMATION

This ends our treatment of the deliberations and actions surrounding the decision of the United Kingdom to enter into conflict in the South Atlantic. With the departure of its naval task force Britain was now ready to use force, if necessary, to achieve its dual goals of regaining administration of the Falklands and checking aggression. Both the assessment of the risk inherent in such an operation and the need for international support as rationalization and justification had been undertaken. It was now left to the political and military leadership to translate this start into action which honestly reflected the original objectives.

VIII. THE FALKLANDS WAR: CONDUCT

In examining the Conduct phase of this war we will attempt to trace the objectives of the armed intervention, noted during the deliberations over entry, into their translation into military action. Our purpose will be to relate the experience of the Falklands conflict to the theory on the conduct of limited war advanced in the Limited War Model.

Even though the Falklands War was of short duration, lasting less than eleven weeks, it would be impossible to cover all of the combat operations and their relationship to our theoretical model. Instead, our efforts will be directed towards a few selected examples of the use of the instrument of controlled and limited force in war.²⁶⁵ In this regard, four different aspects of the war will be studied. The first is the development of military action. In this section we will look at the mobilization and dispatch to the South Atlantic of the military forces necessary for the accomplishment of the predetermined objectives. Our second topic will deal with the use of "selective

²⁶⁵Those interested in a complete examination of the war are now offered a number of books and articles that deal with either the conflict in toto or some specific aspect of it. One British Government document is particularly helpful in reviewing the conduct of the war. This is: John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (hereafter The Nott Report) Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: HMSO, December 1982). Two unofficial "histories" from the British perspective are also widely quoted. These are Hastings and Jenkins, already cited, and The Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Inside Story (London: Sphere Publishing, 1982). The Argentine side of the war is, at present, much harder to document. The best attempt in English has been made in Robert Scheina, "The Malvinas Campaign," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 98-117. A good review of some of the other Falklands literature is found in Walter Little, "The Falklands Affair: A Review of the Literature," Political Studies, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 296-310.

intervention" during the subsequent military campaign. This treatment will focus on the amphibious landing at San Carlos and the battle for that beachhead which resulted. The third section will examine the implementation of objectives. In this area, the British use of the "exclusion zones" around the Falklands will be analyzed. Our final topic in this section will be a look at Britain's relations with the international community during the Conduct phase of this war with specific attention given to those with the United States.

A. SHAPING MILITARY ACTION

From the moment of the Argentine seizure of the Falklands it was obvious to the most casual observer that the effort to retake the islands would be primarily a naval show. This necessitated the mobilization of a naval task force that was proficient, if not dominant, in the two basic missions of seagoing forces: sea control and power projection. Sea control was necessary because the British would be operating with an 8000 mile logistical tail that, with the exception of the base on Ascension Island, was entirely over water. A power projection capability was mandated by the objectives of the intervention itself, which ultimately might require the forceful expulsion of the Argentines from the islands.

To accomplish these tasks the British Admiralty had to deploy a force with the ability to wage sea warfare in all three of its dimensions. Hence, it was correctly perceived that surface, air, and submersible elements would all have to be used in the ensuing battle. We have already seen that Britain's allies in NATO helped substantially in this problem by allowing the Royal Navy to be momentarily relieved of many of its duties for the Alliance in the North

Atlantic. However, there were several areas where this hiatus did not appreciably augment the capabilities of the RN. This was primarily in the field of amphibious warfare and integrated naval air support. It is the requisitioning of the Merchant Fleet to fill this void which will be addressed in this section.

The deficiencies in these areas were with the capability of the RN to transport large numbers of troops for an opposed landing and to provide them with aviation support, of both the fixed and rotary winged variety, necessary for their success. In fact, the shortcomings of the British went even deeper, for they could only muster one unit from the Royal Marines(RM), 3 Commando Brigade commanded by Brigadier Julian Thompson, RM, which had the all-arms capability needed to make a seaborne assault.²⁶⁶ Thus, the problem confronting Fleet Chief Fieldhouse was to acquire sufficient transport to take the Marines and aircraft to the Falklands and later to stage another brigade that could be used to reinforce the beachhead once established.

At first it was believed that the Marines would be carried on board the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes but, it was soon discovered that she would be needed for the operation of Sea Harriers, an asset that would be in short supply even with the use of this flattop. Momentarily, the Admiralty was in despair as to how it would transport 3 Commando to the theatre of operations. Then, suddenly, most of these worries evaporated.²⁶⁷

The reason for their relief was the requisitioning of the luxury liner Canberra for use in the war. The transfer of this ship, along with a number of others, was done under the STUFT(Ships Taken Up From Trade) program, later noted by

²⁶⁶Hastings and Jenkins, p.85.

²⁶⁷Ibid, p.88.

A. D. Baker as "a remarkable piece of improvisation."²⁶⁸ For the Marines, the availability of the Canberra was a godsend because it allowed the entire assault brigade to remain at sea indefinitely and to be able to continue training while in transit.²⁶⁹ This passenger liner was only the first of several to be impressed into military service. Later the Uganda was used as a hospital ship and the Queen Elizabeth II or QE II was employed to transfer the 5th Infantry Brigade, the other major unit of the Falklands occupation force. The Canberra and QE II requisitions stand out as crucial to the ultimate success of the campaign for, if they had not been available, the military options open to the British would have been seriously curtailed. Both of these ships were adapted for military service in less than a week after requisition.²⁷⁰

Secretary Nott noted that the "smooth and rapid implementation of existing contingency plans to use merchant shipping in support of the Services was a major success story of the campaign."²⁷¹ The conversions made to these vessels were not of a small nature. Among the more notable changes made to many of the merchantmen were: the fitting of flight decks for helicopter operations, the provision of equipment that enabled each to replenish at sea, the equipping of some as minesweepers, the provision of additional communication, navigation, and cryptographic equipment, and the installation of shipboard water production plants.²⁷²

²⁶⁸A. D. Baker III, "Sealift, British Style", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 6 (June 1983), p. 111.

²⁶⁹Hasting and Jenkins, p. 88.

²⁷⁰The conversion and the experiences of the QE II in the conflict are documented in William H. Flayhart III and Ronald W. Warwick, "The Liner She's a Lady," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 110, No. 11 (November 1984), pp. 53-64.

²⁷¹The Nott Report, p. 26.

²⁷²Ibid.

STUFT also addressed the inadequate capability of the British Fleet to carry sufficient numbers of aircraft to provide for simultaneous air superiority, close air support, and logistic services. This was particularly true when the probability of the loss of units to battlefield attrition was taken into account. Four roll on-roll off (Ro-Ro) ships, the Europic Ferry, Atlantic Conveyor, Atlantic Causeway, and Contender Bezant, along with one container ship, the Astronomer, were requisitioned to provide this service. Though none launched aircraft directly into combat the "spares" they carried proved extremely useful in the battle for the islands.²⁷³

Captain David J. Kenney has argued that "the visibility of Britain's massive logistical effort showed better than anything else its resolution to retake the Falklands."²⁷⁴ Nothing exemplified this effort more than the conversion of merchant vessels to military service. In all, this project offers an excellent example of the mobilization of the assets necessary for the pursuit of the goals established earlier in the crisis. With the dispatch of its augmented fleet to the South Atlantic, Britain now had the capability to achieve its objectives.

B. SELECTIVE INTERVENTION

In this section we will look at the use of "selective intervention" by the British forces in the Falklands conflict. Our concern will be with the integrated use of mobility, specially trained/"elite" forces, joint service operations, and technological superiority on the

²⁷³A complete listing of all of the STUFT and the roles which they filled in the Falklands War can be found in Baker, pp. 112-113.

²⁷⁴Captain David J. Kenney, USNR, "The Fascinating Falklands Campaign," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 6 (June 1983), p. 100.

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LIMITED WAR: A MODEL FOR ENTRY CONDUCT AND TERMINATION
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
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battlefield. As usual, there are several examples from which one could draw. However, we will focus on the initial large-scale British landing on Falklands, the amphibious assault at San Carlos Water.

The attack at San Carlos, known as OPERATION SUTTON, was a unequivocal success for the British. It permanently reestablished the forces of the United Kingdom on the Falklands and, in retrospect, spelled the beginning of the end for the Argentine occupation forces. The landing and subsequent defense and consolidation of the beachhead provide an excellent example of the use of "selective intervention" on the modern battlefield.

If the British were going to fulfill their goal of restoring their administration to the Falklands they knew that the islands would eventually have to be reoccupied. There was some debate in London as to the timing and method of this military occupation. Several possibilities were open to planners: a blockade could be put in place around the archipelago and its Argentine defenders could be starved into submission, strategic bombing could be employed against the islands to reduce their defenses, or an amphibious assault could be made against the islands before any significant attrition had taken place. The course decided on was a combination of the first and last options. The exclusion zones would be put in place to isolate the islands from the mainland and hence, any significant reinforcement. However, the Falklands would be retaken by ground forces as quickly as practicable. This is because London wanted the war to be of as short a duration as possible. British decision-makers realized that both international and domestic support, strong at the beginning of the campaign, would perceptibly weaken as time passed.

Once it was decided that the British would make an amphibious assault against the islands it was left to the

military planners to select the appropriate target, though final approval for the operation would always rest with the Prime Minister and her "War Cabinet". The task of assessing the possibilities for and location of the landing became the responsibility of Commodore Amphibious Warfare Michael Clapp, RN, who would stage the operation from his assault ships and Brigadier Julian Thompson, RM, whose men would make the attack. They considered three different permutations in their planning.

First, they could land on West Falkland. This had the advantage of sidestepping the major portion of the Argentine defense which was stationed on the other island but, offered no opportunity to quickly convert a success into a drive toward the politically strategic capital at Port Stanley. For this reason, it was rejected.

Second, they could land on East Falkland near Port Stanley itself, thereby immediately putting the capital at risk. However, this plan just reversed the advantage and disadvantage of the first option. Though it would provide a direct thrust toward the ultimately crucial battleground around Port Stanley, it would also challenge the Argentines in the area where they were the strongest. This is because the bulk of the Argentine occupation troops, thought to number approximately 10,000, were deployed in the greatest number around the capital. Therefore, this option was also rejected.

The final plan also entailed a landing on East Falkland, but in an area that was isolated from major Argentine force concentrations. It was this plan that was finally accepted as the soundest.²⁷⁵ San Carlos Water, an inlet in the north-west corner of the island, was decided upon as the actual

²⁷⁵For an interesting account of some of the deliberation that went into the selection of an amphibious assault sight see: Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 176-179.

target for the landing. Defence Minister Nott later noted that San Carlos was selected because it offered an excellent anchorage, was easily protected from submarines, and was difficult for the enemy to reinforce.²⁷⁶ After this issue had been settled, the matter became not where the landing would be made but, when.

Commodore Clapp notified Fleet Headquarters at Northwood on May 8th of the preference of the tactical planners for the San Carlos sight.²⁷⁷ The Admiralty later briefed the political authorities on the plan, expressing its concurrence with the deployed staff's decision. On May 19th, Thatcher had Headquarters signal the task force to implement OPERATION SUTTON at its discretion.²⁷⁸ On the 20th, Rear Admiral Woodward, now commanding the entire British expedition, directed Clapp and Thompson to execute their plan on the next day. The landing at San Carlos was subsequently made against light opposition on May 21st.

How did this operation exhibit the traits of "selective intervention"? Each of these characteristics will now be examined in turn. Again, the instances sighted are by no means all inclusive but, offer only examples considered representative of this type of tactical action.

The exploitation of mobility is key to any "selective intervention" operation and this was also part of the San Carlos assault. The Falklands themselves were extremely hard to traverse. Covered with soft peat and numerous bogs the islands were a nightmare to landlocked maneuver warfare. However, they were surrounded by an element that could be negotiated much more easily--the sea. This gave the advantage of maneuver to the force which could control the waters

²⁷⁶The Nott Report, p.7.

²⁷⁷Hastings and Jenkins, p.184.

²⁷⁸Ibid, p.190.

around the islands. Jeffrey Record properly notes that due to rugged terrain interior lines of communication were virtually non-existent on the Falklands. As a result, the British, who controlled the sea, "could move much faster and in greater force...than <the Argentines> could on land."²⁷⁹ The landing at San Carlos is an example of the British translating their superiority in sea control into a significant strategic victory.

Specially trained/"elite" forces are also part of a "selective intervention" strategy. Virtually the entire British landing force that went ashore at San Carlos could be described in this manner. The Marine Brigade augmented by two Parachute Regiments were the core of the assault team. This force was further supplemented by elements of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and Special Air Squadron (SAS), two units which represent the most highly trained combat teams that Britain could put in the field.

Many have commented that the difference between the calibre of the troops fielded by the U.K. and Argentina was the difference in the war. Nott said: "The most important factor in the success of the task force was the skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual Servicemen."²⁸⁰ The San Carlos operation provides irrefutable evidence of this. The fact that the initial attack was carried out in the night and the beachhead secured before sunrise (a movement of several thousand men), without major incident, is testament to this fact.

OPERATION SUTTON also was a joint services venture. It combined the seamanship of the Royal Navy with the assault capabilities of both the Royal Marines and the British Army. During the days that followed, air units from these services

²⁷⁹Record, p.49.

²⁸⁰The Nott Report, p.16.

would also be employed in safeguarding and expanding the beachhead. While the contribution of the Royal Air Force (RAF) was minimal to the actual landing, its logistical support in the days leading up to the assault was vital. Thus, each branch played their part in this operation.

The exploitation of technological superiority was also a part of the San Carlos assault. In the initial night landing night vision goggles and thermal image indicators, both excellent sensors for the location of enemy positions in the dark, were used.²⁸¹ This was equipment that the Argentines did not share and contributed to the total surprise of the small garrison that had been deployed to defend the inlet.

Technology played an even bigger role in the air war that raged over the beachhead in the week immediately after the landing. Though Britain did not escape from this confrontation unscathed, many felt that the possession of certain weapons systems forced the Argentines into tactical situations that eventually contributed to their defeat. Captain C. H. Layman, RN who commanded the frigate HMS Argonaut cites such an example. In his opinion, the British possession of the Sea Dart, a surface-to-air missile known to be deadly to high and medium altitude targets forced the Argentines to make their attacks on the British shipping in San Carlos Water at low altitude. This, in turn, caused many of the Argentines bombs to not fuze on impact, thus the British Fleet was spared the loss of more than one ship by this advantage. Captain Layman spoke from experience, for the Argonaut itself took two bombs that never exploded.²⁸² One might also add that the lack of any Argentine electronic

²⁸¹Hastings and Jenkins, p. 176.

²⁸²Captain C. H. Layman, RN, "Duty in Bomb Alley", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 8 (August 1983), pp. 35-40.

counter-measures (ECM) capability, which could possibly have degraded the performance of the British weapons, was another factor that forced them out of their optimum weapon's delivery profiles.

One further area of technological superiority that impacted on the air defense around the San Carlos landing area is worthy of mention. This is the British possession of the Sea Harrier armed with the AIM-9L missile. Several writers have noted that this offered a significant advantage to Britain's aviators.²⁸³ Simply put, this weapon gave the British pilot the chance to achieve a kill on an enemy aircraft from any aspect while his Argentine counterpart was compelled to maneuver to his opponent's rear quarter before he could successfully launch his weapon. This divergence goes much of the way toward explaining the British 23 to 0 air-to-air kill ratio during the war.²⁸⁴

Exhibiting all of the necessary traits of "selective intervention", the San Carlos operation is one of which Britain is understandably proud. Though not without losses, due almost entirely to the air attacks on the beachhead after the landing, San Carlos remains the type of action through which limited wars are won. In Hastings and Jenkins words: "...this was a moment at which the British reaped the fruits of boldness."²⁸⁵

²⁸³For example see: Scheina, p.114; General T. B. Milton, USAF(Ret.), "Too Many Missing Pieces," Air Force, December 1982, p.49; and "British Cite Two Phases in Falklands Conflict," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 13, 1982, p.78.

²⁸⁴A complete listing of the British weapons performance is found in: The Nott Report, Annexes B & C, pp.45-46.

²⁸⁵Hastings and Jenkins, p.194.

C. IMPLEMENTING OBJECTIVES

Our attention now will turn to the conversion of the established political objectives into military action directed toward their fulfillment. In this area, we will concentrate on analyzing the understanding between the civilian and military authorities as to what the ultimate goals of the conflict would be and how these would be achieved. In the Falklands War the best way to approach this question is to look at the Rules of Engagement (ROE), within which the British operated in the South Atlantic, and examine their connection with the objectives that we earlier noted as underlying the decision to enter into armed hostilities. ROEs in this intervention are inseparable from the "exclusion zones" which the British declared around the disputed islands. Thus, our analysis will be on the reasoning behind their development and implementation.

The fact that the British felt that the Falklands conflict would be a sea war has already been well established. Such a war played into the strong suite of the United Kingdom and was also dictated by the distance of the disputed territory from the homeland. While the objectives of the U.K. was to assure the return of the Falklands to its administration and concurrently prove that aggression does not pay, there was also the feeling that this should be accomplished with a minimum loss of life. To operationalize the goals of their intervention and properly reflect the limitation that they were putting on themselves the British established "exclusion zones" around the Falklands. At first, the purpose was to exclude maritime assets only. Later, both an air and sea quarantine were emplaced surrounding the islands.

Defence Minister Nott explained the reason for these zones in this way:

"We engaged in intense and prolonged diplomatic activity in pursuit of a peaceful solution. But we could not depend upon it. We therefore took military steps intended to put pressure on Argentina to withdraw and to make possible our repossession of the Islands by force if that should ultimately prove necessary.... While diplomatic efforts continued the net was gradually drawn more tightly around the Argentine garrison on the Falklands."²⁸⁶

The British had no desire to attack the Argentine mainland. In fact Attorney General, Michael Havers, had declared that an attack on Argentina proper would be outside the diplomatic framework within which Britain was justifying the conflict.²⁸⁷ Therefore, the zones can be seen as the ultimate compromise between the political objectives/ limitations of the war and the need for appropriate military action through which it might be integrated and accomplished.

The initial zone to be put into effect was the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), announced on April 7th and activated on the 12th. It was based on a circle with a 200-mile radius centered on the Falklands and was designed to ward off shipping that might either reinforce the Argentine garrison or complicate the naval battle problem.²⁸⁸ Under its rules any vessel trying to penetrate the MEZ could be fired upon without warning by British units. The zone was justified by the arrival of the first of the RN's nuclear powered attack submarines, the HMS Spartan, on station in the South Atlantic. Its rules were drawn up to give the Argentines pause about sortying their naval forces too close to the Falklands and was designed to give the British SSN's room

²⁸⁶The Nott Report, p.5.

²⁸⁷This was UN Resolution 502 calling for Argentine withdrawal and Article 59 of the UN charter giving nations the right of self-defense. See: Hastings and Jenkins, p.162.

²⁸⁸Norman Friedman, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislearned," Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter 1983), p.922.

for maneuver, but in an area small enough to be credibly patrolled.

The MEZ was transformed into a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) on April 30th. This extended the blockade to both air and sea units within the same 200-mile radius of the islands. The announcement of the TEZ coincides with the arrival of the naval task force, including the two aircraft carriers, into the "war zone". It was really just an extension of the defense area that had been declared around the task force on April 23rd and was only a logical progression of the British desires to both safeguard their growing naval forces in the South Atlantic while increasing the pressure on the Argentines.

Through the imposition of the first two "exclusion zones" announcement from London had always proceeded implementation. This had given the conflict an almost unreal systematic aura. Such was not to be the case in the final expansion of the quarantined area.

By the end of April the efforts to end the Falklands crisis peacefully were nearing the end of their rope. In London, it was felt that the time for military action had arrived. South Georgia was reoccupied on the 25th yet, there was still no sign of the Argentines retreating from their gains of their own volition. In this situation, Buenos Aires certainly thought it could wait. Time was, literally, on its side as the Antarctic winter approached. Meanwhile, Britain craved action to maintain both their tactical momentum and the military pressure on Argentina.

The chance for a real blow at Buenos Aires was provided with the location of the the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by the nuclear attack sub HMS Conqueror on May 1st. This aging vessel was considered by the British to be one of the two most prestigious naval targets that their submarines could engage, the other being the Argentine carrier

Veinticinco de Mayo. Unfortunately, the ship was steaming outside of the TEZ so permission to attack had to be gained from London.²⁸⁹

A left-wing British magazine later claimed that there was a cover-up of the facts surrounding the sinking of the Belgrano. According to the New Statesman permission to attack this cruiser was part of an orchestrated attempt by the Thatcher Government to not only derail any remaining peace initiatives but, to push Britain toward total war for the Falklands.²⁹⁰ However, the attack on this cruiser is more likely explained by the fact that the British wanted, first to put Argentina's second largest naval unit out of commission and second to send an unmistakable message about its resolve to Buenos Aires. There is also ample evidence that Thatcher and her advisors did not believe that the ship would actually sink but, instead would be crippled with only a small loss of life.²⁹¹ Hence, on May 2nd the Conqueror was ordered to engage the Belgrano even though she remained outside the TEZ. This directive was carried out immediately and resulted in the quick capsizing of the cruiser with the loss of over 300 of her crew onboard.

This escalation of the war was greeted with much consternation around the world, providing a real lesson for those who would make rules limiting war and then disregard them. Though London formally justified the sinking by its earlier declaration of a "defense area" around the fleet (April 23rd), global reaction to the unexpected loss produced almost universal bewilderment and some bitterness. Argentina understandably attempted to exploit the British

²⁸⁹Phil Williams, "Miscalculation, Crisis Management and the Falklands Conflict," The World Today, April 1983, pp.148-149.

²⁹⁰"All Out War," New Statesman, August 24, 1984, p.8-10,14.

²⁹¹Hastings and Jenkins, p.164.

gaff. This effort prompted one of the more memorable quotes of the conflict attributed to Jorge Herrera Vegas, an Argentine spokesman at the United Nations: "Britain may not rule the waves, but she certainly waives the rules."²⁹²

The TEZ was extended to include all of the Atlantic west of the Falklands to within 12 miles of the Argentine coast on May 7th. This move was mandated by a combination of the international shock over the Belgrano incident and the sinking two days later of the British destroyer Sheffield by an Exocet air-to-surface missile launched from a Super Etendard aircraft. It was this zone that was to provide the "free fire" area for the remainder of the conflict.

In summary the use of the "exclusion zones" was an excellent integration of the capabilities of the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic and the political objectives for which the war was waged. With the notable exception of the sinking of the Belgrano it was used very systematically and effectively. Even in that case it was the civilian leadership that decided that the ship be engaged. Therefore, the implementation of the goals of the intervention, within the constraints of the limited war instrument, was well served by this arrangement.

D. ALLIES: RECRUITMENT AND RELATIONS AFTER ENTRY

In this section we will examine the relations between the United Kingdom and its "allies" during the Conduct phase of the war. This will include a look at the maintenance of support within the international community of the coalition that Britain had built prior to entry, as well as additions and deletions from it. While Britain realized that the prosecution of the war would always remain its own responsibility it, nevertheless, avidly sought to retain the

²⁹²Ibid, p.166.

foundation which justified its actions in the South Atlantic and in some instances provided the indirect military help needed to accomplish its objectives.

To note how important the survival of their blanket of international support was to London, one need only look at the British attitude toward the numerous "peace initiatives" that were put forward during the period before their actual reoccupation of the Falklands. In all of these situations it was important for the U.K. to avoid the appearance of intransigency, thereby retaining the role of an injured party which was only seeking retribution for the crime committed against it. An example of the paradox that this sometimes entailed is shown by the British attitude toward the plan developed by the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in mid-May 1982.

Perez de Cuellar's initiative was the last advanced before the British assault at San Carlos Water and it was extremely important to London that, on the verge of this major operation, they keep the solid support of the international community. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the Argentines were locked into a military solution for the islands, which Buenos Aires still apparently believed it could win. Hence, taking a chance, Thatcher told the Secretary General that she would agree to a United Nations administration of the islands if the Argentine forces would unilaterally withdraw. This was a significant retreat on her promise to "return the islands to British administration" and certainly represented a cost-benefit analysis of the issues involved. In this case, the risk of accepting a peace plan was probably unacceptable to Argentina, though it did not correspond with Britain's primary objective of the conflict, one weighed the risk of alienating its support on the international front. Therefore, the British accepted the plan in the hope that if, as a result, the conflict were

Government had plans to push the escalation of hostilities in the South Atlantic toward total war.³²⁰ According to its sources, a Polaris submarine was sent as far south as Ascension Island to provide the government with the option to foment a nuclear holocaust on the Argentines should the situation so warrant. The city of Cordoba in the northern part of that South American country was supposedly selected as the target for the first missile.³²¹ This was a prospect that the New Statesman understandably found disturbing.

While one can sympathize with the concern that the deployment of such weapons systems generate, it is not surprising that a Polaris sub may have been sent south to provide a possible augmentation for the conventional task force. Besides the awesome destructive potential that is inherent in a nuclear force deployment two other considerations are relevant to this situation. The foremost is the sheer coercive capability of such a deployment. However, a second factor could be that its deployment was a hedge against the surprise use of nuclear weapons by the Argentines. Though the fact that Buenos Aires covertly had the bomb was extremely unlikely, it was known to have long coveted the weapon and Britain could have merely been "covering its bets" with the dispatch of Polaris.³²² It is

³²⁰"All Out War," New Statesman, August 24, 1984, pp. 8-10, 14.

³²¹Ibid, p. 9.

³²²A potentially more interesting and still unaddressed question is whether the British task force sailed for the South Atlantic with nuclear ASW weapons on board and what the ROE was for their potential use in the case of a successful attack by an Argentine submarine on some high-value naval unit. The sinking of the QE II, Canberra, or an one of the British aircraft carriers would have been a hard felt blow in London. The response to such an event is a matter of conjecture. However, it can be assumed that normal loadouts for RN vessels probably include such weapons.

adverse effect on the South American forces morale. From a tactical standpoint Argentine positions around Goose Green only had to be screened from the primary British thrust to the east toward the politically strategic capital at Port Stanley. Instead, 2 Para was ordered to assault and occupy the substantial Argentine positions near the community. Hastings and Jenkins explain this decision as one that was made in London, where the political need for a victory in the wake of the naval losses at San Carlos became an overriding factor.³¹⁸

After a heated battle, lasting most of the day, 2 Para achieved the victory. Defence Minister Nott later recalled the dual significance of the battle:

"First it gave us a chance to assess the fighting qualities of the enemy. Second, and more importantly, by their outstanding performance against a numerically superior enemy 2 Para established a psychological ascendancy over the Argentines which our forces never lost."³¹⁹

We might also recall the psychological significance that the May 2nd sinking of the General Belgrano had on the later conduct of the naval war by the Argentines. This is a unquestionable instance where military pressure led toward the termination of hostilities. Hence, the use of conventional military pressure served the British well during the campaign. In the final section of this chapter we will look at its ability to finalize London's victory. But, first we must address the role of nuclear weapons in this conflict.

The evidence of the use of nuclear pressure during the war is scant. In fact there is only one open source that refers to their potential employment. This is the article in the New Statesman that purports that the Thatcher

³¹⁸Hastings and Jenkins, p.231.

³¹⁹The Nott Report, p.10.

This is easily understandable in regard to the British desire to avoid the necessity of having to completely reconquer the islands. Thus, the early uses of conventional forces by London ties in with the previously mentioned attempts to coerce Argentina into withdrawing from the Falklands. By staging operations that did not necessarily contribute to advancement toward their overall objectives the British hoped to convince Buenos Aires' of their ability and resolve to retake the contested territory.

We noted previously that the dispatch of the task force from the U.K. could have been much more of a diplomatic than military move. Another event that falls within this classification is the reoccupation of South Georgia by British forces on April 25th. There is little doubt that this island, far to the east of the Falklands, could have been bypassed by the British without serious strategic repercussion. However, its recapture met two British needs. First, it gave the U.K. a needed victory with which to start their campaign. Secondly, it sent a distinct message to Buenos Aires. In Nott's words: "The recapture of South Georgia dealt a psychological blow to the Argentine Government and provided clear evidence of the United Kingdom's resolve and willingness to resort to military action if other courses were closed."³¹⁶

Another example of conventional military pressure's use in the psychological realm was the May 28th attack of 2 Para on the Argentine positions at Darwin and Goose Green on East Falkland.³¹⁷ Again the purposes and effects of this attack were analogous to the earlier effort against South Georgia in that it gave the British a much needed victory and had a

³¹⁶The Nott Report, p.5.

³¹⁷2 Para was one of the two remaining battalions of the British Parachute Regiment. Along with its sister unit, 3 Para, it had been attached to 3 Commando Brigade for the Falklands operation.

C. TERMINATION AND MILITARY PRESSURE

In this section our purpose will be to look at the role that military pressure played in ending this war. The use of battlefield pressure has two purposes in this context. The first is the obvious tactical advantage that is drawn from successfully maintaining the momentum of one's own offensive operations. The second is the psychological toll that is forced on the enemy at both the political and military levels when he is compelled to continually fend off attacks.

The actual or threatened employment of two different types of weapons--conventional or nuclear-- can produce pressure on one's adversary. The former is the more often used (for obvious reasons) and achieves both the tactical and psychological benefits previously mentioned. However, nuclear weapons, in limited wars, must be categorized as more often falling into the psychological realm. This fact is particularly true in situations of nuclear monopoly, a circumstance which the Falklands War exhibited quite well. Here, one nuclear armed power, Britain, faced a non-nuclear foe, Argentina. Thus, the British had the escalatory capacity to substantially outdistance their adversaries. But, before we discuss the role that nuclear weapons played in this conflict let us consider the arena where the war was actually won, the conventional battlefield.

Conventional military pressure was used by the British throughout the war. Although, it would ultimately be the vehicle through which the conflict would be terminated, in the early stages of the confrontation, this type of action was utilized more for its effect on the psychological front.

Hurting Argentine Morale, U.S. Officials State," Wall Street Journal, May 26, 1982, p.2.

"<The> expansion of the exclusion zone to all but a 12-mile strip...off the Argentine mainland was reinforced by the British torpedoing of the...cruiser General Belgrano <and thus>, effectively decoupled Argentina's naval power from the conflict."³¹²

The date of the defeat of the combined Argentine air arm is much harder to pin down. Certainly, one could say that its high water mark was during the late May days following the San Carlos landing when, over a period of less than a week, four British ships were sunk (HMS Ardent-21st, HMS Antelope-23rd, and HMS Coventry and SS Atlantic Conveyor-25th). In a later interview, Sea Harrier pilot "Fred" Fredrickson intimated that the performance of the Argentine aviators went down markedly after the first few days of combat.³¹³ This is attributable to the attrition of experienced aircrews, the technologically superior British anti-air weapons systems, and the increasingly difficult mission which the Argentine fliers were facing.

Hastings and Jenkins argue that May 25th marked the turning point of the air war.³¹⁴ Up until this day, the Argentines had been pounding the British shipping near San Carlos Water. Yet, after the accomplishments of the Latin airmen on the 25th, it would be two weeks before another British ship was sunk through attack from the air. Though it was not apparent at the time, the war in the Falklands had progressed irretrievably into the Termination phase after the successful defense of the San Carlos beachhead. In fact, some experts outside of the United Kingdom were already predicting the imminent end of the war.³¹⁵

³¹²Commander Robert J. Kelsey, "Maneuvering in the Falklands," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 108, No. 9 (September 1982), p.37.

³¹³"British Cite Two Phases to the Falklands Conflict," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 13, 1982, p.78.

³¹⁴Hastings and Jenkins, p.228.

³¹⁵For example see: "U.K. Advances in the Falklands Are

significant integrated attack from the Argentine military. In fact, after their amphibious seizure and military consolidation of the "Malvinas" the South Americans conducted no more sizable coordinated operations during the war. The Argentine services were thus left to confront Britain individually and with significantly reduced chances of success. The initiation of the actual termination of this war can therefore be tied to a pair of events. The first is the defeat of the Argentine surface navy and the second is the effective neutralization of its combined air force and naval air arms.

The subdual of Buenos Aires' navy is traceable to a single event, the sinking of the General Belgrano on May 2, 1982. After this catastrophe the Argentine surface fleet never dared to sortie from the relative safety of its coastal waters. This limitation downgraded the ability of Argentina to successfully defend their gains in the South Atlantic, particularly when the battle was being waged in excess of 400 miles from their mainland bases. The inability of its aircraft carrier, diesel attack submarines, and Exocet armed escorts to continually challenge the British task force must be considered one of the more significant tactical events of the war.

The psychological shock that the loss of the Belgrano had on the Argentines is now well understood. Secretary Nott matter of factly noted that after its sinking "major Argentine units remained within 12 miles of the Argentine coast and took no further part in the campaign."³¹¹ However, Commander Robert J. Kelsey's analysis was more to the point. He stated:

³¹¹The Nott Report, p. 7.

would say, "is honor UN Security Council Resolution 502."³⁰⁹ Yet, in the end, the Argentines saw fit to disregard this edict. Britain was, therefore, compelled to take action beyond the realm of diplomatic pressure to continue the pursuit of its goals.

B. INITIATING TERMINATION

One could argue that the Termination phase of this conflict began not long after hostilities were actually joined. The Haig mission and the proposals forwarded by President Terry Belaunde of Peru and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar of the United Nations were all attempts to end the Falklands/Malvinas War before it could run its full course. Unfortunately, these attempts failed, though Britain expressed interest in varying degrees to all. It was destined that negotiations would not end this struggle, for it would be decided on the battlefield.

The British dispatch of their carrier and amphibious task force to the South Atlantic can also be interpreted as a move toward conflict termination in the sense that it was not merely deployed for combat but, as a show of resolve. It was initially hoped that this would be enough to send the Argentines home. Thus, the original motivation for sending the RN south could well have been more diplomatic than military.³¹⁰ However, like the attempts at negotiation, diplomatic/political coercion was eventually to fail.

This left Britain with no alternative but to militarily defeat Argentina in the contested theatre of operations surrounding the Falklands, a process that was to take almost two months. As one looks back, it now seems amazing that the U.K. was able to reoccupy the islands without meeting a

³⁰⁹Hastings and Jenkins, p. 101.

³¹⁰Ibid, p. 336.

steadfastly steer the United Kingdom through even the bleak days when the Argentine air attacks were pounding the Royal Navy near the San Carlos beachhead. In retrospect, one must credit the Prime Minister with forthrightly directing the United Kingdom during this crisis by refusing to muddle the issues or related indicators for which the war was respectively fought and judged. Even when she was forced to gamble to hold international support, by tentatively accepting a negotiating position that endorsed some form of third party administration for the Falklands, she firmly stuck to her demand that the Argentine military must go.³⁰⁷ Of course, her bets on both occasions were hedged on a belief that eventually the self-determination of the islanders would be respected and that the Argentine Junta would continue to prove itself incapable of diplomatic flexibility. However, one must agree with Alistair Horne's declaration soon after the war: "...Mrs. Thatcher's simple, iron determination to act on principle has been both steady and infectious."³⁰⁸

Britain was able to stick to the demand for the withdrawal of all of the Argentine forces on the Falklands because of UN Security Council Resolution 502 which also called for the unilateral departure of Buenos Aires' troops. Thus, the U.K. could hold its "bottom line" and concurrently look to the accomplishment of its objectives while not appearing overly intransigent. This is why "502" was such a diplomatic coup for London. As the war progressed Mrs. Thatcher could easily intone her conditions for the termination of hostilities. "All the Argentines have to do," she

³⁰⁷One example of this was the previously mentioned Perez de Cuellar plan the other was the Peruvian peace plan which was an issue in early May. For details see: Henderson, p.35.

³⁰⁸Alistair Horne, "A British Historian's Meditations," National Review, July 23, 1982, p.888-889.

the goals for which it was fought have been accomplished. The segregation of the indicators of objective accomplishment from the goals to which they attest is often a problem for both the political and military leadership. This complication is, in itself, indicative of a weak understanding of what the intervention is meant to accomplish. It is to the credit of the British hierarchy that they avoided this pitfall.

The objectives of London from the day that Argentina invaded the Falklands were to see the islands returned to their administration and to assure that overt aggression was shown to be an empty international tool. Also, from this first day the British demanded one condition before they would consider any comprehensive negotiations on conflict termination, the withdrawal of the Argentine military from the archipelago. Therefore, it is the author's contention that Argentine withdrawal was the indicator that the Thatcher Government was employing in their analysis of the progress of the intervention.

This was a valid signal because the abandonment of the islands by the Argentines would, in almost every case, be a precursor to some semblance of increased British control over the Falklands due to the desires of the local populace. Also, any retreat by Buenos Aires would accomplish the goal of successfully resisting open aggression. Thus, this position provided a simplistic and all encompassing signal of goal accomplishment to which London could easily adhere.

That Prime Minister Thatcher stubbornly stuck to the unequivocal demand that Argentina withdraw from the islands was a source of strength to some and a signal of inflexibility to others.³⁰⁶ However, in light of her eventual success, Mrs. Thatcher must be commended on her ability to

³⁰⁶For evidence of the consistency of her stand see: Haig, pp. 271-272, 286, and 292.

IX. THE FALKLANDS WAR: TERMINATION

In this final chapter on the Falklands War we will consider the conclusion of this conflict. Unlike our earlier case study on the Korean War, this intervention in the South Atlantic was ended by a complete military triumph on the contested ground. In the lexicon of the Limited War Model, its termination was "dictated". However, like all such wars there were attempts to both negotiate with and/or pressure the enemy into capitulation before the conflict ran its full course. It is an understanding of these attempts and their relation to the established British objectives that we will now analyze.

Our examination will be divided into four sections. In the first, we will look at the indicator that was used to signal the successful accomplishment of objectives by the British. This will be followed by an analysis of some of the initial attempts to end the war. The third section will deal with military pressure and its relationship to conflict termination. Both conventional and nuclear options will be considered in this area. This chapter will then close with the actual termination of hostilities and an assessment of the United Kingdom's performance in the war in relation to its original establishment of goals.

A. MEASURING OBJECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT

Our concern in this section will be with analyzing the indicator(s) used by the British to signal the accomplishment of the objectives in entering the conflict. This is of obvious importance for the successful termination of a conflict cannot be contemplated until one is certain that

most notably, the AIM-9L missile and the utilization of American communication and relay facilities.³⁰⁵

With the addition of the U.S., London now confronted the Argentines with an almost solid support from the West. This coalition now spelled doom for Buenos Aires' ambitions in the Falkland Islands. The only questions remaining were: How much time would it take for Britain to reoccupy the archipelago? And, what would be the cost in lives and material?

E. SUMMATION

This ends our treatment of the Conduct phase of the Falklands conflict. We have traced the conversion of British objectives in this war to their translation into military action. This entailed both the mobilization of the elements necessary to properly pursue London's goals in the South Atlantic--the requisitioning of merchant ships--and the development and implementation of a system that correctly reflected those goals in a military reality--the use of "exclusion zones". The utilization of the technique of "selective intervention" has also been examined, in relation to the landing at San Carlos Water, and its effectiveness noted. Finally, the relationship and recruitment of "allies" has been analyzed during the conduct of the war. We will now look at the British attempts to end this war on terms favorable to its interests.

³⁰⁵For example see: "Sidewinder Deliveries," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 31, 1982, p.20 "U.S. Supplying Arms to British, Sources Say," Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1982, p.2 and Hastings and Jenkins, p.142.

the Americans.³⁰⁰ Thus, Washington was never as neutral as either it or the British claimed.

During the month of April Haig traversed from London to Buenos Aires several times hoping to achieve a diplomatic coup that would avoid war. As his mission time and again was broken between the rocks of belligerent intransigence and indecisiveness the Secretary slowly began to realize that the U.S. would soon be offered no choice but to side with London against the aggressive actions of the Junta.³⁰¹ He even confided his doubts to London's ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, noting the "irrational and chaotic nature of the Argentine leadership."³⁰² By the end of the month, his negotiating attempt in a shambles (though not from lack of effort), Haig announced the official U.S. tilt toward Britain.³⁰³ This included the imposition of economic sanctions and the pledge that the United States would "respond positively to requests for material support by for the British forces."³⁰⁴ The U.K. would later use this blank check to acquire both hardware and services that were of substantial use in the Falklands,

³⁰⁰"U.S. Said to Aid British Forces," New York Times, April 13, 1982, p.1.

³⁰¹Haig's story is best told by himself. See: Chapter 13 "The Falklands: 'Do Not Urge Britain to Reward Aggression'" in Caveat, pp. 261-299.

³⁰²Sir Nicholas Henderson, "America and the Falklands," Economist, November 12, 1983, p.34.

³⁰³This decision hurt U.S. relations with many of its hemispheric neighbors. For example see: Warren Hage, "U.S. Strategy Irks Latins," New York Times, May 5, 1982, p.19; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Sees Setback To Its Latin Ties," New York Times, May 23, 1982, p.1; "OAS Without U.S. Predicted as Result of Falklands War," Baltimore Sun, May 26, 1982, p.4; and Louis Witnitzer, "Falklands: Military, Diplomatic Impact Beyond Islands," Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1982, p.7.

³⁰⁴"Transcript of Remarks By Haig on Falklands," New York Times, May 1, 1982, p.8.

disproportionate attack by the U.K.²⁹⁷ One could well argue that the difference between the "alliance" structures of these two belligerents was a major determinant of both the short duration and outcome of this war.

If Britain was encouraged by the success that it was enjoying with its European allies it also found the U.S. decision to retain a neutral position at the beginning of the conflict disconcerting. The efforts of Secretary Haig to arbitrate the crisis were received with a slight chill by Thatcher's Government because it felt that its position regarding the Falklands was bedded in untouchable moral turf. Hastings and Jenkins state that "there remained one large blot on the British diplomatic escutcheon as the task force set sail...the United States."²⁹⁸ Though London decided to give the American Secretary a chance to resolve the crisis, it was determined early on to, at least initially, not back away from the formula set forth in UN Resolution 502; Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands followed by negotiations over the islands. Meanwhile, the British hoped to woo the U.S. into overt support.

In fact, British fears about the "rock bottom" interests of Washington were misplaced. The U.S. had already sided with them in the UN on "502" and sympathy in America was, though not unanimous, strongly tilted toward London.²⁹⁹ In addition, the U.S. continued to "assist" Britain in areas where there were "agreements". This included the supply of jet fuel to U.K. aircraft stopping over at the Ascension Island airbase, a facility owned by the British but, run by

²⁹⁷"Excerpts From OAS Resolution on the War," New York Times, May 30, 1982, p.16.

²⁹⁸Hastings and Jenkins, p.103.

²⁹⁹For a good example of pro-British sentiment see: Marvin Stone "Britain and Argentina: Equal Friends?," U.S. News & World Report, April 26, 1982, p.92.

to end any UN oversight would respect the right of self-determination for the islanders and eventually return the Falklands to some association with the Crown.²⁹³ It was probably somewhat to the relief of the Thatcher Cabinet that Buenos Aires subsequently rejected the plan. However, this course of action is indicative of the emphasis that Britain put on the maintenance of international support.

In fact, British attempts to maintain their international consensus throughout the war were well rewarded. European support remained fairly solid with sanctions being renewed by the EEC on May 17th, for an additional week, and then extended indefinitely. This was accomplished with the adherence of all but two of the membership of the "Common Market", with Italy and Ireland refusing renewal. Such a show of "community solidarity" was unusual for the Europeans and certainly reflects the success of the diplomatic effort which Whitehall made.²⁹⁴

European help, at times, went beyond that of just an economic boycott. The British were known to be understandably upset when the Exocet missiles that France had sold the Argentines sank the Sheffield on May 4th.²⁹⁵ Yet, it was later revealed that the French were very cooperative in helping Britain to effectively counter the sea-skimming missile.²⁹⁶ Overall, one must conclude that the help that London received from its regional allies far outweighed that accorded Argentina, which waited until May 29th before the OAS even voted to condemn the "unwarranted and

²⁹³Hastings and Jenkins, p. 172-173.

²⁹⁴Daoudi and Dajani, p. 151-152.

²⁹⁵For example see: The Sunday Times Insight Team, "Did the French Connection Sink the Sheffield?", The Sunday Times, May 9, 1982, p.1.

²⁹⁶"Helping Britain Cope With the Exocet," Newsweek, July 5, 1982, p. 17.

unlikely that the true movements of the U.K.'s SSBNs during this period will ever be known because the success of the British on the ground made any debate over their use moot.

D. FINALIZING AND JUDGING TERMINATION

The Termination phase of the Falklands War entered its final period when the campaign to recapture Port Stanley opened in earnest on May 30th. On this day, elements of 3 Commando Brigade secured both Mt. Kent and Mt. Challenger guarding the western approaches to this small village that served as the capital of the Falklands. This effectively isolated what remained of the Argentine East Falkland occupation force on the small peninsula leading to Port Stanley.

Ten days later, reinforced by the arrival of 5 Brigade, an assault was made on the high ground dominating the capital, less than a six miles away. Dislodging the Argentine forces from their well-prepared defensive positions was a difficult task but, the ability of the British to stage an integrated attack from the ground, air, and sea had long ago disheartened the Argentines. When the Scots Guards captured Tumbledown Mountain from an Argentine Marine battalion, most further organized resistance ended. On June 14th, faced with an impossible tactical situation General Menendez, Argentine Governor of the Malvinas, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore, RM, commander of all British ground forces. With this act the Argentine occupation of the Falklands ended. Argentine prisoners of war were repatriated shortly thereafter.

When Mr. Rex Hunt was returned as Civil Commissioner of the Falklands for the Crown on June 25th, the primary objective of Britain in its campaign for the Falklands was realized. We can also say that the complete removal of all the Argentine occupation forces set a precedent against the use

of overt aggression. Thus, it can be safely stated that Britain accomplished all of the goals which it had set for itself before the war.

The cost of the war to the United Kingdom was not insignificant, 255 British servicemen were killed and another 777 were wounded.³²³ Furthermore, the cost of the operation totaled 700 million British pounds while the replacement price of all the lost and damaged equipment approached another 900 million British pounds. However, in the wake of the war, few in Britain questioned the price as much as they savored the victory.

In conclusion, the Falklands War provides an excellent example of the employment of limited war in our contemporary era. Though its Entry, Conduct, and Termination phases were not without mistakes, the final accounting must reflect a job well-done by both the British political and military authorities. Having now completed our examination of this conflict we can address the summation of this study. It is in the next and final chapter that this will be done.

³²³Hastings and Jenkins, p.316. For purposes of comparison this was approximately one-third of total British casualties in the Korean War.

X. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter our purpose will be to scrutinize both the applicability and validity of the Limited War Model presented earlier in this work. It was in this context that the two case studies undertaken were directed. Now, after their completion, we can compare their relationship to our theoretical paradigm.

In general, the finding of our study is that the model presented does offer some insight into the understanding of the selected examples of limited war. Thus, it is anticipated that it would be of value in future policy making and instrumentation. However, these results are not without some qualification, a fact that will become clearer later in this summation.

To organize the findings of this study for easy reference and systematic consideration we will readdress each of the questions developed in Chapter 3 as the vehicle through which the model could be tested. Each inquiry will be presented and then discussed in turn. This will be followed by a short summation offering some overall thoughts on the applicability of the model. We will then conclude with a few ideas that, in the course of the study, were thought to merit further consideration.

A. REVIEW OF QUESTIONS

1. Entry

1. What were the principle considerations in the decision to employ armed intervention?
 - a) Political
 - b) Military

In this area the two cases showed both divergencies and similarities. While the United States was significantly influenced by its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union as it contemplated entry into the Korean conflict, Britain was little affected by the ramifications of the East-West struggle in its deliberations surrounding the Falklands. Because of this, one gets the impression that the perceived stakes of the Korean War were higher than those played for in the Falklands. This is evidenced by the participation of a far larger number of nations in the Korean intervention than in the later South Atlantic War.

These differences can be explained in part by the fact that these wars existed in international contexts that were significantly different from each other. It would seem that wars fought with limited means for limited ends are not so much a product of the issues at hand as of the international environment in which they exist. This observation lends support to the continuing need to prepare for the possibility of limited war.

In the ledger of similarities we find that both our actors felt that the defense of abstract principles, specifically self-determination and the resistance of aggression, were worth defending, though only with limited means. There would seem to be a connection between the waging of war for precedent and the devotion of political and material resources in its furtherance. This is evidenced by the commitment of both the actors studied to limit, at least initially, its military response to a carefully orchestrated conventional intervention. We can also say that both had real concerns about the impact that the war might have on their national prestige and to some extent their position in the world.

On the military side there was also both divergence and similarity. The difference was primarily one of the

relative size of each actor's military establishment. Obviously, the U.S. had a much larger and somewhat more flexible force and troop matrix than did Britain at their time of crisis. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that each took a military machine to war that had been significantly reduced in the preceding years in both manpower and material. Perhaps a more intriguing fact is that neither let this deter their taking action of a military nature in an area perceived as being of vital interest.

2. Were these considerations translated into clearly established objectives at the outset of the conflict?

The answer to this inquiry is a qualified yes. It is evident that objectives were roughly established by the political authorities early in their deliberations. However, it would appear that they were not always clearly understood by all with a role in their eventual pursuit. This was noted specifically in the Korean case and will be addressed in more depth in the review of the Conduct phase.

Overall one could say that the American and British decision-makers were well aware of both the political and military issues and constraints as they considered their possible entry into war. If there was a shortcoming it was in the area of clarity. It has often been demonstrated that political authorities will use a purposely muddled elucidation of goals to leave room for later maneuver. Though this hedging technique is sometimes useful, it can also chart the decision-maker's course for unknown waters, a fact that was demonstrated in this study.

3. Is there evidence that the actor assessed its political/military will and capability to out perform its opponent in a "competition in risk-taking before entering into the conflict?

Again, with some qualification, we can say that in each of our cases some assessment of risk was made. A further related observation is that the ability to adequately assess risk is a function of time available. In this regard, it was much easier for the British, who were involved in a long process of escalation toward an actual entry into large-scale hostilities than for the Americans whose initial deliberations on intervention lasted less than a week. The obvious lesson is that accurate long-range intelligence is mandatory to avoid pitfalls in crisis situations.

It would also be no exaggeration to say that in both cases the early risk assessments of the decision-makers lagged significantly behind events. Strategic preconception and miscalculation had a substantial impact in this area. However, one factor does seem to be very clear, that each actor considered the risk of non-action much more dangerous than the risk of the wrong action. This is the paradox of the "lessons of Munich" crisis management parallel in action. Both Britain and the United States ultimately decided to enter a "competition in risk-taking" at the level of fairly large-scale conventional military action. This, in their view, properly matched the interest involved with the chance they were willing to take.

The allies of the prospective opponent were also considered in the decision to enter into armed hostility. This was much more of a factor in the Korean situation than in the later Falklands crisis. The fact that the former was seen as more of an ideological struggle than the latter explains this difference.

4. Were allies sought before entry? Why and at what price?

In the Entry phase of both conflicts "allies" were sought before military involvement. An interesting aspect of this action is that neither of our highlighted actors expected or, indeed, wanted large amounts of material assistance. This is due in part to the fact that each desired the freedom to maneuver for its individual interests yet, coveted the cloak of international justification. Therefore, both made the effort to court international public opinion. This was one area where, in both cases, the results achieved by the respective diplomats were helpful and of impressive longevity.

2. Conduct

1. Were the objectives established during the Entry phase translated into the political/military action necessary for the successful prosecution of the war?

In both of the cases studied our subjects quickly diagnosed and reacted to the type of war that both the situation offered and that they wished to fight. In Korea this was principally a conventional, ground oriented, battlefield with supporting operations from both sea and air assets. In the Falklands the war was projected to be initially a struggle for sea control and eventually one in which the ability of each belligerent to project its power across the ocean and into the contested archipelago would be decisive.

Once the type of combat had been determined we saw both our actors attempt to mobilize the resources necessary for the successful prosecution of their objectives. Though an attempt was not made to tell the entire story of this process in either war, we did note some specific examples of the type of activity for which we were searching. For instance, the concerted effort to tailor and/or improvise the military forces available within the existing time

constraints for action showed an understanding of the need to promptly seek objectives through action. We also saw attempts to maximize any inherent escalatory capability, though this was always implemented within the framework of a concern for the restraint on the use of force. Both the U.S. and U.K. get fairly high marks in their initial military reaction to the war although, the tactical results of their early combat did not always reflect the earnestness of their efforts.

2. Did one side possess technological superiority at the beginning of the conflict? If so, how did it exploit this advantage?

In both cases technological superiority was existent and exploited. This was much more apparent in the Korean case where the enemy had only a small air force and navy. In fact, as a Naval officer, it was interesting to note that naval superiority was utilized with great benefit in both conflicts. The advantages it generated in power projection and mobility were helpful in Korea and decisive in the Falklands. Air power and, in the latter conflict, missile technology also were offered good examples of the use of this type of advantage.

3. Was a form of "selective intervention" employed on the actual battlefield? Were joint service operations utilized?

It can easily be argued that the foremost battlefield victories of each of the conflicts we studied stemmed from an operation that used the fundamentals of "selective intervention". Jeffrey Record correctly notes that both these wars proved the continuing viability of amphibious

assault.³²⁴ It might also be added that the success of these efforts was grounded in an almost complete naval superiority, highlighting the advantages inherent and the flexibility provided by a "balanced" sea service.

Specially trained and/or "elite" forces were also much in evidence in these conflicts. The uses and the impact of these types of troops are never so apparent as on the limited battlefield where individual elements often have an amplified impact on the strategic equation. Marine, commando, and parachute forces combined with well-trained airmen and seamen to give a significant lift to the probability of success in each of these wars and also to prove the potential of carefully planned and implemented joint service operations.

4. Were any of the original objectives changed during the course of the war? Why?

Our conclusions must be somewhat mixed and tentative on this question. In Korea there is substantial evidence that the U.S. military leadership in the field misunderstood the priorities of their political and military counterparts in Washington. Thus, it seemed to some that the objectives of the war were changed in midstream. However, it is the author's contention that what changed was not so much the goal as the indicator used to signal its accomplishment. The classic case in this regard was the controversy surrounding the crossing of the 38th parallel and the push toward the Yalu in Korea. The relief of General Douglas MacArthur was one result of this situation and will long be remembered for the doubts it raised concerning the battlefield strategy best suited to a limited war.

³²⁴Jeffrey Record, "The Falklands War," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1982), p.48.

In contrast, Britain was able to stand firmly by its objectives throughout the duration of its war. Of course, it is hard to say if this would have been possible had the Falklands conflict lasted for the three years experienced in Korea. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom must be commended on the consistency of its position. Credit for this ultimately falls to the exhibition of personal resolve shown by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

5. Were allies sought after entry into the conflict?
Why and under what pretext or arrangement?

Relations with "allies" were important to our actors during the Conduct phase of each conflict. The most important consideration was always the maintenance of international justification that such support exemplified. However, neither the U.S. or the U.K. was willing to substantially alter its objectives in the conflict to retain support, though both showed a willingness to, at times, soften its rhetoric and public image to augment such efforts.

3. Termination

1. Were measures or tactical goals developed to indicate the achievement of objectives? What were they?

The concept of the segregation of goals and their related indicators, in general, appears little understood though it was evidenced at times our study. The problems of the United States in Korea stemmed, in a real way, from its changing of the indicators (e.g. reaching the 38th parallel, crossing the 38th parallel, destroying the army of North Korea, reaching the Kansas-Wyoming line, etc.) through which it judged its success in the conflict. The United Kingdom, which retained a single and simplistic indicator (the

withdrawal/removal of the Argentine occupation force on the Falklands), had considerably less trouble.

Washington's failure to set forth an unmistakable single or set of indicator(s) caused a great deal of consternation both for their commanders in Korea and for the public at home. While the Korean situation was much more complex than that which surrounded the Falklands it did not defy this type of systematic organization. The failure to accomplish this led to repercussions that were most serious.

2. Was a periodic assessment made of the progress toward objectives?

The answer to this inquiry is obviously much dependent on the one preceding. For this reason, its answer in the Korean case must be a somewhat qualified no. Because the indicators seemingly changed on several occasions and no attempt was made to provide a vehicle through which they could be cross-referenced, such a periodic assessment became impossible. Hence, "ad hoc" analysis was employed as the only alternative until the stalemate of the late stages of the war forced both sides to end the conflict, due in part to sheer exhaustion.

In the British case the assessment of progress toward objectives was distinctly tied to efforts to militarily terminate the conflict. Since the U.K. was faced with a situation where they were forced to defeat the Argentine services one by one, termination was gauged through tactical progress. As long as the political support which backing the intervention did not waver this was a simple and effective formula.

3. When the initial objectives were reached was war termination sought?

Again we are faced with an inquiry that is dependent on the answer to its predecessor and in the case of the U.S. the answer must again be no. The success of the Inchon landing with the strategic momentum it produced offered the first opportunity for the U.S. to seriously consider termination on terms very favorable to their goals. It was a change of indicators that prohibited this. In retrospect, it can be safely assumed that, had the American decision-makers realized that Communist China would enter the war, this would have been the course they would have taken. Unfortunately, a miscalculation cost the U.S. a chance for an earlier and possibly more meaningful victory.

The British, faced with a situation where their conflict could only be ended on the battlefield, could not initiate termination until the Argentine garrison had been either withdrawn or forced to leave. Thus, we can place the initiation of the termination of the Falklands War at the time when two of the three Argentine service arms had been beaten and the garrison alone was left on the islands. The author contends that this was on or shortly after May 25th.

4. Under what condition in relation to the original stated objectives was the conflict ended?

Both our case studies can be judged as "successful" in that they accomplished most of their originally stated objectives. In Korea, the survival of the ROK was assured and the line against Communism and overt aggression was drawn and adequately defended. The only failure was the ability to keep the war limited to its initial participants. The entry of the PRC was thus somewhat of a setback, though the fact that the war remained "limited" can be interpreted positively.

Britain's success was complete. The islands were returned to British administration and the aggression of the

Argentines was revenged. It was a conflict that, in the view of the U.K., could not have turned out much better.

5. Was the employment of nuclear weapons ever considered? If so, under what circumstances?

We can definitively say that the use of nuclear weapons was contemplated in Korea. This began with contingency planning soon after the invasion by the North and went as far as veiled nuclear coercion later in the conflict. Many credit the latter action as being crucial to the final Communist agreement to end hostilities on the peninsula.

The evidence of the role that the contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons played in the Falklands War is murky. It would not be surprising to find that they were considered as some type of contingency. However, the rumor published about the movement of a Polaris sub toward the South Atlantic is the only evidence we have. The fact is that the British conventional forces enjoyed such great success that nuclear coercion was never even remotely needed.

6. How was the conflict terminated?

Our two case studies exemplified different modes of termination. The war in Korea was ended with a negotiated settlement while the Falklands conflict was ended by complete military victory. However, both employed the use of military pressure in their closing stages.

We have already mentioned the role of nuclear weapons in the termination of the Korean War. Also, conventional pressure was also used to speed the end of this conflict, the bombing of the irrigation dam complex north of Pyongyang being a good case in point. In the Falklands military pressure began on the psychological level, in the hope of avoiding the necessity of having to invade and

reconquer the islands. Yet, to bring the war to an end, a military campaign against the capital at Port Stanley was mandated to "dictate" the close of the conflict to the obstinate Argentines.

B. FINAL THOUGHTS

In conclusion, we can say that the Limited War Model provides an interesting insight into the decision-making process surrounding the utilization of the limited war instrument. Though far from perfect, it provides a possible starting point for understanding this type of war. Before we close, several other comments and suggestions for further study merit mention.

First, it is not surprising to find that the step-by-step progression of the model does not conform to the time constraints that are often associated with crisis-management. Hence, decisions made concerning entry into a limited war may well be overlapped (e.g. objective or goal formulation might have to be considered simultaneously with the assessment of risk). However, in such situations the model still offers a guide that is relevant to the decision-maker. If nothing else, it provides a checklist for the review formulation after initial deliberation. Concern about overlap within the model is especially applicable to the Conduct and Termination phases. Here the interaction between events in the field and political maneuvering to end a conflict becomes extremely complex. This is one area where much more theoretical work could be done.

Second, after completing the two case studies a thought advanced much earlier seemed to be confirmed. This is that the Entry phase of a limited war is by far the most important. The decisions made during this time period impact all further considerations and actions in the conflict. Thus,

one should be not only deliberately cautious but, foresighted while acting in this phase. This is accomplished by projecting the policy alternatives through a theoretical assessment of their possible impact on later events prior to implementation. In this endeavor consultation of this model might be of some use. Without question, this is an inexact science, yet an undertaking that should be made to the greatest extent possible.

Finally, one other idea became apparent while working on the case studies. This was that they are both ripe for Allisonian analysis, a fact particularly true of the Korean War where the declassification of many documents in the mid-1970's makes the prospect of such a study appear extremely interesting. The Falklands War also would offer an intriguing, though probably much less source fertile, ground for study because the Allisonian technique is less often applied to non-American cases.

This ends our attempt to present and analyze the Limited War Model. The problem of war, and in today's world "limited war", promises to be ever present. One can only hope that this effort contributed to its understanding in some small way.

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